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CryPLH: Protecting Smart Energy Systems from Targeted Attacks with a PLC Honeypot

  • Dániel István Buza
  • Ferenc Juhász
  • György Miru
  • Márk Félegyházi
  • Tamás HolczerEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8448)

Abstract

Smart grids consist of suppliers, consumers, and other parts. The main suppliers are normally supervised by industrial control systems. These systems rely on programmable logic controllers (PLCs) to control industrial processes and communicate with the supervisory system. Until recently, industrial operators relied on the assumption that these PLCs are isolated from the online world and hence cannot be the target of attacks. Recent events, such as the infamous Stuxnet attack [15] directed the attention of the security and control system community to the vulnerabilities of control system elements, such as PLCs. In this paper, we design and implement the Crysys PLC honeypot (CryPLH) system to detect targeted attacks against industrial control systems. This PLC honeypot can be implemented as part of a larger security monitoring system. Our honeypot implementation improves upon existing solutions in several aspects: most importantly in level of interaction and ease of configuration. Results of an evaluation show that our honeypot is largely indistinguishable from a real device from the attacker’s perspective. As a collateral of our analysis, we were able to identify some security issues in the real PLC device we tested and implemented specific firewall rules to protect the device from targeted attacks.

Keywords

Virtual Machine Target Attack Python Script Real Device Simple Network Management Protocol 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgement

We would like to acknowledge the help and the provided Siemens PLC device to Óbuda University and the company evopro. This work is partially funded by the EIT ICTLabs through activity ASES 13030.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dániel István Buza
    • 1
  • Ferenc Juhász
    • 1
  • György Miru
    • 1
  • Márk Félegyházi
    • 1
  • Tamás Holczer
    • 1
    Email author
  1. 1.Laboratory for Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS Lab), Department of Networked Systems and Services (HIT)Budapest University of Technology and Economics (BME)BudapestHungary

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