Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Network Throughput and Reliability: Preventing Hazards and Attacks Through Gaming—Part 2: A Research Agenda

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Game Theoretic Analysis of Congestion, Safety and Security

Part of the book series: Springer Series in Reliability Engineering ((RELIABILITY))

Abstract

It is clear from the discussions in the previous chapter that, while there has been work done on improving network throughput and reliability, only a plethora of literature discusses a unified model to address both hazards and attacks. This is the motivation behind the previous chapter and the current one, where an attempt is made to bridge this gap. In spite of our initial modeling and computational experiments, no one has yet established the formal conditions under which a Pareto Nash equilibrium exists to prevent both hazards and attacks. Such an equilibrium includes the necessary posturing to discourage terrorist attacks, and to perform preventive maintenance and upgrade on our critical civil infrastructure ahead of a hazard. Meanwhile, general principles of how to best defend systems of specific types against intelligent attacks are emerging that can help system managers to allocate resources to best defend their systems. The research framework outlined in this chapter will gain insights into hazards and attack mitigation for a variety of infrastructure networks. In addition, there is much that can be done in the behavioral science perspective.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  1. Aliprantis CD, Chakrabarti SK (2000) Games and decision making. Oxford University Press, New York

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  2. Antoniou J, Pitsillides A (2012) Game theory in communication networks: cooperative resolution of interactive networking scenarios. CRC Press, Boca Raton

    Google Scholar 

  3. Bell MGH (2003) The use of game theory to measure the vulnerability of stochastic networks. IEEE Trans Reliab 52(1):63–68

    Article  Google Scholar 

  4. Bell MGH, Kanturska U, Schmocker J-D, Fonzone A (2008) Attacker-defender models and road network vulnerability. Roy Soc Lond Philos Trans A Math Phys Eng Sci 366:1893–1906

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  5. Braess D (1968) Uber ein paradoxen der verkehrsplanung. Unternehmensforschu 12:258–268

    MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  6. Cannon-Bowers JA, Salas E (2001) Reflection on shared cognition. J Organ Behav 22:195–202

    Article  Google Scholar 

  7. Cappanera P, Scaparra MP (2011) Optimal allocation of protective resources in shortest-path networks. Transp Sci 45:64–80

    Article  Google Scholar 

  8. Castrillo DP, Wettstein D (2000) Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value. Working Paper 461.00, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Spain

    Google Scholar 

  9. Chan Y (2005) Location, transport and land-use: modelling spatial-temporal information. Springer, Berlin, 930 pp (with Web-based software)

    Google Scholar 

  10. Chan Y, McCarthy J (in press) Game-theoretic paradigms in collaborative research: part 1—theoretical background. Int J Soc Syst Sci

    Google Scholar 

  11. Chan Y, McCarthy J (in press) Game-theoretic paradigms in collaborative research: part 2—experimental design. Int J Soc Syst Sci

    Google Scholar 

  12. Chan Y, Yim E, Marsh A (1997) Exact and approximate improvement to the throughput of a stochastic network. IEEE Trans Reliab 46(4):473–486

    Article  Google Scholar 

  13. Cominetti R, Correa JR, Stier-Moses NE (2009) The impact of oligopolistic competition in networks. Oper Res 57:1421–1437

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  14. Croxton KL, Gendron B, Magnanti TL (2007) Variable disaggregation in network flow problems with piecewise linear costs. Oper Res 55(1):146–157

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  15. Dai JG, Lin W (2007) Maximum pressure policies in stochastic processing networks. Oper Res 55(4):662–673

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  16. Del Vecchio JR, Chan Y, Bruso K (2014) A game-theoretic model for secure international communications. Working Paper, Department of Systems Engineering, University of Arkansas at Little rock, Little Rock, Arkansas

    Google Scholar 

  17. Downward A, Zakeri G, Philpott AB (2010) On cournot equilibria in electricity transmission networks. Oper Res 58:1194–1209

