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Inter-Organizational Relationships pp 7–36Cite as

Theories Explaining Inter-Organizational Relationships in Terms of Coordination and Control Needs

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Part of the book series: Contributions to Management Science ((MANAGEMENT SC.))

Abstract

This chapter provides a synoptic description of the main theories that see inter-organizational relationships as coordination and control issues: the Transaction Costs Economics theory, the Agency theory and the Resource Dependence theory. These three theories share the idea that inter-organizational relationships are founded on opportunism and bounded rationality, and that organizations seek to control the critical aspects of their business network interactions in order to pursue their goals. These three theories are often considered as complementary in literature, since they often provide opposite predictions in similar cases. Scholars interested in e-marketplaces and in the inter-organizational impacts of the Internet have mainly focused on the Transaction Costs Economics theory so far; this theory has undergone important evolution and hybridization processes, and is then more thoroughly described than the other two in this chapter.

Authored by Cecilia Rossignoli

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  1. Department of Business Administration, University of Verona, Verona, Italy

    Cecilia Rossignoli & Francesca Ricciardi

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  1. Cecilia Rossignoli
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  2. Francesca Ricciardi
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Rossignoli, C., Ricciardi, F. (2015). Theories Explaining Inter-Organizational Relationships in Terms of Coordination and Control Needs. In: Inter-Organizational Relationships. Contributions to Management Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-11221-3_2

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