Abstract
In a context of organizational change franchising appears as a new systemic trend of enterprise context. In the provision of health and Well-being services there has been, in last the 10 years, a huge increase in demand of this type of organizational form, to solve issues of employment and creation of self-employment. Two of the organizational problems that modify the behavior of these networks are opportunism (free-riding) and adverse election (hold-up). It is the necessary, therefore, to structure and to define mechanisms of control in the development of the networks and the proper units of franchising, so that the companies do not disappear, jeopardizing a whole system of creating a brand, a image, an investment and know-how. This article intends to demonstrate that the bigger the problems of hold-up and free-riding in franchising systems, the greater the probability of the franchisor to supply territorial exclusiveness to the franchisees. It seems, therefore, that the territorial exclusiveness is the guarantee, for a franchisor, that the return on fixed investments of franchisee will not be later considered out of control or may lead to a lack of business sustainability.
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Appendix: Surve
Appendix: Surve
Variable | Questions | |
|---|---|---|
Territorial exclusivity | Q1 | Franchisor provides their franchisees with exclusive territories |
Growth in sales per outlet | Q2 | Average annual growth in sales per outlet in the franchise system in 2006, 2008 and 2010 |
Proportion of outlets discontinued | Q3 | Number of outlets discontinued in the franchise system in 2006, 2008 and 2010 |
Proportion of outlets discontinued | Q4 | Number of outlet in the franchise system at the beginning of 2006, 2008 and 2010 |
Level of specific investments | Q5 | The level of specificity of the investments made by the franchisees is high (e.g., in case of relationship disruption franchisees will lose the value of such investments to a great extent). (Seven-point semantic differential scale) |
Free-rideable services | Q6 | The franchisees provide a high level of services that are free-rideable by other franchisees of the franchise system (e.g., due to the fact that the products/services traded require an important distributor promotion or they are technical or difficult to use). (Seven-point semantic differential scale) |
Chain size | Q7 | Number of outlets of the franchise system in Spain and Portugal at the beginning of 2006 |
Chain age | Q8 | Age of the franchise system in Spain and Portugal at the beginning of 2006 |
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Nogueira, F., de Carvalho, A.B.S. (2015). Networks in the Health and Welfare Sector: A Study Beyond Borders – Portugal/Spain. In: Peris-Ortiz, M., Álvarez-García, J. (eds) Health and Wellness Tourism. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-11490-3_3
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