Abstract
Social choice theory is the study of mechanisms for collective decision making. While originally concerned with modelling and analysing political decision making in groups of people, its basic principles, arguably, are equally relevant to modelling and analysing the kinds of interaction taking place in a multiagent system. In support of this position, I review examples from three strands of research in social choice theory: fair division, voting, and judgment aggregation.
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Endriss, U. (2014). Social Choice Theory as a Foundation for Multiagent Systems. In: Müller, J.P., Weyrich, M., Bazzan, A.L.C. (eds) Multiagent System Technologies. MATES 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 8732. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-11584-9_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-11584-9_1
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