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Kernel Memory Protection by an Insertable Hypervisor Which Has VM Introspection and Stealth Breakpoints

  • Kuniyasu Suzaki
  • Toshiki Yagi
  • Kazukuni Kobara
  • Toshiaki Ishiyama
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8639)

Abstract

Recent device drivers are under threat of targeted attack called Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) since some device drivers handle industrial infrastructure systems and/or contain sensitive data e.g., secret keys for disk encryption and passwords for authentication. Even if attacks are found in these systems, it is not easy to update device drivers since these systems are required to be non-stop operation and these attacks are based on zero-day attacks. DriverGuard is developed to mitigate such problems. It is a light weight hypervisor and can be inserted into pre-installed OS (Windows) from USB memory at boot time. The memory regions for sensitive data in a Windows kernel are protected by VM introspection and stealth breakpoints in the hypervisor. The hypervisor recognizes memory structure of guest OS by VM introspection and manipulates a page table entry (PTE) using stealth breakpoints technique. DriverGuard prevents malicious write-access to code region that causes Blue Screen of Death of Windows, and malicious read and write access to data region which causes information leakage. Current implementation is applied on pre-installed Windows7 and increases security of device drivers from outside of OS.

Keywords

Computer Security Information Leakage Virtual Machine Introspection Stealth Breakpoints 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Kuniyasu Suzaki
    • 1
  • Toshiki Yagi
    • 1
  • Kazukuni Kobara
    • 1
  • Toshiaki Ishiyama
    • 2
  1. 1.National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and TechnologyJapan
  2. 2.FFRI, Inc.Japan

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