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The Ability of the Commission to Achieve Disclosure in Financial Markets

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Abstract

This chapter examines whether securities commissions (governments in some jurisdictions) are able to achieve financial market disclosure alone, or whether their role would be enhanced with coregulation with stock exchanges and the securities industry. One reason is because securities commissions and new laws are often set up with high hopes to promote disclosure in an environment fuelled by politics and the media following booms, busts and failures of self-regulating markets. As a result, disclosure regulation to give powers to a securities commission—investigations, examinations, administrative, civil and criminal action for breaches—is sometimes ‘political’ and is not part of a coherent overall plan. The top-down regulation of disclosure, passed with high hopes, often proves to be inadequate. This demonstrates that regulation by commissions alone will result in regulation failure, a failure which can only be overcome with coregulation with financial markets (including the stock exchanges) and the securities industry built on a strong foundation of the need to keep securities markets fully informed at all times.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    E.g., article 4 of the Brazil Act states that ‘The …Securities and Exchange Commission of Brazil (CVM) shall perform the duties provided for under the law in order to: (…) IV - protect securities holders and market investors against: (…) c. the use of relevant information not disclosed to the market.’, Law no 6.385 of December 7, 1976, chapter VII-B (Crimes against capital markets) (Brazil).

  2. 2.

    Campbell uses ‘non-departmental agencies’: Campbell (1977), p. 138.

  3. 3.

    See, e.g., Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 8; Mantziaris (1998), pp. 309 and 311.

  4. 4.

    Condon (1997).

  5. 5.

    See, generally, Shaffer and Pollack (2010), p. 706.

  6. 6.

    Commonwealth of Australia (1997), p. 258.

  7. 7.

    Donnan (1999), p. 1, discussed in Chap. 7 dealing with stock exchanges.

  8. 8.

    These approaches are described in their application to online Kingsford Smith (2001), p. 532; Kingsford Smith (2004), p. 439.

  9. 9.

    See, e.g., Lauritsen (2003), p. 468.

  10. 10.

    Parker (2002), p. 292.

  11. 11.

    Mahoney (1997), pp. 1453 and 1475–1500.

  12. 12.

    Baxt (1974), p. 151.

  13. 13.

    Lipton (1983), pp. 527 and 528.

  14. 14.

    Douglas (1940), p. 82.

  15. 15.

    For discussions on SROs see, e.g., Maume (2014); Gadinis and Jackson (2006), p. 1239; DeMarzo et al. (2005), p. 687.

  16. 16.

    This will be discussed in more detail in Chap. 7.

  17. 17.

    International Organization of Securities Commissions (2011), p. 50.

  18. 18.

    Gadinis and Jackson (2006), pp. 1250 and 1251.

  19. 19.

    Austin (2010), pp. 444 and 449.

  20. 20.

    Carson (2003), pp. 7–11.

  21. 21.

    See, e.g., Commonwealth of Australia (1997), p. 259.

  22. 22.

    DeMarzo (2005), p. 688.

  23. 23.

    Gardinis and Jackson (2006), pp. 1253–1255.

  24. 24.

    Austin (2009), p. 203.

  25. 25.

    Some countries (in particular in Europe) empower their regulators to impose administrative penalties without involvement of the courts. Conversely, ‘classical’ civil litigation is exercised by investors alone.

  26. 26.

    This is discussed below in Chap. 7 on stock exchanges dealing with stock exchange self-regulation.

  27. 27.

    Discussed above in Chap. 2; see, e.g., Morris (1984).

  28. 28.

    Skinner (1994), p. 38.

  29. 29.

    Pecora (1939), p. ix. The author was counsel for the United States Senate Committee on Banking and Currency in 1933–1934 in its investigation of stock exchange, banking and securities markets.

  30. 30.

    President Franklin D Roosevelt, quoted by Pecora (1939), p. 286.

  31. 31.

    O’Connor (1949), p. 18, quoted by Condon (1997), p. 17.

  32. 32.

    Silas H. Strawn, one time President of the American Bar Association and of the US Chamber of Commerce, 1934, quoted in Pecora (1939), p. 290.

  33. 33.

    International Organization of Securities Commissions (2011), p. 10.

  34. 34.

    International Organization of Securities Commissions (2010).

  35. 35.

    International Organization of Securities Commissions (2011).

  36. 36.

    Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions, a standard created by the International Accounting Standards Board and several regulators from Islamic countries.

  37. 37.

    Dubai Financial Services Authority (2014), p. 47.

  38. 38.

    Dubai Financial Services Authority (2014), p. 44.

  39. 39.

    Fainsod (1940). Professor Fainsod was a political scientist known for his research on public administration. Fainsod’s model of a commission was not set in a coregulation environment.

  40. 40.

    The ‘separation of powers’ is a feature of the government of a democratic country: (1) the legislature—passes laws; (2) the executive (administration)—administers laws; (3) the judiciary—judges laws.

    Each branch of government is separate and independent. Each branch can limit the other. In a democracy, no-one controls all three branches of government.

  41. 41.

    Campbell (1977), p. 140.

  42. 42.

    Clarke (1989), p. 291.

  43. 43.

    See Maume (2013), p. 616 with further references.

  44. 44.

    For an overview, see European Central Bank (2003).

  45. 45.

    Abrams and Taylor (2000), p. 18.

  46. 46.

    In Australia, market conduct regulation is exercise by the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC), while the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) is the prudential regulator.

  47. 47.

    After an enquiry into the regulators’ performance during the Global Financial Crisis, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) was disestablished in April 2013. It was replaced by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA). See Taylor (2010), p. 23.

  48. 48.

    Lewis (2002), pp. 89 and 93 pointed out that 62 % of 421 agencies created since 1946 were terminated by 1997.

  49. 49.

    Cox (2009), p. 941, n 1.

  50. 50.

    Langevoort (2009), p. 1025.

  51. 51.

    See, e.g., Wallman (2009), p. 825. Wallman, a former SEC Commissioner, prefers functional financial regulation (not securities, futures, banking, insurance) in the interests of investor protection and efficient, transparent and fair marketplaces.

  52. 52.

    See, e.g., Seligman (2009), p. 667.

  53. 53.

    Fisch (2009), p. 785.

  54. 54.

    See, e.g., Coffee and Sale (2009), p. 707.

  55. 55.

    Coffee and Sale (2009), p. 782, referring to US Department of Treasury (2008).

  56. 56.

    Grundgesetz [Constitution] (Germany) Art. 74(1) lit. 11.

  57. 57.

    For an in-depth analysis of the German regulatory framework, see Pekmezovic (2009).

  58. 58.

    See, e.g., Latimer (2001), p. 206; Latimer (2001/2002), p. 261.

  59. 59.

    Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, OJ L 331/84 (15 November 2010) 86.

  60. 60.

    As discussed above in Chap. 3; see, e.g., Latimer (1994).

  61. 61.

    Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 1(2).

  62. 62.

    Financial Markets Authority Act 2011 (New Zealand) s 9.

  63. 63.

    At http://www.sfc.hk/web/annualreport2012-13/EN/mission-statement.html. Accessed 29 April 2014; in similar terms, Securities and Exchange Commission of Brazil at http://www.cvm.gov.br/ingl/indexing.asp, and German BaFin, at http://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Broschuere/dl_b_bafin_about_us.pdf?__blob=publicationFile. Accessed 29 April 2014.

  64. 64.

    http://www.finance.gov.bw/index.php?option=com_content1&parent_id=184&id=185. Accessed 29 April 2014.

  65. 65.

    http://www.lautorite.qc.ca/en/mission-en-corpo.html. Accessed 29 April 2014.

  66. 66.

    Article 5 of Law no. 6.385 of December 7, 1976, referring to the Commissão de Valores Mobiliários (Securities and Exchange Commission of Brazil).

  67. 67.

    Referring to the Securities and Futures Commission of Hong Kong: Low (2000), p. 14.

