Abstract
In June 2013 the European Commission agreed to impose provisional anti-dumping duties (AD) on imports of Chinese solar panels. Reactions followed promptly: China openly contemplated duties on several iconic European products such as cars and wine and moved to impose AD duties on chemicals imported from the EU and opened an investigation for wine. A trade war seemed to loom large between Brussels and Beijing.
See ministry of commerce of the People's Republic of China (http://german.mofcom.gov.cn/article/thema/antidumping/201306/20130600155394.shtml) on the investigation opened for wine and Reuters (http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/27/us-china-eu-anti-dumping-idUSBRE95Q06320130627 – “China to impose anti-dumping duties on European chemical”, June 27th 2013) on the imposition of duties on toluidine.
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- 1.
See for instance Spiegel Online (May 19 2013): “Deutsche Industrie bekämpft Solar-Strafzölle für China.”
- 2.
See for instance FAZ (May 28th 2013): “Berlin legt sich im Handelsstreit mit Brüssel an.” and Spiegel Online (May 27 2013): “Streit mit China: EU-Mehrheit lehnt Solar-Strafzölle ab.”
- 3.
See Heute im Bundestag No.266 (May 15th 2013).
- 4.
German exports to China reached 66.6bn € in 2012 (imports from China: 77.3bn €). While German exports increased between 1995 and 2012 by 6.4 % on average, exports to China increased by 15.4 % p.a. See German Statistical Office: https://www.destatis.de/DE/PresseService/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2013/03/PD13_107_51.html
- 5.
According to the WTO dumping occurs when a company exports a product at a lower price than it normally charges on its home market. GATT Art.6 and the Anti-Dumping agreement provide the legal framework for AD use in the WTO. For a short introduction also see http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm or Hoekman and Kostecki (2001).
- 6.
See Kucik and Reinhardt (2008, p.478) who claim that “(...) anti-dumping has become the method of first resort for escaping from a WTO commitment” and note that “Several observers have also argued that the international trading regime’s flexibility provisions, especially anti-dumping, undermine the normative basis for compliance by legitimating protectionism”.
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Wruuck, P. (2015). Introduction. In: The Political Economy of Anti-dumping Protection. Contributions to Economics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-11224-4_1
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