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Why Do We Need Responsive Regulation and Behavioural Research in EU Internal Market Law?

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European Perspectives on Behavioural Law and Economics

Part of the book series: Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship ((EALELS,volume 2))

Abstract

Due to its intrinsic need to establish an internal market even against the nation states’ will, EU law has always had to rely on the responsiveness of its peoples in order to make the establishment of the internal market a success. As to this need, top-down macro-economic regulation without a social bottom-up backup by the peoples of Europe has mostly failed. This creates a “legitimacy market failure” of the EU internal market, which needs to be cured by responsive regulation. Data gained from behavioural research are the right tools to cure such a market failure in EU internal market law. The provision of hard data from behavioural research is the most promising way to do so as it leaves room for Member States to behave opportunistically only if they present more convincing data. By combining responsive regulation and behavioural economics, the EU is able to first listen to its people and second incentivize Member States to act in the best interest for its peoples and the internal market.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See e.g. European Governance—A white paper, COM(2001) 428 final; Mandelkern Group on Better Regulation, Final Report, 13 November 2001 and the articles in S. Weatherill (ed.) Better Regulation (Oxford 2007); as well as Allio 2011; McColm 2011; Radaelli 2007; Wiener 2006.

  2. 2.

    Ackermann 2007, p. 9.

  3. 3.

    See Nourse and Shaffer 2009, pp. 61–138; Miles and Sunstein 2013, p. 81; critical Leiter 2013.

  4. 4.

    Nourse and Shaffer 2009, pp. 88–90.

  5. 5.

    Nourse and Shaffer 2009, pp. 76–77.

  6. 6.

    See Macneil 2000, p. 697.

  7. 7.

    Simon 2006.

  8. 8.

    Black and Baldwin 2010. The link between new governance theories and responsive regulation was also illustrated by Walker and de Búrca: “New Governance is seen as a highly pragmatic and flexible approach to and modality of regulation, a method for ensuring maximum responsiveness and adaptability, with an emphasis on open-ended and provisional goals, and ensuring revisability and corrigibility,” see Walker and de Búrca 2007.

  9. 9.

    Bizer and Führ 2002, p. 5.

  10. 10.

    Nourse and Shaffer 2009, p. 77.

  11. 11.

    Nourse and Shaffer 2009, p. 77.

  12. 12.

    This distinction is, of course, a simplification. (Neo-) classical law and economics likewise knows a number of market failures which enable “social” regulation, which also translate into internal market law, see Franck and Purnhagen 2014, p. 332.

  13. 13.

    Jolls and Sunstein 2007.

  14. 14.

    See on the term and the parameters affiliated with it Black and Baldwin 2010.

  15. 15.

    The difference between input and output legitimacy date back to the work of Easton 1965 and have been advanced mainly by Scharpf 1970; Scharpf 1997; Scharpf 1999.

  16. 16.

    Scharpf 1999, p. 7.

  17. 17.

    Scharpf 1999, p. 7.

  18. 18.

    Bekkers and Edwards 2007, p. 35.

  19. 19.

    See on the term “domain” Dyson 2014, pp. 115–137.

  20. 20.

    See especially Danielsson-Tham et al. 2004, p. 153. There are also studies which have proven that these threats may also come from consuming pasteurized milk, see Koch et al. 2010, p. 1581.

  21. 21.

    See especially Art. 3 of Council Directive 92/46/EEC of 16 June 1992 laying down the health rules for the production and placing on the market of raw milk, heat-treated milk and milk-based products. See for the USA FDA, The Dangers of Raw Milk: Unpasteurized Milk Can Pose a Serious Health Risk, available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/FoodborneIllnessContaminants/UCM239493.pdf.

  22. 22.

    See Art. 3 of Council Directive 92/46/EEC of 16 June 1992 laying down the health rules for the production and placing on the market of raw milk, heat-treated milk and milk-based products.

  23. 23.

    See Downes 2014, p. 113.

  24. 24.

    See for a comprehensive study on the the regulative practice at that time Joerges et al. 1988, 252 et seqq.

  25. 25.

    See Tricker 2000, p.  1; Hey, Jacob and Volkery 2007, p. 1861.

  26. 26.

    McGee and Weatherill 1990, p. 583.

  27. 27.

    McGee and Weatherill 1990, p. 582.

  28. 28.

    Purnhagen 2014b, p. 318.

  29. 29.

    See for further assessment into the challenges of regulation of new technology products van der Meulen et al. 2014, pp. 1–2.

  30. 30.

    van der Meulen et al. 2014, pp. 1–2.

  31. 31.

    van der Meulen et al. 2014, pp. 1–2.

  32. 32.

    See for a more thorough analysis Grossman 2012.

  33. 33.

    Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology Products, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (26 June 1986), p. 23.

  34. 34.

    Some States such as Maine currently consider enacting special requirements of labelling law.

  35. 35.

    See for an old (and therefore with regards to the legal regulations largely outdated), but on the substance still valid observation Lynch and Vogel 2001; for a more recent one Pollack and Shaffer 2009, pp. 45–77.

  36. 36.

    Pollack and Shaffer 2009, pp. 45–52.

