Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

China’s Rise: Towards a Division of Labor in Transatlantic Relations

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Responding to China’s Rise

Part of the book series: The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific ((PEAP,volume 15))

Abstract

This chapter examines the implications of China’s rise for transatlantic relations. Will China’s rise weaken transatlantic ties or will it be a force for more cooperation across the Atlantic? While China’s rise presents more challenges than opportunities for the transatlantic relationship, this chapter argues that the US and European states can develop complementary strategies and a division of labor in dealing with a rising China, US–China bipolarity, and a more East Asia-centered world.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    This chapter draws on Tunsjø (2011a, 2011b, 2012, 2013a).

  2. 2.

    Ross et al. (2010).

  3. 3.

    The argument is that a new international system that is emerging because of changes in the distribution of capabilities within the system. However, the international system remains anarchical.

  4. 4.

    Tunsjø (2010, 2013b).

  5. 5.

    Heng (2006); Rasmussen (2006).

  6. 6.

    Albert (2001, 64).

  7. 7.

    Coker (2009). It should be noted that the balance of power theory predominantly applies to great power relations.

  8. 8.

    Tunsjø (2011a, 2011b, 2013b).

  9. 9.

    Mearsheimer (2001); Waltz (1979).

  10. 10.

    Walt (1987).

  11. 11.

    Lieber and Alexander (2005/2006, 192).

  12. 12.

    On the soft balancing debate, see Art (2006); Brooks and Wohlforth (2005); Fortmann et al. (2004); Lieber and Alexander (2005); Pape (2005); and Paul (2004).

  13. 13.

    The State Council Information Office of the PRC (2008).

  14. 14.

    Tunsjø (2011a). The author is grateful to Johannes Gullestad Rø for his comments and suggestions in conceptualizing the term hedging.

  15. 15.

    See among others Deudney et al. (2011); Kerr and Liu (2007); Ross et al. (2010); and Shambaugh et al. (2008).

  16. 16.

    Foot (2010).

  17. 17.

    Shambaugh (2005a).

  18. 18.

    Gill (2008, 278; 2010).

  19. 19.

    US Department of Defense (2006, 2010a, 2010b, 2012).

  20. 20.

    Art (2004, 200–201); Tunsjø (2013a); US Department of Defense (2012); “Why Europe No Longer Matters,” The Washington Post, 18 June 2011.

  21. 21.

    “Asia’s Rise Means We Must Re-think EU-US Relations,” Europe’s World, 1 February 2007. Available from http://europesworld.org/2007/02/01/asias-rise-means-we-must-re-think-eu-us-relations/. Accessed 2014-05-02.

  22. 22.

    A warning to the EU and the European defense industry that their access to the US market might be restricted if the weapons embargo were lifted has probably been the most important tool available to US policymakers for ensuring compliance with their position.

  23. 23.

    “Ashton pragmatic on China in EU foreign policy blueprint,” EUobserver, 17 December 2010.

  24. 24.

    Keohane (2002, 744); Niblett (2007, 635).

  25. 25.

    Keohane (2002).

  26. 26.

    Shambaugh (2008); Wu (2010).

  27. 27.

    “Why Europe no longer matters,” The Washington Post, 18 June 2011.

  28. 28.

    “Full Text: Barack Obama’s Speech in Tokyo,” Financial Times, 14 November 2009.

  29. 29.

    “Europe and Benign Neglect,” The New York Times, 6 September 2010.

  30. 30.

    Ibid.

  31. 31.

    Kagan (2002, 4). See also Lundestad (2005).

  32. 32.

    Walt (1998/1999).

  33. 33.

    Hallams et al. (2013); Matlary and Petersson (2013).

  34. 34.

    Allin et al. (2007); Dannreuther and Peterson (2006).

  35. 35.

    Shambaugh (2005a).

  36. 36.

    http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/united-states/. Accessed 1 May 2014.

  37. 37.

    Given the role of the EU and the financial austerity in many European states, the idea of a strong arms buildup and an arms race in Europe may seem far-fetched. However, great powers’ shifting fortunes and ambitions have surprised many in the past, and the scenario cannot be ruled out.

  38. 38.

    Deudney et al. (2011); “In China’s Orbit,” The Wall Street Journal, 18 November 2010; Kaplan (2009); Kennedy (2010, 6–9); Mahbubani (2008); Overholt (2008); Shambaugh (2005b). For a more skeptical view about the rise of Asia, see Pei (2009).

  39. 39.

    Art (2004, 201–202); “Europe and Benign Neglect,” New York Times, 6 September 2010.

  40. 40.

    “Asia’s Rise Reshapes Global Economy, Prices, RBA’s Stevens Says,” Bloomberg, 9 March 2011.

  41. 41.

    Kennedy (2010).

  42. 42.

    Ibid.

  43. 43.

    Art (2004, 202), Weidenfeld and Zaborowski (2007); “Why Europe No Longer Matters,” The Washington Post, 18 June 2011.

  44. 44.

    “Obama Speech on Asia Well Received in the Region,” The Independent, 14 November 2009.

  45. 45.

    Art (2004, 201).

  46. 46.

    Walt (1998/1999).

  47. 47.

    Ibid.

  48. 48.

    Mearsheimer (2006); Ross (2013).

  49. 49.

    Walt (1998/1999).

  50. 50.

    Joint Chiefs of Staff (2011); O’Rourke (CitationRef CitationID="CR11”>2009</CitationRef>, 25); Ross (2004, 280–282, 2013); US Department of Defense (2012).

  51. 51.

    US Department of Defense (2012).

  52. 52.

    Rø (2013).

  53. 53.

    Tunsjø (2013a).

  54. 54.

    The last time a US carrier operated in Norwegian waters and close to where Russia operates its Northern Fleet was in 1993.

  55. 55.

    “Obama: Defense Cuts Won’t Affect Asia-Pacific Region,” USA Today, 17 November 2011.

  56. 56.

    Waltz (1979, 69–70; 2000, 27).

  57. 57.

    Waltz (2000, 32). See also Waltz (1993).

  58. 58.

    Waltz (2000, 37).

  59. 59.

    Waltz (2000, 27).

  60. 60.

    Layne (1993); Mearsheimer (1990).

  61. 61.

    Brooks and Wohlforth (2008); Hansen (2011); Ikenberry et al. (2011).

  62. 62.

    Kupchan (2002); Murray and Brown (2012); National Intelligence Council (2012); Zakaria (2008).

  63. 63.

    Layne (2006, 2009, 2012); Posen (2011).

  64. 64.

    Posen (2009).

  65. 65.

    Layne (2012, 205).

  66. 66.

    Beckley (2011); Wohforth (2012).

  67. 67.

    Waltz (1979, 131). The key question now is whether China can be placed in the top rank with the US and score above other great powers, such as Russia.

  68. 68.

    Cabestan (2010); Gow (2010); Wacker (2010).

  69. 69.

    Grant (2010); Wacker (2010).

  70. 70.

    Tunsjø (2013a).

  71. 71.

    Walt (1998/1999).

  72. 72.

    Ross (2004, 2006).

  73. 73.

    Mackinder (1904, 427, 436).

  74. 74.

    Kagan (2008); Lucas (2008).

  75. 75.

    Tunsjø (2011a, 2013a).

  76. 76.

    Art (2010).

  77. 77.

    Tunsjø (2013a).

  78. 78.

    Fortmann et al. (2004, 372); Ikenberry et al. (2011).

  79. 79.

    Ross et al. (2010).

  80. 80.

    Waltz (1979, 168–170).

  81. 81.

    The argument for a return to bipolarity is not discussed in depth in this chapter. However, it should be noted that roughly similar bipolar distribution of capabilities between the current international system and the system in 1950 has not resulted in similar effects. This could be a result of the fact that the international system is not yet bipolar. Conversely, and more convincingly, it can be argued that the international system is at the starting point of a new bipolar era, but the differences and importance of geography (continental Europe vs. maritime East Asia), nuclear weapons, economic interdependence, ideology, and alliance formations will postpone balancing in the twenty-first century bipolar system until China reaches more power parity with the United States.

  82. 82.

    Waltz (1979, 127).

  83. 83.

    Kluth and Pilegaard (2011).

  84. 84.

    The concept of hedging has also been applied to other great powers, such as Japan and India, as well as other states in Asia and Europe. Samuels (2007, 7) sums up Japan’s security policy in terms of hedging and goes a long way to suggest that the Japanese case can be generalized: “Japan has long been doing what all states do to reduce risk and maximize gain in an uncertain world—it has hedged.” For hedging behavior in Asia see among others: “Asia primed for a new Cold War,” The Australian, 2 February 2011; Cruz De Castro (2009); Department of Defense (Australia) (2009); Goh (2005, 2006); Kuik (2008); Murphy (2010); Sutter (2006). On hedging in Europe, see Art (2004). On hedging in India, see Kapila (2008) and Scott (2008); “The country needs a more informed debate on China: Nirupama Rao,” The Hindu, 22 December 2010.

  85. 85.

    Medeiros (2006).

  86. 86.

    In the White House’s National Security Strategy (2006), published in March 2006, the Bush administration spelled out its general outlook on China: “The US will welcome the emergence of a China that is peaceful and prosperous and that cooperates with us on common challenges and mutual interest …while we hedge [my emphasis] against other possibilities” (pp. 41–42). The 2006 US Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) communicates the same general sentiment (p. 30). In several of its annual reports to Congress on China’s military developments, the Department of Defense (DoD) underscores that China’s rise will “naturally and understandably prompt international responses that hedge against the unknown [or] lead to hedging against the unknown” (US Department of Defense 2010b). Moreover, the US DoD’s June 2008 National Defense Strategy elaborates on the “hedging strategy,” stating that the “Department will respond to China’s expanding military power, and to uncertainties over how it might be used, through shaping and hedging” (2008, 10).

  87. 87.

    Zoellick (2005).

  88. 88.

    US Department of Defense (2010a, 32, 90, 94).

  89. 89.

    While hedging is not part of their analysis, the authors of a Transatlantic Academy report recommend that the US, NATO, and the EU redefine and reshape a new division of labor between them. See Deudney et al. (2011).

  90. 90.

    Brooks and Wohlforth (2005, 91–92).

  91. 91.

    Michta (2011, 60).

  92. 92.

    Tunsjø (2011b).

  93. 93.

    “NATO Needs Better Nonmilitary Options,” Defense News, 21 March 2011.

  94. 94.

    “NATO Needs Better Nonmilitary Options,” Defense News, 21 March 2011.

  95. 95.

    Waltz (1979, 105).

  96. 96.

    Schweller (1999).

  97. 97.

    Foot (2006, 88–90).

References

  • Albert, Mathias. 2001. From Defending Borders Towards Managing Geopolitical Risks? Security in a Globalized World. Geopolitics 5(1): 57–80.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Allin, Dana H., Gilles Andréani, Philippe Errera, and Gary Samore. 2007. Adelphi Paper 389: Repairing the Damage, Possibilities and Limits of Transatlantic Consensus. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Art, Robert J. 2004. Europe Hedges Its Security Bets. In Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, ed. T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, 179–213. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • _____. 2006. Correspondence: Striking a Balance. International Security 30(3):177–85.

    Google Scholar 

  • _____. 2010. The United States and the future global order. In US–China–EU Relations: Managing the New World Order, ed. Robert S. Ross, Øystein Tunsjø, and Zhang Tuosheng, 7–25. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Beckley, Michael. 2011. China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure. International Security 36(3): 41–78.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brooks, Stephen G., and William C. Wohlforth. 2005. Hard Times for Soft Balancing. International Security 30(1): 72–108.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • _____. 2008. World Out of Balance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cabestan, Jean-Pierre. 2010. China and European Security and Economic Interests: A French Perspective. In US–China–EU Relations: Managing the New World Order, ed. Robert S. Ross, Øystein Tunsjø, and Zhang Tuosheng, 122–42. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Coker, Christopher. 2009. War in an Age of Risk. Cambridge: Polity Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cruz De Castro, Renato. 2009. The US-Philippine Alliance: An Evolving Hedge against an Emerging China Challenge. Contemporary Southeast Asia 31(3): 399–423.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dannreuther, Roland, and John Peterson (eds.). 2006. Security Strategy and Transatlantic Relations. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Department of Defense (Australia). 2009. Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030. Defense White Paper. http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper2009/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf (accessed 12 February 2014).

  • Deudney, Daniel, James Goldgeier, Hanns W. Maull, Steffen Kern, Soo Yeon Kim, and Iskander Rehman. 2011. Global Shift: How the West Should Respond to the Rise of China. Washington, DC: Transatlantic Academy.

    Google Scholar 

  • Foot, Rosemary. 2006. Chinese Strategies in a US-Hegemonic Global Order: Accommodating and Hedging. International Affairs 82(1): 77–94.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • _____. 2010. Strategy, Politics, and World Order Perspectives: Comparing the EU and US Approaches to China’s Resurgence. In US–China–EU Relations: Managing the New World Order, ed. Robert S. Ross, Øystein Tunsjø, and Zhang Tuosheng, 212–32. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fortmann, Michel, T.V. Paul, and James J. Wirtz. 2004. Conclusions: Balance of Power at the Turn of the New Century. In Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, ed. T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, 360–83. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gill, Bates. 2008. The United States and the China-Europe Relationship. In China-Europe Relations, Perceptions, Policies and Prospects, ed. David Shambaugh, Eberhard Sandschneider, and Zhou Hong, 270–86. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • _____. 2010. Managing Tensions and Promoting Cooperation: US-Europe Approaches on Security Issues with China. In US–China–EU Relations: Managing the New World Order, ed. Robert S. Ross, Øystein Tunsjø, and Zhang Tuosheng, 259–82. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goh, Evelyn. 2005. Meeting the China Challenge: The U.S. in Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies. Washington, DC: The East-West Center.

    Google Scholar 

  • _____. 2006. Understanding “Hedging” in Asia-Pacific Security. PacNet (newsletter of Pacific Forum CSIS) 16.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gow, James. 2010. Travelling Hopefully, Acting Realistically? UK–China Interaction. In US–China–EU Relations: Managing the New World Order, ed. Robert S. Ross, Øystein Tunsjø, and Zhang Tuosheng, 101–21. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grant, Charles. 2010. How Should Europe Respond to China’s Strident Rise? (1 February). http://www.cer.org.uk/publications/archive/bulletin-article/2010/how-should-europe-respond-chinas-strident-rise (accessed 14 February 2014).

  • Hallams, Ellen, Luca Ratti, and Ben Zyla (eds.). 2013. NATO Beyond 9/11: The Transformation of the Transatlantic Alliance. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hansen, Birthe. 2011. Unipolarity and World Politics: A Theory and its Implications. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heng, Yee-Kuang. 2006. War as Risk Management: Strategy and Conflict in an Age of Globalised Risks. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ikenberry, John G., Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth (eds.). 2011. International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2011. The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: Redefining America’s Military Leadership.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kagan, Robert. 2002. Power and Weakness. Policy Review 113(3): 3–28.

    Google Scholar 

  • _____. 2008. The Return of History and the End of Dreams. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaplan, Robert D. 2009. Center Stage for the 21st Century. Foreign Affairs 88(2): 16–32.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kapila, Subhash. 2008. India’s Imperatives for an Active Hedging Strategy Against China. Group Paper 2556. Noida, India: South Asia Analysis Group.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kennedy, Paul. 2010. Asia’s Rise: Rise and Fall. The World Today 66(8/9): 6–9.

    Google Scholar 

  • Keohane, Robert. O. 2002. Ironies of Sovereignty: The European Union and the United States. Journal of Common Market Studies 40(4): 743–65.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kerr, David, and Fei Liu. 2007. The International Politics of EU-China Relations. British Academy Occasional Papers 10. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kluth, Michael Friederich, and Jess Pilegaard. 2011. Balancing Beyond the Horizon? Explaining Aggregate EU Naval Military Capability Changes in a Neo-realist Perspective. European Security 20(1): 45–64.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kuik, Cheng-Chwee. 2008. The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore’s Response to a Rising China. Contemporary Southeast Asia 30(2): 159–85.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kupchan, Charles A. 2002. The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century. New York, NY: Knopf.

    Google Scholar 

  • Layne, Christopher. 1993. The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise. International Security 17(4): 5–51.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • _____. 2006. The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States’ Unipolar Moment. International Security 31(2): 7–41.

    Google Scholar 

  • _____. 2009. US Hegemony in a Unipolar World: Here to Stay or Sic Transit Gloria? International Studies Review 11(4): 784–87.

    Google Scholar 

  • _____. 2012. This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly 56(1): 203–213.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lieber, Keir A., and Gerard Alexander. 2005. Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing Back. International Security 30(1): 109–39.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • _____. 2005/2006. Lieber and Alexander Reply. International Security 30(3): 191–96.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lucas, Edward. 2008. The New Cold War: How the Kremlin Menaces Both Russia and the West. London: Bloomsbury.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lundestad, Geir. 2005. The United States and Western Europe Since 1945: From “Empire” by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mackinder, Halford J. 1904. The Geographical Pivot of History. The Geographical Journal 23(4):421-44. Reprinted in 2004. The Geographical Journal 170(4): 298–321.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mahbubani, Kishore. 2008. The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the Far East. New York, NY: PublicAffairs.

    Google Scholar 

  • Matlary, Janne Haaland, and Magnus Petersson (eds.). 2013. NATO’s European Allies: Military Capability and Political Will. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mearsheimer, John J. 1990. Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War. International Security 15(4): 5–56.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • _____. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York, NY: W.W. Norton.

    Google Scholar 

  • _____. 2006. China’s Unpeaceful Rise. Current History 105(690): 160–62.

    Google Scholar 

  • Medeiros, Evan S. 2006. Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific Stability. The Washington Quarterly 29(1): 145–67.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Michta, Andrew A. 2011. NATO’s Last Chance. The American Interest 6(5): 56–60.

    Google Scholar 

  • Murray, Donette, and David Brown (eds.). 2012. Multipolarity in the 21st Century: A New World Order. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Murphy, Ann Marie. 2010. Beyond Balancing and Bandwagoning: Thailand’s Response to China’s Rise. Asian Security 6(1): 1–27.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • National Intelligence Council. 2012. Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds.

    Google Scholar 

  • Niblett, Robin. 2007. Choosing between America and Europe: A New Context for British Foreign Policy. International Affairs 83(4): 627–41.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • O’Rourke, Ronald. 2009. China’s Naval Modernization: Implications for US Navy Capabilities–Background and Issues for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.

    Google Scholar 

  • Overholt, William H. 2008. Asia, America, and the Transformation of Geopolitics. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pape, Robert A. 2005. Soft Balancing against the United States. International Security 30(1): 7–45.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Paul, T.V. 2004. Introduction: The Enduring Axioms of Balance of Power Theory and Their Contemporary Relevance. In Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, ed. T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, 1–25. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pei, Minxin. 2009. Think Again: Asia’s Rise. Foreign Policy 173(4): 32–36.

    Google Scholar 

  • Posen, Barry. 2009. Emerging Multipolarity: Why Should We Care? Current History 108(721): 347–352.

    Google Scholar 

  • _____. 2011. From Unipolarity to Multipolarity: Transition in Sight? In International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity, ed. John G. Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth, 317–41. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rasmussen, Mikkel Vedby. 2006. The Risk Society at War: Technology and Strategy in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Rø, Johannes Gullestad. 2013. Issue Brief: US Rebalancing: A View from Europe. Washington, DC: Atlantic Council.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ross, Robert S. 2004. Bipolarity and Balancing in East Asia. In Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, ed. T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, 267–304. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • _____. 2006. Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia. Security Studies 15(3): 355–95.

    Google Scholar 

  • _____. 2013. US Grand Strategy, the Rise of China, and US National Security Strategy for East Asia. Strategic Studies Quarterly 7(2): 20–40.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ross, Robert S., Øystein Tunsjø, and Zhang Tuosheng (eds.). 2010. US-China EU Relations: Managing the New World Order. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Samuels, Richard J. 2007. Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of Asia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schweller, Randall L. 1999. Managing the Rise of Great Powers, History and Theory. In Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power, ed. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, 1–31. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Scott, David. 2008. Sino-Indian Security Predicaments for the Twenty-First Century. Asian Security 4(3): 244–70.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shambaugh, David. 2005a. The New Strategic Triangle: US and European Reactions to China’s Rise. The Washington Quarterly 28(3): 7–25.

    Google Scholar 

  • _____., ed. 2005b. Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamic. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • _____. 2008. China Eyes Europe in the World: Real Convergence or Cognitive Dissonance? In China-Europe Relations, Perceptions, Policies and Prospects, ed. David Shambaugh, Eberhard Sandschneider, and Zhou Hong, 127–47. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shambaugh, David, Eberhard Sandschneider, and Zhou Hong (eds.). 2008. China-Europe Relations: Perceptions, Policies and Prospects. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • The State Council Information Office of the PRC. 2008. China’s National Defense in 2008.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sutter, Robert G. 2006. China’s Rise: Implications for US Leadership in Asia. Washington, DC: The East-West Center.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tunsjø, Øystein. 2010. Hedging Against Oil Dependency: New Perspectives on China’s Energy Security Policy. International Relations 24(1): 25–45.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • _____. 2011a. Geopolitical Shifts, Great Power Relations and Norway’s Foreign Policy. Cooperation and Conflict 46(1): 60–77.

    Google Scholar 

  • _____. 2011b. A Division of Labour in Transatlantic Relations. Clingendael Asia Forum. http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20110000_cas_artikel_%20tunsjø.pdf (accessed 9 April 2014).

  • _____. 2012. Testimony and Prepared Written Statement before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Testimony presented at the Hearing on China-Europe Relationship and Transatlantic Implications. 19 April.

    Google Scholar 

  • _____. 2013a. Europe’s Favourable Isolation. Survival: Global Politics and Strategy. 55(6): 91–106.

    Google Scholar 

  • _____. 2013b. Security and Profit in China’s Energy Policy: Hedging Against Risk. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • US Department of Defense. 2006. Quadrennial Defense Review Report. 6 February.

    Google Scholar 

  • _____. 2008. National Defense Strategy. 5 August.

    Google Scholar 

  • _____. 2010a. Quadrennial Defense Review Report. 1 February.

    Google Scholar 

  • _____. 2010b. Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China. 16 August.

    Google Scholar 

  • _____. 2012. Sustaining U.S.: Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense. 5 January. http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf (accessed 14 February 2014).

  • Wacker, Gudrun. 2010. Changes and Continuities in EU–China Relations: A German Perspective. In US–China–EU Relations: Managing the New World Order, ed. Robert S. Ross, Øystein Tunsjø, and Zhang Tuosheng, 77–100. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Walt, Stephen. 1987. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • _____. 1998/1999. The Ties That Fray: Why Europe and America are Drifting Apart. The National Interest 54(4): 3–11.

    Google Scholar 

  • Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.

    Google Scholar 

  • _____. 1993. The Emerging Structure of International Politics. International Security 18(2): 44–79.

    Google Scholar 

  • _____. 2000. Structural Realism After the Cold War. International Security 25(1): 5–41.

    Google Scholar 

  • The White House. 2006. National Security Strategy (NSS). 16 March.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weidenfeld, Werner, and Marcin Zaborowski. 2007. Asia’s Rise Means We Must Re-think EU-US Relations. European Union Institute for Security Studies. http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/analy163.pdf.

  • Wohforth, William C. 2012. How Not to Evaluate Theories. International Studies Quarterly 56(1): 219–22.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wu, Baiyi. 2010. An analysis of Chinese images of the United States and the EU. In US–China–EU Relations: Managing the New World Order, ed. Robert S. Ross, Øystein Tunsjø, and Zhang Tuosheng, 164–90. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zakaria, Fareed. 2008. The Post-American World. New York, NY: W. W. Norton.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zoellick, Robert B. 2005. Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility. Speech given at the National Committee on US-China Relations, 21 September, New York, NY.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Oslo, Norway

    Øystein Tunsjø

Authors
  1. Øystein Tunsjø
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Øystein Tunsjø .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of California Berkeley APEC Study Center, Berkeley, California, USA

    Vinod K. Aggarwal

  2. 1 Bow Street, Harvard College Writing Program, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA

    Sara A. Newland

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Tunsjø, Ø. (2015). China’s Rise: Towards a Division of Labor in Transatlantic Relations. In: Aggarwal, V., Newland, S. (eds) Responding to China’s Rise. The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific, vol 15. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-10034-0_8

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation