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Punishibility of Artificial Intelligence Technology

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Liability for Crimes Involving Artificial Intelligence Systems

Abstract

In determining the type and measure of punishment to be imposed on the offender, the court is guided by the general purposes of punishment. The court is expected to assess and evaluate each case in this context, based on two types of considerations: data about the offense (in rem) and the about the offender (in personam). When the court evaluates these two types of data, it does so through the prism of the general purposes of punishment. In the modern criminal law there are four accepted general purposes of punishment. The four purposes are retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation. These purposes are discussed below.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See in general Gabriel Hallevy, The Right to Be Punished – Modern Doctrinal Sentencing 15–56 (2013).

  2. 2.

    Bronislaw Malinowski, Crime and Custom in Savage Society (1959, 1982).

  3. 3.

    Nigel Walker, Why Punish? (1991).

  4. 4.

    Paul Butler, Retribution, for Liberals, 46 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1873 (1999); Michele Cotton, Back With a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1313 (2000); Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1659 (1992).

  5. 5.

    See, e.g., article 242 of the German Penal Code.

  6. 6.

    Ledger Wood, Responsibility and Punishment, 28 Am. Inst. Crim. L. & Criminology 630 (1938).

  7. 7.

    Immanuel Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Justice: Part I – The Metaphysics of Morals 102 (trans. John Ladd, 1965).

  8. 8.

    Gabriel Hallevy, Victim’s Complicity in Criminal Law, 2 Int’l J. Punishment & Sentencing 74 (2006).

  9. 9.

    Andrew von Hirsch, Doing Justice: The Choice of Punishment 50 (1976). Compare United States v. Bergman, 416 F.Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y.1976); Richard S. Frase, Limiting Retributivism, Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy 135 (Andrew von Hirsch, Andrew Ashworth and Julian Roberts eds., 3rd ed., 2009).

  10. 10.

    Where W is the value of the benefit, R is the risk of being caught, and P is the value of the punishment.

  11. 11.

    In a higher point of view, this may prospectively reduce the state’s expenses, if the sanction is effective. If delinquency is prevented or reduced, some of the state’s sources may be available for other social tasks.

  12. 12.

    Gabriel Hallevy, The Recidivist Wants to Be Punished – Punishment as an Incentive to Re-offend, 5 Int’l J. of Punishment & Sentencing 124 (2009).

  13. 13.

    Susan Easton and Christine Piper, Sentencing and Punishment: The Quest for Justice 124–126 (2nd ed., 2008); Nigel Walker, Why Punish? (1991); Andrew von Hirsch, Anthony E. Bottoms and Elizabeth Burney, Criminal Deterrence and Sentence Severity (1999); Daniel Nagin, General Deterrence: A Review of the Empirical Evidence, Deterrence and Incapacitation: Estimating the Effects of Criminal Sanctions on Crime Rates 95 (Alfred Blumstein, Jacqueline Cohen and Daniel Nagin eds., 1978); Margery Fry, Arms of the Law 76 (1951).

  14. 14.

    James Q. Wilson, Thinking about Crime 123–142 (2nd ed., 1985).

  15. 15.

    Laurence H. Ross, Deterrence Regained: The Cheshire Constabulary’s “Breathalyser Blitz”, 6 J. Legal Stud. 241 (1977).

  16. 16.

    Stephan Hurwitz, Criminology 303 (1952).

  17. 17.

    Easton and Piper, supra note 13, at pp. 124–126.

  18. 18.

    Paul Johann Anselm Feuerbach, Lehrbuch des Gemeinen in Deutschland Gültigen Peinlichen Rechts 117 (1812, 2007).

  19. 19.

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  20. 20.

    Johannes Andenaes, The Morality of Deterrence, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 649 (1970).

  21. 21.

    Jeffrie G. Murphy, Getting Even: Forgiveness and Its Limits (2003); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2 Philosophy and Public Affairs 43 (1973).

  22. 22.

    Dan M. Kahan, Between the Economics and Sociology: The New Path of Deterrence, 95 Mich L. Rev. 2477 (1997); Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence’s Difficulty, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2385 (1997); Jonathan S. Abernethy, The Methodology of Death: Reexamining the Deterrence Rationale, 27 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 379 (1996); Craig J. Albert, Challenging Deterrence: New Insights on Capital Punishment Derived from Panel Data, 60 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 321 (1999); James M. Galliher and John F. Galliher, A “Commonsense” Theory of Deterrence and the “Ideology” of Science: The New York State Death Penalty Debate, 92 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 307 (2002); Andrew D. Leipold, The War on Drugs and the Puzzle of Deterrence, 6 J. Gender Race & Just. 111 (2002).

  23. 23.

    For the principle of personal liability in criminal law see Gabriel Hallevy, The Matrix of Derivative Criminal Liability 1–61 (2012).

  24. 24.

    Antony Robin Duff and David Garland, Introduction: Thinking about Punishment, A Reader on Punishment 1, 11 (Antony Robin Duff and David Garland eds., 1994).

  25. 25.

    Easton and Piper, supra note 13, at pp. 124–126.

  26. 26.

    Leon Radzinowicz and Roger Hood, A History of English Criminal Law and Its Administration from 1750 vol. 5: The Emergence of Penal Policy (1986).

  27. 27.

    Mirko Bagaric, Punishment and Sentencing: A Rational Approach (2001).

  28. 28.

    Jeffrie G. Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2 Philosophy and Public Affairs 43 (1973).

  29. 29.

    Gabriel Hallevy, Therapeutic Victim-Offender Mediation within the Criminal Justice Process – Sharpening the Evaluation of Personal Potential for Rehabilitation while Righting Wrongs under the Alternative-Dispute-Resolution (ADR) Philosophy, 16 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 65 (2011).

  30. 30.

    David Abrahamsen, Crime and the Human Mind (1945); Elmer H. Johnson, Crime, Correction and Society 44–439 (1968); William C. Menninger, Psychiatrist to a Troubled World (1967).

  31. 31.

    John Lewis Gillin, Criminology and Penology 708 (1927); Paul W. Tappan, Sentences for Sex Criminals, 42 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 332 (1951).

  32. 32.

    Robert W. Kastenmeier and Howard C. Eglit, Parole Release Decision-Making: Rehabilitation, Expertise and the Demise of Mythology, 22 Am. U. L. Rev. 477 (1973); Jessica Mitford, Kind and Usual Punishment: The Prison Business (1974).

  33. 33.

    David P. Farrington and Brandon C. Welsh, Preventing Crime: What Works for Children, Offenders, Victims and Places (2006); Lawrence W. Sherman, David P. Farrington, Doris Leyton MacKenzie and Brandon C. Welsh, Evidence-Based Crime Prevention (2006); Rosemary Sheehan, Gill Mclvor and Chris Trotter, What Works with Women Offenders (2007); Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F.Supp. 269 (1977); Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2003] E.W.C.A. Civ. 1522, [2003] All E.R. (D) 56; Secretary of State for Justice, [2008] E.W.C.A. Civ. 30, [2008] All E.R. (D) 15, [2008] 3 All E.R. 104; Anthony E. Bottoms, Empirical Research Relevant to Sentencing Frameworks: Reform and Rehabilitation, Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy 16 (Andrew von Hirsch, Andrew Ashworth and Julian Roberts eds., 3rd ed., 2009); Peter Raynor, Assessing the Research on ‘What Works’, Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy 19 (Andrew von Hirsch, Andrew Ashworth and Julian Roberts eds., 3rd ed., 2009); Francis T. Cullen and Karen E. Gilbert, Reaffirming Rehabilitation, Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy 28 (Andrew von Hirsch, Andrew Ashworth and Julian Roberts eds., 3rd ed., 2009); Andrew von Hirsch and Lisa Maher, Should Penal Rehabilitation Be Revived?, Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy 33 (Andrew von Hirsch, Andrew Ashworth and Julian Roberts eds., 3rd ed., 2009).

  34. 34.

    Richard P. Seiter and Karen R. Kadela, Prisoner Reentry: What Works, What Does Not, and What Is Promising, 49 Crime and Delinquency 360 (2003); Clive R. Hollin, Treatment Programs for Offenders, 22 Int’l J. of Law & Psychiatry 361 (1999).

  35. 35.

    Francis A. Allen, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 226 (1959); Livingston Hall and Sheldon Glueck, Criminal Law and Its Enforcement 18 (2nd ed., 1958); Edward Rubin, Just Say No to Retribution, 7 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 17 (2003).

  36. 36.

    Andrew Ashworth, Rehabilitation, Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy 1, 2 (Andrew von Hirsch, Andrew Ashworth and Julian Roberts eds., 3rd ed., 2009); Peter Raynor and Gwen Robinson, Rehabilitation, Crime and Justice 21 (2005); Shadd Maruna, Making Good: How Convicts Reform and Build their Lives (2001); Stephen Farrall, Rethinking What Works with Offenders: Probation, Social Context, and Desistance from Crime (2002).

  37. 37.

    Leon Radzinowicz and Roger Hood, A History of English Criminal Law and Its Administration from 1750 vol. 5: The Emergence of Penal Policy (1986).

  38. 38.

    Mirko Bagaric, Punishment and Sentencing: A Rational Approach (2001).

  39. 39.

    Martin P. Kafka, Sex Offending and Sexual Appetite: The Clinical and Theoretical Relevance of Hypersexual Desire, 47 Int’l J. of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 439 (2003); Matthew Jones, Overcoming the Myth of Free Will in Criminal Law: The True Impact of the Genetic Revolution, 52 Duke L. J. 1031 (2003); Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 257 (1987).

  40. 40.

    Ledger Wood, Responsibility and Punishment, 28 Am. Inst. Crim. L. & Criminology 630, 639 (1938).

  41. 41.

    Gerald Caplan, Principles of Preventive Psychiatry (1964).

  42. 42.

    Marcus Felson, Crime and Everyday Life: Insights and Implications for Society 17, 95, 109, 120 (1994).

  43. 43.

    Ronald V. Clarke, Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies (1992); Ronald V. Clarke and Derek B. Cornish, Modeling Offenders’ Decisions: A Framework for Policy and Research, 6 Crime and Justice: An Annual Review of Research 147 (1985).

  44. 44.

    Don M. Gottfredson, Assessment and Prediction Methods in Crime and Delinquency, Presidents National Commission for Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime (1967); Joan Petersilia and Peter W. Greenwood, Mandatory Prison Sentences: Their Projected Effects on Crime and Prison Populations, 69 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 604 (1978).

  45. 45.

    John W. Hinton, Dangerousness: Problems of Assessment and Prediction (1983); John Monahan, Predicting Violent Behavior: An Assessment of Clinical Techniques (1981); Peter Greenwood and Allan Abrahamse, Selective Incapacitation (1982).

  46. 46.

    Jack P. Gibbs, Crime, Punishment and Deterrence 58 (1975).

  47. 47.

    Barbara Hudson, Understanding Justice: An Introduction to Ideas, Perspectives and Controversies in Modern Penal Theory 32 (1996, 2003).

  48. 48.

    Joseph Murray, The Effects of Imprisonment on Families and Children of Prisoners, The Effects of Imprisonment 442 (Alison Liebling and Shadd Maruna eds., 2005); Shadd Maruna and Thomas P. Le Bel, Welcome Home? Examining the “Reentry Court” Concept from a Strength-Based Perspective, 4 Western Criminology Review 91 (2003).

  49. 49.

    Malcolm M. Feeley and Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 Criminology 449 (1992); Andrew von Hirsch, Incapacitation, Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy 75 (Andrew von Hirsch, Andrew Ashworth and Julian Roberts eds., 3rd ed., 2009); Andrew von Hirsch, Past or Future Crimes: Deservedness and Dangerousness in the Sentencing of Criminals 176–178 (1985).

  50. 50.

    Franklin E. Zimring and Gordon J. Hawkins, Deterrence: The Legal Threat in Crime Control (1973).

  51. 51.

    Mark H. Moore, Susan R. Estrich, Daniel McGillis and William Spellman, Dealing with Dangerous Offenders: The Elusive Target of Justice (1985).

  52. 52.

    Anthony E. Bottoms and Roger Brownsword, Incapacitation and “Vivid Danger”, Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy 83 (Andrew von Hirsch, Andrew Ashworth and Julian Roberts eds., 3rd ed., 2009); Andrew von Hirsch and Andrew Ashworth, Extending Sentences for Dangerousness: Reflections on the Bottoms-Brownsword Model, Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy 85 (Andrew von Hirsch, Andrew Ashworth and Julian Roberts eds., 3rd ed., 2009).

  53. 53.

    Andrew von Hirsch and Lila Kazemian, Predictive Sentencing and Selective Incapacitation, Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy 95 (Andrew von Hirsch, Andrew Ashworth and Julian Roberts eds., 3rd ed., 2009); Lila Kazemian and David P. Farrington, Exploring Residual Career Length and Residual Number of Offenses for Two Generations of Repeat Offenders, 43 J. of Research in Crime and Delinquency 89 (2006).

  54. 54.

    Arne Lonberg, The Penal System of Denmark (1975); Jean E. Floud and Warren Young, Dangerousness and Criminal Justice (1981); Linda Sleffel, The Law and the Dangerous Criminal (1977); Parole Board, [2003] U.K.H.L. 42, [2004] 1 A.C. 1.

  55. 55.

    W.H. Hammond and Edna Chayen, Persistent Criminals (1963); David A. Thomas, Principles of Sentencing 309 (1980); Lawrence Davidoff and John Barkway, Extended Terms of Imprisonment for Persistent Offenders, 21 Home Office Research Bulletin 43 (1986); Andrew von Hirsch, Prediction of Criminal Conduct and Preventive Confinement of Convicted Persons, 21 Buff. L. Rev. 717 (1972).

  56. 56.

    See, e.g., article 104 of the Sexual Offences Act, 2003, c.42; article 227 of the Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c.44; articles 98–101 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act, 2008, c.4; Richards, [2006] E.W.C.A. Crim. 2519, [2007] Crim. L.R. 173.

  57. 57.

    Jonathan Simon, The Ideological Effect of Actuarial Practices, 22 Law & Society Rev. 771 (1988); Jonathan Simon, Megan’s Law: Crime and Democracy in Late Modern America, 25 Law & Social Inquiry 1111 (2000).

  58. 58.

    Joseph B. Vaughn, A Survey of Juvenile Electronic Monitoring and Home Confinement Programs, 40 Juvenile & Fam. C. J. 1 (1989).

  59. 59.

    Nigel Walker, Punishment, Danger and Stigma: The Morality of Criminal Justice ch. 5 (1980); Marvin E. Wolfgang, Current Trends in Penal Philosophy, 14 Isr. L. Rev. 427 (1979).

  60. 60.

    Gabriel Hallevy, The Matrix of Derivative Criminal Liability 75–83 (2012).

  61. 61.

    Norval Morris, Incapacitation within Limits, Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy 90 (Andrew von Hirsch, Andrew Ashworth and Julian Roberts eds., 3rd ed., 2009).

  62. 62.

    Mirko Bagaric, Punishment and Sentencing: A Rational Approach (2001).

  63. 63.

    Herbert L. Packer, The Practical Limits of Deterrence, Contemporary Punishment 102, 105 (Rudolph J. Gerber, Patrick D. McAnany and Norval Morris eds., 1972).

  64. 64.

    Martin P. Kafka, Sex Offending and Sexual Appetite: The Clinical and Theoretical Relevance of Hypersexual Desire, 47 Int’l J. of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 439 (2003); Matthew Jones, Overcoming the Myth of Free Will in Criminal Law: The True Impact of the Genetic Revolution, 52 Duke L. J. 1031 (2003); Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 257 (1987).

  65. 65.

    Livingston Hall and Sheldon Glueck, Criminal Law and Its Enforcement 17 (2nd ed., 1958).

  66. 66.

    Martin P. Kafka, Sex Offending and Sexual Appetite: The Clinical and Theoretical Relevance of Hypersexual Desire, 47 Int’l J. of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 439 (2003); Matthew Jones, Overcoming the Myth of Free Will in Criminal Law: The True Impact of the Genetic Revolution, 52 Duke L. J. 1031 (2003); Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 257 (1987).

  67. 67.

    Peter A. French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility 47 (1984).

  68. 68.

    Stuart Field and Nico Jorg, Corporate Liability and Manslaughter: Should We Be Going Dutch?, [1991] Crim. L.R. 156 (1991).

  69. 69.

    Harry G. Henn and John R. Alexander, Corporations and Other Business Enterprises 184 (3rd ed., 1983); People v. Strong, 363 Ill. 602, 2 N.E.2d 942 (1936); State v. Traux, 130 Wash. 69, 226 P. 259 (1924); United States v. Union Supply Co., 215 U.S. 50, 30 S.Ct. 15, 54 L.Ed. 87 (1909); State v. Ice & Fuel Co., 166 N.C. 366, 81 S.E. 737 (1914); Commonwealth v. McIlwain School Bus Lines Inc., 283 Pa.Super. 1, 423 A.2d 413 (1980).

  70. 70.

    John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalised Inquiry Into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 386 (1981); Steven Box, Power, Crime and Mystification 16–79 (1983); Brent Fisse and John Braithwaite, The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime: Individualism, Collectivism and Accountability, 11 Sydney L. Rev. 468 (1988).

  71. 71.

    Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct, 60 Law & Contemp. Probs. 23 (1997); Richard Gruner, To Let the Punishment Fit the Organization: Sanctioning Corporate Offenders Through Corporate Probation, 16 Am. J. Crim. L. 1 (1988); Steven Walt and William S. Laufer, Why Personhood Doesn’t Matter: Corporate Criminal Liability and Sanctions, 18 Am. J. Crim. L. 263 (1991).

  72. 72.

    Stuart Field and Nico Jorg, Corporate Liability and Manslaughter: Should We Be Going Dutch?, [1991] Crim. L.R. 156 (1991).

  73. 73.

    Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct, 60 Law & Contemp. Probs. 23 (1997); Richard Gruner, To Let the Punishment Fit the Organization: Sanctioning Corporate Offenders Through Corporate Probation, 16 Am. J. Crim. L. 1 (1988); Steven Walt and William S. Laufer, Why Personhood Doesn’t Matter: Corporate Criminal Liability and Sanctions, 18 Am. J. Crim. L. 263 (1991).

  74. 74.

    United States v. Allegheny Bottling Company, 695 F.Supp. 856 (1988).

  75. 75.

    Ibid, at p. 858.

  76. 76.

    Ibid.

  77. 77.

    John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalised Inquiry Into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 386 (1981); Steven Box, Power, Crime and Mystification 16–79 (1983); Brent Fisse and John Braithwaite, The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime: Individualism, Collectivism and Accountability, 11 Sydney L. Rev. 468 (1988).

  78. 78.

    Allegheny Bottling Company case, supra note 75, at p. 861.

  79. 79.

    Ibid, at p. 861: “Such restraint of individuals is accomplished by, for example, placing them in the custody of the United States Marshal. Likewise, corporate imprisonment can be accomplished by simply placing the corporation in the custody of the United States Marshal. The United States Marshal would restrain the corporation by seizing the corporation’s physical assets or part of the assets or restricting its actions or liberty in a particular manner. When this sentence was contemplated, the United States Marshal for the Eastern District of Virginia, Roger Ray, was contacted. When asked if he could imprison Allegheny Pepsi, he stated that he could. He stated that he restrained corporations regularly for bankruptcy court. He stated that he could close the physical plant itself and guard it. He further stated that he could allow employees to come and go and limit certain actions or sales if that is what the Court imposes. Richard Lovelace said some three hundred years ago, ‘stone walls do not a prison make, nor iron bars a cage.’ It is certainly true that we erect our own walls or barriers that restrain ourselves. Any person may be imprisoned if capable of being restrained in some fashion or in some way, regardless of who imposes it. Who am I to say that imprisonment is impossible when the keeper indicates that it can physically be done? Obviously, one can restrain a corporation. If so, why should it be more privileged than an individual citizen? There is no reason, and accordingly, a corporation should not be more privileged. Cases in the past have assumed that corporations cannot be imprisoned, without any cited authority for that proposition. … This Court, however, has been unable to find any case which actually held that corporate imprisonment is illegal, unconstitutional or impossible. Considerable confusion regarding the ability of courts to order a corporation imprisoned has been caused by courts mistakenly thinking that imprisonment necessarily involves incarceration in jail. … But since imprisonment of a corporation does not necessarily involve incarceration, there is no reason to continue the assumption, which has lingered in the legal system unexamined and without support, that a corporation cannot be imprisoned. Since the Marshal can restrain the corporation’s liberty and has done so in bankruptcy cases, there is no reason that he cannot do so in this case as he himself has so stated prior to the imposition of this sentence”.

  80. 80.

    Russ VerSteeg, Early Mesopotamian Law 126 (2000); G. R. Driver and John C. Miles, The Babylonian Laws, Vol. I: Legal Commentary 206, 495–496 (1952): “The capital penalty is most often expressed by saying that the offender ‘shall be killed’…; this occurs seventeen times in the first thirty-four sections. A second form of expression, which occurs five times, is that ‘they shall kill’… the offender”.

  81. 81.

    Frank E. Hartung, Trends in the Use of Capital Punishment, 284(1) Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 8 (1952).

  82. 82.

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  83. 83.

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  84. 84.

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  85. 85.

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  86. 86.

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  88. 88.

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  1. Faculty of Law, Ono Academic College, Kiryat Ono, Israel

    Gabriel Hallevy

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Hallevy, G. (2015). Punishibility of Artificial Intelligence Technology. In: Liability for Crimes Involving Artificial Intelligence Systems. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-10124-8_6

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