Advertisement

Quality and Pricing of Delivery Services in the E-commerce Sector

  • Claire Borsenberger
  • Helmuth CremerEmail author
  • Philippe De Donder
  • Denis Joram
Chapter
  • 930 Downloads
Part of the Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy book series (TREP, volume 50)

Abstract

We study the delivery market for e-commerce products, with two technologies: home delivery and delivery to a relay point. Taste differences for these are represented by a Hotelling model. Operators choose the (costly) quality of their delivery service. We study a single operator who uses both technologies and a duopoly with two single-technology operators. The home delivery operator may or may not be regulated; the relay operator is not regulated. We study pricing policies and the impact of competition on welfare. We also show that quality regulation may have an adverse effect on welfare.

Keywords

Marginal Cost Consumer Surplus Home Delivery Total Welfare Mixed Oligopoly 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

References

  1. Borsenberger, C., Cremer, H., De Donder, P., Joram, D., & Lécou, S. (2014). Pricing of delivery services in the e-commerce sector. In M. A. Crew & T. J. Brennan (Eds.), The role of the postal and delivery sector in a digital age (pp. 75–92). Cheltenham/Northampton: Edward Elgar.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Gabszewicz, J., & Thisse, J.-F. (1992). Location. In R. Aumann & S. Hart (Eds.), Handbook of game theory (Vol. I, pp. 281–304). Amsterdam: North-Holland (chapter 9).Google Scholar
  3. Mussa, M., & Rosen, S. (1978). Monopoly and product quality. Journal of Economic Theory, 18, 301–317.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Shaked, A., & Sutton, J. (1982). Relaxing price competition through product differentiation. Review of Economics Studies, 49, 3–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Varian, H. (1992). Microeconomic theory. New York: Norton.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Claire Borsenberger
    • 1
    • 2
  • Helmuth Cremer
    • 3
    Email author
  • Philippe De Donder
    • 4
  • Denis Joram
    • 5
  1. 1.European and National Regulation DivisionGroupe La PosteParisFrance
  2. 2.the University of Toursaffiliated to the Laboratoire d’Economie d’OrléansParisFrance
  3. 3.Toulouse School of Economics (IDEI, GREMAQ and IuF)ToulouseFrance
  4. 4.Toulouse School of Economics (IDEI and GREMAQ-CNRS)ToulouseFrance
  5. 5.the European and National Regulation DivisionGroupe La PosteParisFrance

Personalised recommendations