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Loss Aversion, Omission Bias and the Civil Standard of Proof

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European Perspectives on Behavioural Law and Economics

Part of the book series: Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship ((EALELS,volume 2))

Abstract

This article shows how insights from cognitive psychology, namely loss aversion, omission bias and status quo bias, explain the intuitive appeal of a standard of proof in civil cases that is considerably higher than the “preponderance of the evidence” or “balance of probabilities” standard employed by Common Law. These insights may explain the almost visceral rejection any suggestions lowering the standard of proof in civil matters have received in Germany. They do not, however, provide a normative basis for a standard of proof higher than 50 % posterior subjective probability in civil cases.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Addington vs. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), 422, 423; for English law In Re H & Others (minors) UKHL 16, AC 563 (1995), sect. 76; Wright 2009, 80.

  2. 2.

    Engel 2009, 435; Motsch 2009, 242.

  3. 3.

    Paulus 1997, 750; Kokott 1998, 18; Clermont and Sherwin 2002, 262 et seq.; Engel 2009, 435; Motsch 2009, 242; but see Gottwald 2000, 175; Brinkmann 2005, 3.

  4. 4.

    For US law O’Malley et al. 2001, § 166.51; for English law Miller vs. Minister of Pensions , 3 All ER 372 (1947), 373 et seq.

  5. 5.

    For English law Redmayne 1999, 172; for US law Livanovitch v. Livanovitch, 131 A. 799, 800 (Vt. 1926) (“If […] you are more inclined to believe from the evidence that he did so deliver the bonds to the defendant, even though your belief is only the slightest degree greater than that he did not, your verdict should be for the plaintiff” (quoting the jury instructions).

  6. 6.

    The standard of proof in Germany is better described as a “conviction raisonnée” rather than the French “conviction intime ”; see Deppenkemper 2004, 208 et seq., 421 and the references cited therein.

  7. 7.

    BGHZ 53, 245 = BGH NJW 1970, 946 (translation from German by the author); for Swiss law BGE 130 III 321 sect. 3.2.

  8. 8.

    For German law Kadner Graziano 2011, 189; for Swiss law Berger-Steiner 2008, sect. 6.81; Walter 2009, 53; Bühler 2010, sect. 9.

  9. 9.

    For German law Greger 1978, 110; for Swiss law Summermatter and Jacober 2012, 142.

  10. 10.

    For German law Bender 1981, 258; Fuchs 2005, 80.

  11. 11.

    See, e.g., for German law BGH NJW 1995, 2169; NJW 2004, 777; for Swiss law BGE 130 III 321 sect. 3.3; 132 III 715 sect. 3.2.

  12. 12.

    Walter 1979, 184.

  13. 13.

    But see Gottwald 2000, 175; Brinkmann 2005, 3, who argue against any difference in principle between the German and the Common Law’s standard of proof in civil cases.

  14. 14.

    Prütting 2010, 142.

  15. 15.

    Clermont and Sherwin 2002, 244.

  16. 16.

    The seminal papers are Kaplan 1968 and Cullison 1969.

  17. 17.

    The use of the plural for “statements” is deliberate. In my view, the Bayesian posterior probability must be for the joint probability of all relevant factual statements being true. This avoids the much debated “conjunction paradox” at the potential cost of defining standard of proof differently than current law.

  18. 18.

    Kegel 1967, 337; Maassen 1975, 10; Redmayne 1999, 172; Posner 2007, 647, but see Motsch 1983, 83.

  19. 19.

    See Park et al. 2010, for an overview. The debate started with Finkelstein and Fairley 1970 and the answer came from Tribe 1971. The collection of essays by Tillers 1988 provides an overview of the debate up to that time, and Tillers 2011 a summary of the debate since.

  20. 20.

    See the references cited in Tillers and Gottfried 2007.

  21. 21.

    Rosenberg 1965, 16.

  22. 22.

    Baumgärtel 1996, n. 9.

  23. 23.

    Musielak 1975, 49.

  24. 24.

    Kaye 1987, 55.

  25. 25.

    Biemann 2009, 207.

  26. 26.

    Bourmistrov-Jüttner 1987, 247.

  27. 27.

    Cullison 1969, 564 et seqq.; DeKay 1996, 111.

  28. 28.

    Kaplan 1968, 1072.

  29. 29.

    In US law, a further intermediate standard of proof known as “clear and convincing evidence”, which is applicable in certain civil cases (e.g., civil fraud), is well-established, see, e.g., Addington vs. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), 422, 423, while it is a matter of controversy whether English law recognizes such an intermediate standard of proof, Anderson et al. 2006, 243; McBride 2009, 325 et seq.