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  18. Evans JR (1976) Maximum flow in probabilistic graphs—the discrete case. Networks 6:161–183

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  19. Ford LR Jr, Fulkerson DR (1962) Flows in networks. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  20. Garcia A, Patek SD, Sinha K (2007) A decentralized approach to discrete optimization via simulation: application to network flow. Oper Res 55(4):717–732

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  21. Guikema SD (2009) Game theory models of intelligent actors in reliability analysis: an overview of the state of the art. In: Bier VM, Azaiez MN (eds) Game theoretic risk analysis of security threats. International series in operations research and management science. Springer, New York

    Google Scholar 

  22. Hausken K, Bier, VM, Zhuang J (2009) Defending against terrorism, natural disaster, and all hazards. In: Bier VM, Azaiez MN (eds) Game theoretic risk analysis of security threats. International series in operations research and management science. Springer, New York

    Google Scholar 

  23. Holmgren ÅJ, Jenelius E, Westin J (2007) Evaluating strategies for defending electric power networks against antagonistic attacks. IEEE Trans Power Syst 22:76–84

    Article  Google Scholar 

  24. Hsieh C-C, Lin M-H (2006) Simple algorithms for updating multi-resource allocations in an unreliable flow network. Comput Ind Eng 50:120–129

    Article  Google Scholar 

  25. Hu J, Chan Y (2005) A multi-criteria routing model for incident management. In: Proceedings, 2005 IEEE international conference on systems, man and cybernetics, Waikoloa, Hawaii, 10–12 Oct 2005, pp 832–839

    Google Scholar 

  26. Hu J, Chan Y (2008) Dynamic routing to minimize travel time and incident risks. Paper ID 403, proceedings of the 10th international conference on application of advanced technologies in transportation, Athens, Greece, 28–30 May, 14 pp

    Google Scholar 

  27. Hu J, Chan Y (2013) Stochastic incident-management of asymmetrical network-workloads. Transp Res Part C 27:140–158

    Article  Google Scholar 

  28. Huang GL, Song F, Wang XD (2010) Quantitative modeling of couple piezo-elastodynamic behavior of piezoelectric actuators bonded to an elastic medium for structural health monitoring: a review. Sensors 10:3681–3702

    Article  Google Scholar 

  29. Hui K-P, Bean N, Kraetzl M, Kroese DP (2005) The cross-entropy method for network reliability estimation. Ann Oper Res 134:101–118

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  30. Jha MK, Okonkwo FO (2008) Analysis of system and user travel‐time reliability in urban areas. In: Proceedings of the 10th international conference on application of advanced technologies in transportation, Paper ID 873, Athens, 28-30 May, 10 pp

    Google Scholar 

  31. Kovenock D, Roberson B, Sheremeta RM (2010) The attack and defense of weakest-link networks. CESIFO working paper no. 3211, Ifo Institute, Center for Economic Studies, Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research

    Google Scholar 

  32. Losada C, Scaparra MP, O’Hanley JR (2012) Optimizing system resilience: a facility protection model with recovery time. Eur J Oper Res 217:519–530

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  33. Lou Y, Zhang L (2011) Defending transportation networks against random and targeted attacks. Transp Res Rec J Transp Res Board 2234:31–40

    Article  Google Scholar 

  34. Lownes NE, Wang Q, Ibrahim S, Ammar RA, Rajasekaran S, Sharma D (2011) A many-to-many game theoretic approach to measuring transportation network vulnerability. Transp Res Rec J Transp Res Board 2263:1–8

    Article  Google Scholar 

  35. Lyle D, Chan Y, Head E (1999) Improving information-network performance: reliability versus invulnerability. IIE Trans 31:909–919

    Google Scholar 

  36. Missouri Agency Records Retention Schedules (2014) https://www.sos.mo.gov/records/recmgmt/retention/agency.asp. Accessed 20 May 2014

  37. Murray-Tuite PM, Fei X (2010) A methodology for assessing transportation network terrorism risk with attacker and defender interactions. Comput-Aided Civil Infrastruct Eng 25:396–410

    Article  Google Scholar 

  38. Robinson AR, Chan Y, Dietz DC (2006) Detecting a security disturbance in multi-commodity stochastic networks. Telecommun Syst 31(1):11–27

    Article  Google Scholar 

  39. Samuelson L (1997) Evolutionary games and equilibrium selection. MIT Press, Cambridge

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  40. Sancho NGF (1988) On the maximum expected flow in a network. J Oper Res Soc 39:481–485

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  41. Scaparra MP, Church RL (2008) A bilevel mixed-integer program for critical infrastructure protection planning. Comput Oper Res 35:1905–1923

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  42. Schavland J, Chan Y, Raines R (2009) Information security: designing a stochastic-network for reliability and throughput. Naval Res Logist 56(7):625–641

    Google Scholar 

  43. Smith JC, Lim C (2008) Algorithms for network interdiction and fortification games. In: Chinchuluun A, Pardalos PM, Migdalas A, Pitsoulis L (eds) Pareto optimality, game theory and equilibria. Springer, New York

    Google Scholar 

  44. Steuer R (1986) Multiple criteria optimization: theory, computation, and application. Wiley, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersy

    Google Scholar 

  45. Szeto WY, O’Brien L, O’Mahony M (2009) Measuring network reliability by considering paradoxes: multiple network demon approach. Transportation research record, No. 2O90, Transportation Research Board, Washington, DC, pp 42–50

    Google Scholar 

  46. Szeto WY (2011) Cooperative game approaches to measuring network reliability considering paradoxes. Transp Res Part C 19:229–241

    Article  Google Scholar 

  47. Van Hove JC, Chan Y, Caromi R, Abbosh A (2013) Performance in stochastic communication networks: monitoring and prediction. Working Paper, Systems Engineering Department, University of Arkansas at Little Rock, Little Rock, Arkansas

    Google Scholar 

  48. van den Nouweland A, van Golstein Brouwers W, Groot Bruinderink R, Tijs S (1996) A game theoretical approach to problems in telecommunications. Manage Sci 42:294–303

    Google Scholar 

  49. Won J, Karray F (2011) A greedy algorithm for faster feasibility evaluation of all-terminal-reliable networks. IEEE Trans Syst Man Cybern B Cybern 41(6):1600–1611

    Article  Google Scholar 

  50. Zhuang J, Bier VM (2007) Balancing terrorism and natural disasters—defensive strategy with endogenous attacker effort. Oper Res 55(5):976–991

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

This chapter draws heavily from the published works of the author. The original publication sources are properly cited throughout. Certain sentences may be paraphrased from these sources, and certain figures are reproduced with or without editing. All the published research cited in this fashion was funded by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and was performed while the author was a government employee. The DOD support is gratefully acknowledged. The author also wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Henry Shyllon who assembled some of the reference publications used in this chapter upon the author’s suggestion. Mr. Shyllon also formatted the first draft of this chapter according to the publisher guidelines.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Arkansas at Little Rock, Little Rock, Arkansas, USA

    Yupo Chan

Authors
  1. Yupo Chan
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Yupo Chan .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Sciences, University of Stavanger, Stavanger, Norway

    Kjell Hausken

  2. Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, University at Buffalo State University of New York, Buffalo, New York, USA

    Jun Zhuang

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Chan, Y. (2015). Network Throughput and Reliability: Preventing Hazards and Attacks Through Gaming—Part 2: A Research Agenda. In: Hausken, K., Zhuang, J. (eds) Game Theoretic Analysis of Congestion, Safety and Security. Springer Series in Reliability Engineering. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13009-5_6

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13009-5_6

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-13008-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-13009-5

  • eBook Packages: EngineeringEngineering (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation