Abstract
CSR involves the management of a corporation using the resources of that corporation to promote the welfare of non-shareholders (disadvantaged members of the community, the global poor, animals, future generations, etc.). In some cases CSR is used as a tactic to augment the competitive strength of a firm. We can call this “instrumental CSR” or “shared-value CSR”. This is where promoting non-shareholder welfare is seen as the best way of maximising shareholder value in the long term. In other cases, however, promoting the welfare of non-shareholders may be expected to compromise the economic interests of shareholders to some extent; one group benefits at the expense of the other. Call this “zero-sum” CSR. If we accept the so-called principle of shareholder primacy, Zero-Sum CSR appears morally problematic. This principle says that shareholders have a unique and privileged moral status in the corporation. More specifically, it says that shareholders, in virtue of their special relationship with management, are entitled to have the corporation governed in a way that is aimed at maximising their economic interests. My aim is to carefully distinguish three argumentative strategies for reconciling Zero-Sum CSR with the moral rights of shareholders.
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Notes
- 1.
In a similar vein Bruce Langtry (1994) describes shareholders as “residual risk bearers”. Langry explains: “they guarantee the performance of contracts, accepting the risk of net loss in return for entitlement to any net profit” (p. 438).
- 2.
Tom Campbell (2009) rightly points out that even if people do have natural welfare rights, it does not follow that corporations have the corresponding obligation to fulfil those rights. Campbell suggests that this may in fact be unfair and inefficient way of distributing wealth (pp. 556–557).
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Dobos, N. (2015). Shareholder Rights and Zero-Sum CSR: Strategies for Reconciliation. In: Idowu, S., Frederiksen, C., Mermod, A., Nielsen, M. (eds) Corporate Social Responsibility and Governance. CSR, Sustainability, Ethics & Governance. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-10909-1_13
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