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Business Models: Some Implications for USPS

  • Michael A. CrewEmail author
  • Timothy J. Brennan
Chapter
Part of the Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy book series (TREP, volume 50)

Abstract

Designing appropriate policies to reform the United States Postal Service (USPS) requires an understanding of business models: privately-owned competitive firms, different forms of regulated monopolies, labor-owned and publicly-owned enterprises, and government agencies. The most crucial factors in comparing these institutional forms are identifying the residual claimants and assessing the power of the incentives and the ability they have to promote efficient operation. Cross-subsidy, allocative and internal efficiency, externalities, innovation, and market structure are also important. Adequate reform of USPS requires Congressional acceptance that the government agency model should be replaced by more independent or privatized models adopted in other countries.

Keywords

Business Model Market Power Allocative Efficiency Public Enterprise Residual Claimant 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Rutgers Business School, Rutgers UniversityNewarkUSA
  2. 2.Department of Public PolicyUniversity of Maryland, Baltimore County (UMBC)BaltimoreUSA

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