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Computational Soundness of Asymmetric Bilinear Pairing-Based Protocols

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 8782))

Abstract

Asymmetric bilinear maps using Type-3 pairings are known to be advantageous in several points (e.g., the speed and the size of a group element) to symmetric bilinear maps using Type-1 pairings. Kremer and Mazaré introduce a symbolic model to analyze protocols based on bilinear maps, and show that the symbolic model is computationally sound. However, their model only covers symmetric bilinear maps. In this paper, we propose a new symbolic model to capture asymmetric bilinear maps. Our model allows us to analyze security of various protocols based on asymmetric bilinear maps (e.g., Scott’s client-server ID-based key exchange). Also, we show computational soundness of our symbolic model under the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption.

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Yoneyama, K. (2014). Computational Soundness of Asymmetric Bilinear Pairing-Based Protocols. In: Chow, S.S.M., Liu, J.K., Hui, L.C.K., Yiu, S.M. (eds) Provable Security. ProvSec 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8782. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12475-9_23

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12475-9_23

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-12474-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-12475-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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