Abstract
The evolution of tort liability for defamation seems to create one of the most puzzling phenomena within the area of economic analysis of tort law. Whereas generally tort law evolves from negligence towards strict liability, the US Supreme Court established the platform for the revival of negligence-based tort law in case of libel and defamation. In Gertz v. Robert Welch (1974) the court explicitly advised for the application of the negligence rule if the plaintiff was a “private person”. The paper concentrates on these changes in two aspects: the relation between them and new British libel laws and the economic analysis of defamation within a context of European Convention on Human Rights (art. 10). Applying the standard rational choice theory various law and economics scholars proposed different alternatives based on the balance between public good (freedom of speech) and actual damage to the individual. The consideration having been already presented and discussed in law and economics literature concentrated on the internalization strategy, assuming full rationality and free access to information for agents (journalists, publishers) and adjudicators (courts and juries). I suggest that a more modern approach to judicial process requires the reference to cognitive limitations of adjudicators and systemic errors committed by judges. Generally the divergence between prediction and post diction may lead to a lower level of risk-aversion and a higher level of publication in case of standards such as in the Reynolds standard in English common law or the generally accepted balancing strategy applied by the ECHR in Bladet Tromso and Stensas v. Norway (1999).
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The defence has been extended by Lord Nicholls’ proposition in Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127, where the House of Lords acknowledged that the mass media could have been entitled to the qualified privilege, provided certain conditions were met, including the following: (1) The seriousness of the allegation (2) The public nature of the information (3) The source of the information (4) The steps taken to verify the information (5) The status of the information (6) The urgency of the matter; (7) Whether comment was sought from the plaintiff; (8) Whether the plaintiff’s side of the story was covered (9) The tone of the article (10) The circumstances of the publication including the timing. ( Ibidem at 205). This doctrine was confirmed in Loutchansky v. Times Newspapers Ltd [2002] 1 All ER 652.
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New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), 279–280.
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Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), 347–348.
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Cf. Schwabe v. Austria, Judgment of 28 August 1992, par. 37, Series A No. 313.
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Bladet Tromso and Stensas v. Norway, Judgment of 20 May 1999, [GC] No. 21980/93, ECHR 1999-III.
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Pedersen and Baadsgaard v. Denmark, Judgement of 17 Decemner 2004, para 78, [GC], No. 49017/99.
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The other explanation may link this case to the criminal procedure and criminal liability for false allegation rather than simple civil liability for defamation.
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This pertains especially to English law, where defamation cases were till 2013 decided with the jury. Cf. Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 13 July 1995, Series A No. 316-B. The plaintiff in this case was able to satisfy the ECHR that libel damages of £ 1.5 million awarded against him by the English jury was exuberant constituting a violation of his right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the ECHR.
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Brown 1973.
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Shavell 1987.
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Epstein 1986; Spier 1997.
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von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944.
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Simon 1955.
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Kahneman et al. 1982.
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Sunstein 1996.
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Jolls et al. 1998.
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- 24.
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Kahneman et al. 1982.
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Cf. Sloaman 2002.
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Kahneman 2003.
- 28.
- 29.
Kahneman 2003.
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Sloman 2002.
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Glöckner and Ebert 2011.
- 32.
Posner 2003.
- 33.
Jolls et al. 1998.
- 34.
- 35.
Rachlinski 2007–2008.
- 36.
Kahneman 2003.
- 37.
Nossofsky 1992.
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- 39.
Smith et al. 1998, p. 169.
- 40.
Cf. Smith and Sloman 1994.
- 41.
Estes 1994.
- 42.
Nosofsky 1986.
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Hampton 1995.
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Murphy and Medin 1985.
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Cf. Smith et al. 1998.
- 46.
Allen and Brooks 1991.
- 47.
Guttel and Harel 2008, p. 483.
- 48.
Hill v. Colorado 530 U.S. 703, 707 (2000).
- 49.
Hill v. Colorado 530 U.S. 703, 729 (2000).
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Acknowledgement
This research was supported by the European Union and the State of Hungary, co-financed by the European Social Fund in the framework of TÁMOP-4.2.4.A/ 2-11/1-2012-0001 ‘National Excellence Program’.
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Golecki, M. (2015). New York Times v. Sullivan in European Context. In: Mathis, K. (eds) European Perspectives on Behavioural Law and Economics. Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship, vol 2. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-11635-8_12
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