Risk as studied conventionally and risk as manifested in actuality differ widely both in semantics and content. In this paper we explore the possibility of managing risk without resorting to transitive and compulsive relationships termed as “trust”. We draw an exploitable analogy with the assumptions under which cooperation is observed in repeated strategic games and posit that voluntary cooperation between players with mutually incompatible commitments is indeed possible provided that such cooperation can be promiscuous.
KeywordsStrategic Game Side Payment Credible Threat Actuate Risk Latent Risk
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