Abstract
The concept of “necessity of thought” plays a central role in Dag Prawitz’s essay “Logical Consequence from a Constructivist Point of View”. The theme is later developed in various articles devoted to the notion of valid inference. In Sect. 4.1 I explain how the notion of necessity of thought emerges from Prawitz’s analysis of logical consequence. I try to expound Prawitz’s views concerning the necessity of thought in Sects. 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4. In Sects. 4.5 and 4.6 I discuss some problems arising with regard to Prawitz’s views.
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Cozzo, C. (2015). Necessity of Thought. In: Wansing, H. (eds) Dag Prawitz on Proofs and Meaning. Outstanding Contributions to Logic, vol 7. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-11041-7_4
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