  68. 68.

    Latimer (2004), p. 29.

  69. 69.

    Campbell (1977), p. 140; de Smith and Brazier (1998), pp. 190–202.

  70. 70.

    ‘The modern reality is that Ministers will accept responsibility for maladministration in their departments only to the extent that is politically necessary to do so’: Thomas (1995), p. 200.

  71. 71.

    International Organization of Securities Commissions (2010).

  72. 72.

    British Columbia, Government’s Letter of Expectations Between the Minister of Finance (as Representative of the Government of British Columbia) and the Chair of the British Columbia Securities Commission (as Representative of the Corporation) for 2013/2014. http://www.bcsc.bc.ca/uploadedFiles/Government_s_Letter_of_Expectation_2013.pdf. Accessed 29 April 2014.

  73. 73.

    Securities and Exchange Board of India Act 1992 (India) s 16.

  74. 74.

    In Australia, only one general direction has been given under the predecessor of Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 12, on the subject of collaboration and consultation between ASIC and the Director of Public Prosecutions in the investigation and prosecution of serious corporate wrongdoing: ASIC Annual Report (2002–2003) 19. Further, the Minister is authorized to direct investigations under s 14.

  75. 75.

    Finanzdienstleistungsaufsichtsgesetz [Financial Markets Authority Supervision Act] (Germany) § 2 et seqq.

  76. 76.

    International Organization of Securities Commissions (2011), p. 27.

  77. 77.

    Fainsod (1940).

  78. 78.

    International Organization of Securities Commissions (2010).

  79. 79.

    International Organization of Securities Commissions (2010).

  80. 80.

    E.g., Director of Public Prosecutions, District Attorney, Public Attorney’s Prosecutor’s Office (Brazil) (article 12 of Law no. 6.385 of December 7, 1976, Brazil).

  81. 81.

    See, e.g., Markopolos (2010).

  82. 82.

    Bhattacharya and Daouk (2009), p. 577.

  83. 83.

    For an overview, see Jackson and Roe (2009), pp. 207 and 208; Maume and Walker (2013), pp. 263 and 265.

  84. 84.

    See, generally, Rowley (1993).

  85. 85.

    See Maume and Walker (2013).

  86. 86.

    Polinsky and Shavell (2000), p. 45.

  87. 87.

    Coffee (2007), pp. 229 and 297; Jackson and Roe (2009), p. 209.

  88. 88.

    Shavell (1993), pp. 255 and 268.

  89. 89.

    Coffee (2007), p. 305.

  90. 90.

    Black et al. (2006), p. 1055.

  91. 91.

    Coffee (2006), pp. 1534 and 1538.

  92. 92.

    See, for example, Black (2001), pp. 781 and 834–838; Abrams and Taylor (2000).

  93. 93.

    Jackson and Roe (2009), p. 208.

  94. 94.

    See, e.g., Downs (1967); Phillips and Zecher (1981); Macey (1994), p. 909; Jarrell (1984), p. 273.

  95. 95.

    Ramsay (1995), p. 174.

  96. 96.

    Alder (2013).

  97. 97.

    For a good overview of criminal and civil sanctions in various jurisdictions, see Le Minh and Walker (2008), pp. 713 and 749–753 (Table 4).

  98. 98.

    For example, in the People’s Republic of China, see Li and Ong (2009), pp. 697 and 705–708.

  99. 99.

    See, e.g., the licensee’s duty to act honestly and in the client’s best interests under the Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013 (New Zealand) s 433.

  100. 100.

    As discussed in Chap. 5 above.

  101. 101.

    See, e.g., Bayne (1994), p. 297.

  102. 102.

    Grabosky and Braithwaite (1986).

  103. 103.

    See, e.g., in Brazil, a settlement instrument under Article 11 of Law no. 6.385 of December 7, 1976; Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 93A, 93AA; Financial Markets Authority Act 2011 (New Zealand) subpart 4.

  104. 104.

