Abstract
According to the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation, for analysing argumentative discourse, a normative reconstruction is required which encompasses four kinds of transformations. It is explained in this chapter how speech act conditions can play a part in carrying out such a reconstruction. It is argued that integrating Searlean insights concerning speech acts with Gricean insights concerning conversational maxims can provide us with the necessary tools. For this, the standard theory of speech acts has to be amended in several respects and the conversational maxims have to be translated into speech act conditions. Making use of the rules of communication thus arrived at, and starting from the distribution of speech acts in a critical discussion as specified in the pragma-dialectical model, it is then demonstrated how indirect speech acts are to be transformed when reconstructing argumentative discourse. Finally, contextual clues for reconstruction found in argumentative activity types are discussed.
This chapter is based on van Eemeren and Grootendorst (Argumentation 3(4):367–383, 1989).
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Notes
- 1.
Cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1987).
- 2.
Cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1988).
- 3.
The unstated parts of an argumentation can be referred to as “unexpressed premises”. Cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984), pp. 119–149.
- 4.
Of course, there can be other candidates: explanation, amplification, elucidation, but not argumentation.
- 5.
Cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst, where related views are also discussed (1984, pp. 33–39).
- 6.
For practical purposes, we do not go into the exact relationship between sentences and propositions now. We just equate speech acts consisting of the expression of one proposition with one-sentence speech acts.
- 7.
Cf. Searle's description of perlocutionary acts (1970, p. 25).
- 8.
In practice, the difference of opinion can be expressed explicitly, but may also remain implicit, in which case the discussion or discursive text is based on the anticipation of a possible difference of opinion.
- 9.
- 10.
Cf. Searle (1979), pp. 1–29.
- 11.
- 12.
- 13.
Of course this is a simplification, but it draws attention to the fact that proposing normative rules for critical discussion has more ties with reality than some people think. To give an example, one could refer to the similarities between the starting point in the ideal model that the participants in a critical discussion are striving for the resolution of a difference of opinion on the one hand, and the commonly accepted conversational fact that in ordinary conversation there is a preference for agreement among the interlocutors. As empirical research reported in van Eemeren et al. (2009) makes clear, the norms for reasonableness that are expressed in the rules for critical discussion are in fact to a large extent in agreement with those of ordinary arguers.
- 14.
Cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992).
- 15.
In practice, of course, it is not at all uncommon for one of the rules of communication to be broken, but this does not necessarily mean that in such a case the Principle of Communication has been abandoned altogether. If this is the case, however, then the person doing so is reneging on a basic convention to which all the members of the community to which he belongs subscribe, and he or she thereby interferes with the communication. Assuming that it is not clear that a speaker is not in full control of his or her actions (he or she may be drunk for example), or cannot be held responsible for them, the speaker will have to account for this action or be faced with sanctions which may vary from an irritated reaction to a complete breaking off of the contact.
- 16.
Cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984), p. 41.
- 17.
- 18.
Unlike the resolution-centred reconstruction which takes place in a dialectical analysis, the transformations in the audience-centred reconstruction of a rhetorical analysis are motivated by a rhetorical ideal. However, a consistent apparatus for rhetorical analysis, providing us with all the necessary tools for transformation, is, in spite of the long-standing tradition of this form of analysis, not available.
- 19.
A normative reconstruction in the dialectical sense represents a specific angle of approach which can be illuminating and, in the dialectical perspective, also the most appropriate. Naturally, other angles of approach are also possible. A psychological analysis, for instance, would undoubtedly be able to produce other interesting results. Things that appear as relevant from one angle remain out of sight when regarded from another. However, one angle of approach need not necessarily preclude another.
- 20.
All elements of an analytical survey are of direct relevance to the evaluation of the argumentative discourse. If it is unclear what standpoint is being defended, there is no way of telling whether the argumentation that has been advanced is conclusive. And if more than one standpoint is being defended, it must be perfectly clear which language users are acting as the protagonist of which standpoint and exactly who is the source of the various argumentations that have been advanced in the defence of each standpoint. Otherwise, for example, it will be impossible to tell whether the various argumentations for the same standpoint actually constitute a coherent whole. Adequate evaluation of the argumentative discourse is also made more difficult where, as a result of implicitness or indirectness, arguments or unexpressed premises are overlooked or where it is unclear which argument schemes are relied on.
- 21.
- 22.
- 23.
For a distinction between four levels of context, see van Eemeren (2010), pp. 16–19.
- 24.
Cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992), pp. 56–59.
- 25.
As a rule, every speech act presupposes its own acceptability. The Interaction Principle enables us to explain why speakers, even when the listener does not ask for it, take the effort to establish the acceptability of their speech acts by putting forward direct or indirect arguments. The interaction principle reflects in its formulation Sperber and Wilson's principle of relevance: “Every act of ostensive communication communicates the presumption of its own optimal relevance” (1986, p. 158). There are important differences, however. Firstly, the interaction principle is more general than the principle of relevance—even if relevance is taken in its broadest sense—and, secondly, it is formulated in terms of speech act theory, whereas Sperber and Wilson make it their business to reject speech act theory completely (1986, pp. 243–254).
- 26.
The sentence in parentheses refers to the unexpressed premise in the argumentation.
- 27.
Cf. van Eemeren (1986).
- 28.
As a matter of fact, one of Austin’s reasons for developing a theory of speech acts refers to the logical positivists simplistic dichotomy between truth-functional statements and non-truth-functional statements. According to Austin, performative utterances are both non-truth functional and non-metaphysical.
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van Eemeren, F., Garssen, B. (2016). Reconstructing Argumentative Discourse with the Help of Speech Act Conditions. In: Capone, A., Mey, J. (eds) Interdisciplinary Studies in Pragmatics, Culture and Society. Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology, vol 4. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12616-6_17
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