  37. 37.

    Krystallis et al. 2007.

  38. 38.

    See Valletta 2010.

  39. 39.

    In political science, this has been investigated as a gap between input and output legitimacy, see Skogstad 2003, p. 321.

  40. 40.

    Eberlein 2004, pp. 153–155.

  41. 41.

    Weiler 2005.

  42. 42.

    See Weiler 2005.

  43. 43.

    Patterson and Afilalo 2008, pp. 148–160.

  44. 44.

    Lenaerts 2004.

  45. 45.

    Eberlein 2004, pp. 153–155.

  46. 46.

    Binding and Purnhagen 2011, p. 187.

  47. 47.

    By that time admittedly mainly preliminary forms of the Internet making use of distance communication such as Teletext existed.

  48. 48.

    See for an overview over the debate Keller 2004, pp. 1, 10–16; Marsden 2011, pp. 47–50.

  49. 49.

    See on the relationship between Member State inaction and EU policy in the area of consumer protection, Micklitz 2001.

  50. 50.

    Directive 97/7/EC has meanwhile been replaced by the Directive on Consumer Rights 2011/83/EC. As this argument draws from the historical right to withdrawal in Directive 97/7/EC, I will nonetheless build my argument on the outdated Directive.

  51. 51.

    Recently, scholars start to investigate whether the withdrawal right could be justified under recourse of the classical free-will theory by relying on a failure in the formation of the contract, see Hoffmann 2012, p. 1156. I will not recall the reservations against classical free will theory here, it shall suffice to hint at J. Schapp’s argument that “will” is legally only valid insofar as the law grants it validity, see Schapp 1986, p. 8 et seqq. To justify a legal provision with a will of the person is hence quite tautological.

  52. 52.

    See Purnhagen 2013.

  53. 53.

    Cooter 1989, pp. 385–386.

  54. 54.

    See for a more developed analysis on rules of freedom from contract Ben-Shahar 2004.

  55. 55.

    Schwartz 2008; Posner 1998.

  56. 56.

    Cooter 1989, p. 386.

  57. 57.

    Franck and Purnhagen 2014, p. 332.

  58. 58.

    Eisenberg 1995.

  59. 59.

    See on this phenomenon Afilalo et al. 2014, p. 287.

  60. 60.

    Eisenberg 1982, p. 773.

  61. 61.

    Ogus 1994, p. 41.

  62. 62.

    van den Bergh 2003, p. 83.

  63. 63.

    Flume 2000; Hammen 2010; Reich 2000, p. 261.

  64. 64.

    Patterson and Afilalo 2008, pp. 99–100.

  65. 65.

    Micklitz 2009, p. 3.

  66. 66.

    See recently Case C-508/12, 5. 12. 2013, Vapenik v Thurner [2014] ECR I-0000, para 26.

  67. 67.

    Reich 2000, p. 261.

  68. 68.

    See e.g. Avgouleas 2009, p. 440.

  69. 69.

    Tröger 2012; general Stigler 1971.

  70. 70.

    See e.g. Avgouleas 2009, p. 440.

  71. 71.

    Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a to 77 mm (1994).

  72. 72.

    Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a to 78mm (1994).

  73. 73.

    Avgouleas 2009, p. 440.

  74. 74.

    Samuelson 1965. In a little less draconic way Fama 1970, p. 383.

  75. 75.

    Spindler 2011.

  76. 76.

    Avgouleas 2009, p. 440.

  77. 77.

    Purnhagen 2014a.

  78. 78.

    See Usher 2001, p. 151 et seqq.; Steindorff 1996, p. 195.

  79. 79.

    Steindorff 1996, pp. 195–196.

  80. 80.

    See to the relations of both concepts Purnhagen 2014b.

  81. 81.

    The consolidated Capital Requirements Directive comprises European Parliament and Council Directive (EC) 2006/48 for the Taking up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit Institutions [2006] OJ L 177/1 and European Parliament and Council Directive (EC) 2006/49 on the Capital Adequacy of Investment Firms and Credit Institutions [2006] OJ L 177/201.

  82. 82.

    Franck and Purnhagen 2014, p. 336; Steindorff 1996, pp. 195–196.

  83. 83.

    The President‘s Working Group on Financial Markets (PWGFM), Policy Statement on Financial Market Developments’, March 2008.

  84. 84.

    Avgouleas 2009.

  85. 85.

    See in respect of the financial architecture Van Gestel and van Golen 2014.

  86. 86.

    Stigler 1971.

  87. 87.

    See with an assessment Torreblanca et al. 2013.

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Acknowledgement

I would like to thank Hans Micklitz, Jeff Rachlinski, Harm Schepel, Anne-Lise Sibony, and Avishalom Tor for valuable comments on an earlier version of this piece.

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    Prof. Dr. Kai Purnhagen

  2. Law School, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands

    Prof. Dr. Kai Purnhagen

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Purnhagen, K. (2015). Why Do We Need Responsive Regulation and Behavioural Research in EU Internal Market Law?. In: Mathis, K. (eds) European Perspectives on Behavioural Law and Economics. Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship, vol 2. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-11635-8_4

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