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The Ditmarsch Tale of Wonders

  • Conference paper
KI 2014: Advances in Artificial Intelligence (KI 2014)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 8736))

Abstract

We propose a dynamic logic of lying, wherein a ‘lie that φ’ (where φ is a formula in the logic) is an action in the sense of dynamic modal logic, that is interpreted as a state transformer relative to φ. The states that are being transformed are pointed Kripke models encoding the uncertainty of agents about their beliefs. Lies can be about factual propositions but also about modal formulas, such as the beliefs of other agents or the belief consequences of the lies of other agents.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. LORIA — CNRS, Université de Lorraine, France

    Hans van Ditmarsch

Authors
  1. Hans van Ditmarsch
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Universität Bremen, Germany

    Carsten Lutz

  2. University of New South Wales, 2052, Sydney, NSW, Australia

    Michael Thielscher

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van Ditmarsch, H. (2014). The Ditmarsch Tale of Wonders. In: Lutz, C., Thielscher, M. (eds) KI 2014: Advances in Artificial Intelligence. KI 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 8736. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-11206-0_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-11206-0_1

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-11205-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-11206-0

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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