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Other Theories of Trust and Trust Models

  • Michael G. Harvey
Chapter
Part of the SpringerBriefs in Electrical and Computer Engineering book series (BRIEFSELECTRIC)

Abstract

A 3-level basic knowledge structure is integrated with two other virtue theories of knowledge to yield a social perspective on the relation between trust and rationality in individual epistemology. One theory allows us to interpret basic trust as an animal competence that is rational but not reason-based, comprised of two different but mutually dependent pre-reflective trust dispositions, self-trust, and trust in other entities. Both competences are members of a class of natural reactions that are part of our first nature. The relative influences of these competences or reactions on the formation of our beliefs at the level of animal knowledge can be moderated at the level of reflective knowledge by reason-based competences such as intellectual virtues. Another theory allows us to anchor this interactive conception of the relation between trust and reason in the notion of epistemic rationality or normativity. The resulting unified theory of trust places practical limitations on the intellectual goals of basing our decisions on the most accurate and comprehensively coherent beliefs at the time the decision is made, and justifying our initial trust in the reliability of other entities or sources of knowledge in the presence of risk or vulnerability.

Keywords

Rational Belief Natural Reaction Intellectual Virtue Animal Knowledge Initial Trust 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

References

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Johns Hopkins UniversityPittsburghUSA

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