Remark!: A Secure Protocol for Remote Exams

  • Rosario Giustolisi
  • Gabriele Lenzini
  • Peter Y. A. RyanEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8809)


This manuscript presents Remark!, an electronic exam protocol which achieves several authentication, (conditional) anonymity, privacy, and verifiability properties without trusted third parties. Remark! is primarily designed for invigilated Internet-based exams but it also fits computer-based exams with candidates taking their exam in classrooms.


Electronic exams Security analysis Security protocol design Authentication Anonymity Privacy Verifiability 



We thank Jannik Dreier, Ali Kassem and Pascal Lafourcade for helpful discussions on the security of our protocol.

Supplementary material


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Rosario Giustolisi
    • 1
  • Gabriele Lenzini
    • 1
  • Peter Y. A. Ryan
    • 1
    Email author
  1. 1.Interdisciplinary Centre for Reliability, Security and Trust (SnT)University of LuxembourgLuxembourgLuxembourg

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