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Distributed MILS Architectural Approach for Secure Smart Grids

  • Denis BytschkowEmail author
  • Jean Quilbeuf
  • Georgeta Igna
  • Harald Ruess
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8448)

Abstract

Successful decentralized and prosumer-based smart grids need to be at least as dependable and secure as the prevailing one-way, generation-transmission-distribution-consumer power grids. With this motivation in mind, we propose a two-phase model-based design methodology for secure architectural design and secure deployment of such a security architecture on a distributed separation kernel. In particular, we are modeling essential parts of a smart micro grid with several interacting prosumers, and demonstrate exemplary security/privacy requirements of this smart grid. The security policy architecture of this smart grid is deployed on a secure distributed platform, relying on a combination of separation kernels and deterministic network, as developed in the Distributed MILS project.

Keywords

Smart grid security Distributed MILS Separation kernel Formal verification Security policy architecture  Configuration compiler 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Denis Bytschkow
    • 1
    Email author
  • Jean Quilbeuf
    • 1
  • Georgeta Igna
    • 1
  • Harald Ruess
    • 1
  1. 1.fortiss GmbHAn-Institut Technische Universität MünchenMünchenGermany

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