  30. 30.

    See Addington vs. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), 422, 423; for English law In Re H & Others (minors) UKHL 16, AC 563 (1995), sect. 76; Wright 2009, 80.

  31. 31.

    Jury instructions according to the Ninth Circuit Model Criminal Jury Instructions, 2003 edition, § 3.5– Reasonable Doubt—Defined. Sheppard 2003 shows the development from “moral certainty” to “reasonable doubt” to “articulate doubt”, which, according to him, explains the current practice in criminal law better.

  32. 32.

    O’Malley et al. 2001, § 166.51.

  33. 33.

    Livanovitch v. Livanovitch, 131 A. 799, 800 (Vt. 1926) (“If […] you are more inclined to believe from the evidence that he did so deliver the bonds to the defendant, even though your belief is only the slightest degree greater than that he did not, your verdict should be for the plaintiff” (quoting the jury instructions); Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Civil Jury Instructions, 3rd ed. 2005, § 1.42; for English law Redmayne 1999, 172.

  34. 34.

    Illinois Supreme Court Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions in Civil Cases (eds.), Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil, § 21.01 (“more probably true than not true”), available from www.state.il.us/court/CircuitCourt/CivilJuryInstructions/21.00.pdf (last visited 1 August 2012); Sand et al. 2007, Vol. 4, § 73.01, Instruction 73–2 (“by a preponderance of the evidence” means “more likely true than not true”).

  35. 35.

    See the references cited in Tillers and Gottfried 2007.

  36. 36.

    In re Winship 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan J. Concurring); Ball 1960, 817; Kaye 1987, 72; Lee 1997, 25; Posner 1999, 1504; Redmayne 1999, 171; Clermont and Sherwin 2002, 268; Stein 2005, 148; Zamir and Ritov 2012, 189; but see Tyree 1982, 93 et seq.

  37. 37.

    Lee 1997, 25.

  38. 38.

    In a strongly worded article, Kevin M. Clermont and Emily Sherwin “rudely wonder how civilians can be so wrong”, Clermont and Sherwin 2002, 244. For an equally strongly worded rebuttal see Taruffo 2003.

  39. 39.

    But see Gottwald 2000, 175; Brinkmann 2005, 3, who argue against any difference in principle between the German and the Common Law’s standard of proof in civil cases.

  40. 40.

    Maassen 1975.

  41. 41.

    Motsch 1978, 335 et seq.; Nell 1983, 211. A precursor, not yet relying on a decision theoretic framework, was Kegel 1967, 335.

  42. 42.

    Walter 1979, 182. In the German original: “Eine Demontage des “Überzeugungserfordernisses” würde also weithin zu einer Korrumpierung der Rechtsmoral in der Bevölkerung führen – wenn schon eine überwiegende Wahrscheinlichkeit genügt, um “einen Prozess zu gewinnen”! Man muss […] will man die Übereinstimmung eines Volkes mit seiner Justiz, den “Konsens” nicht verlieren, auf gewachsene und verankerte Traditionen Rücksicht nehmen.”

  43. 43.

    Berger-Steiner 2008, Rz. 5.131. See also Hohl 1991, 155: “Le degré de vraisemblance à exiger du juge doit être suffisament élevé pour être acceptable sur les plans moral et éthique et légitimer la coercition judiciaire.”

  44. 44.

    Habscheid 1990, 118. In the German original: “Es ist für mich auch fraglich, ob der Gesetzgeber eine solche Regelung einführen kann, ohne an die Wurzeln des Rechtsstaats zu rühren.”

  45. 45.

    In Switzerland, the traditional view has never been under attack in the first place. This is about to change with the publication of my Habilitationsschrift “Beweismaß und Beweiswürdigung. Rationalität und Intuition” Tübingen 2015 (forthcoming).

  46. 46.

    But see Wagner 2009, 172 et seq.

  47. 47.

    Prütting 2010, 142. In the German original: “Es ist nicht zuletzt den klaren und beharrlichen Darlegungen Karl Heinz Schwabs zu danken, dass solche extremen Auffassungen zu keinem Zeitpunkt in der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft Fuß fassen konnten und in keinem Kommentar zur ZPO mehr Erwähnung finden.”

  48. 48.

    Clermont and Sherwin 2002, 269 ff.

  49. 49.

    Tversky and Kahneman 1991 .

  50. 50.

    Tversky and Kahneman 1992, 306 .

  51. 51.

    Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 279 .

  52. 52.

    Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 279 .

  53. 53.

    Tversky and Kahneman 1991 , 154. Tversky and Kahneman 1992, 59, report a median value of about 2.25.

  54. 54.

    Tversky and Kahneman 1992 , 59, suggest that the median of the empirically observed values for the difference in weight of gains and losses is about 2.25.

  55. 55.

    Rachlinski 1996 , 118.

  56. 56.

    Korobkin and Guthrie 1994,133 et seq; Babcock et al. 1995, 296 et seq.; Rachlinski 1996 , 130 et seq.

  57. 57.

    Clermont and Sherwin 2002, 268.

  58. 58.

    Zamir and Ritov 2012, 180.

  59. 59.

    Fehr and Goette 2007, 300; Gächter et al. 2010, 4.

  60. 60.

    This requires the further assumption that the judge—who does not himself or herself gain or lose anything from his or her decision—vicariously experiences the gain or loss of the parties. This assumption is plausible, however, based on research that shows that judges are indeed influenced by the party’s perspective despite having nothing at stake themselves, see Guthrie et al. 2001, 777.

  61. 61.

    Schweizer 2013, 20.

  62. 62.

    Kahneman and Tversky 1982 , 173; Ritov and Baron 1990, 274; Gilovich and Medvec 1995, 380; Prentice and Koehler 2002, 610.

  63. 63.

    Sugarman 1986, 70; Spranca et al. 1991, 82; Kordes-de Vaal 1996, 165; Prentice and Koehler 2002, 593.

  64. 64.

    Ritov and Baron 1995, 124.

  65. 65.

    Kordes-de Vaal 1996, 165; Sunstein 2005, 540.

  66. 66.

    Sunstein 2004, 1582; Birnbacher 1995, 127, but see 209.

  67. 67.

    Kordes-de Vaal 1996, 165.

  68. 68.

    Kahneman and Tversky 1982 , 173.

  69. 69.

    Erroneously here, as throughout this article, means that the claim was granted although it did not exist under the applicable substantive law. It does not mean that the judge made any procedural errors.

  70. 70.

    Zamir and Ritov 2012 , 182.

  71. 71.

    This is the same sample as the one for the study on the influence of loss aversion on the decision threshold . The results will be reported more fully in my forthcoming Habilitationsschrift.

  72. 72.

    t (154) = 3.17, p < 0,01.

  73. 73.

    Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988, 8; Kahneman et al. 1991 , 197; Schweitzer 1994, 470; Prentice and Koehler 2002, 597; Eidelman and Crandall 2009, 85.

  74. 74.

    Connolly and Zeelenberg 2002, 213.

  75. 75.

    Crandall et al. 2009.

  76. 76.

    Clermont and Sherwin 2002, 268.

  77. 77.

    Rüßmann 1987, n. 21.

  78. 78.

    Stölzel 1913, XXXI.

  79. 79.

    Leipold 1966, 48 et seq.; Prütting 1983, 263 et seq. These days, the consensus view is that it is impossible to reduce the assignment of the burden of proof to a single unifying principle, Ahrens 2008, 29 et seq.; Prütting 2009, n. 42.

  80. 80.

    Kaye 1982, 497.

  81. 81.

    Zamir 2012 , 887 et seq.; Zamir and Ritov 2012, 172. Zamir and Ritov caution, however, against any premature normative conclusions, Zamir and Ritov 2012, 195 et seq.

  82. 82.

    Korobkin and Guthrie 1994, 120 et seq.; Zamir and Ritov 2010 , 262 et seq., 269 (on the malleability of reference points).

  83. 83.

    Zamir 2012, 889 et seq.

  84. 84.

    Redmayne 1999, 174.

  85. 85.

    The fact that in most cases, the car will have been repaired by now makes the argument even stronger.

  86. 86.

    Note that technically, this is not true. If the defendant were a company, it would have to make provisions for the liability at the time of the accident, because the liability exists irrespective of its enforcement by court order.

  87. 87.

    Instead of many after him Mittermaier 1843, 74.

  88. 88.

    See www.worldvaluessurvey.org (last visited 1 February 2014).

  89. 89.

    “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?”, see WVS 2005 OECD questionnaire, A-Ballot, available from www.worldvaluessurvey.org (last visited 1 February 2014).

  90. 90.

    The figures for the courts are: CH 76.90 %; DE 57.50 %; UK 60.20 %; USA 57.40 %.

  91. 91.

    See Demougin and Fluet 2006; Fluet 2010; Kaplow 2012, 756 et seq.

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    PD Dr. Mark Schweizer

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Schweizer, M. (2015). Loss Aversion, Omission Bias and the Civil Standard of Proof. In: Mathis, K. (eds) European Perspectives on Behavioural Law and Economics. Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship, vol 2. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-11635-8_7

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