    Some countries (for example, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxemburg or the UK) have rules on restricting liability for damages caused by their supervisory authorities, whereas others (Netherlands, Sweden) have no such rules; see Walla (2013), p. 106; de Kezel (2009), p. 211.

  105. 105.

    Gellhorn (1973), p. 1380.

  106. 106.

    Brown and Rankin (1990), p. 348.

  107. 107.

    In Europe, the available sanctions for market manipulation can vary between unlimited (UK) and EUR 1,000 (Slovenia and Lithuania). For a comprehensive overview, see Committee of European Securities Regulators (2007).

  108. 108.

    The number of countries which authorize their regulator to impose administrative penalties is growing constantly. For example, the Israel Securities Authority (ISA) implemented enforcement measures for violations and offenses in the capital market for the first time in 2012; see Israel Securities Authority (2013), p. 12. Similarly, New Zealand introduced infringement notices for minor breaches of statute law in 2013; see Maume and Walker (2013), pp. 287–289.

  109. 109.

    Financial Services Authority (UK) (2012), p. 162.

  110. 110.

    United Kingdom National Archive (2012).

  111. 111.

    German Federal Financial Supervision Authority (BaFin) (2013), p. 207. http://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Jahresbericht/dl_jb_2012.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=5. Accessed 29 April 2014. BaFin usually imposes fines of no more than EUR 20,000; see Veil and Walla (2013), p. 128.

  112. 112.

    A good example is the introduction of a (limited) infringement notice regime under the Australian Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) in 2004, see Hyland (2010), p. 32; Langley (2007), p. 439.

  113. 113.

    See, generally, Airo-Farulla and White (2004), p. 57.

  114. 114.

    Gellhorn (1973), p. 1420.

  115. 115.

    In the words of Michel Prada, the former head of the French Securities Commission: ‘The power to impose fines or prohibit individuals provides for timely and efficient regulation and is preferable to using courts in the first instance. The courts exist as an appeal forum and remain the first point of action for criminal proceedings’. See Prada and Walter (2009), p. 40.

  116. 116.

    Wertpapierhandelsgesetz [Securities Trading Act] (Germany) § 39.

  117. 117.

    European Commission (2014).

  118. 118.

    For different strategic approaches to enforcement, see Fig. 6.1.

  119. 119.

    See, e.g., in Australia, Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 793C.

  120. 120.

    See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act 1934 (US) s 21A; Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013 (New Zealand) s 489; Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) Part 9.4.

  121. 121.

    Other countries put emphasis on administrative penalties instead.

  122. 122.

    For a comparison of the objectives of criminal and civil sanctions see Mann (1992), p. 1795; Coffee (1992), p. 1875.

  123. 123.

    Stempel (2014).

  124. 124.

    Sutton and Hobson (2014), p. 14.

  125. 125.

    Between 2003 and 2011, 13 class actions were settled, while 7 class actions were settled in 2012, see King & Wood Mallesons (2013).

  126. 126.

    E.g., Law no. 6.385 of December 7, 1976, chapter VII-B (Crimes against capital markets) (Brazil).

  127. 127.

    Veil and Walla (2013), pp. 128–130.

  128. 128.

    Brown and Rankin (1990).

  129. 129.

    See, e.g., Ribstein (2008), p. 857.

  130. 130.

    See, e.g., Monetary Authority of Singapore Act (Chapter 186) (1999) s 39 (Consent of Public Prosecutor). In Germany, BaFin is imposing administrative penalties (‘Bußgeld’) and refers all criminal matters to the commercial crime units of the Public Prosecution (‘Staatsanwaltschaft’).

  131. 131.

    In New Zealand, the Financial Markets Authority (FMA) has the power to prosecute all criminal matter that relate to financial markets legislation (see Maume 2013, p. 631). This overlaps with the duties of the Serious Fraud Office, a police unit specializing in complex matters with a high expertise in forensic accounting. Such regulatory overlaps may cause uncertainty for the regulators and the regulated, and are arguably not an efficient expenditure of taxpayers’ money.

  132. 132.

    The SEC’s investigation in the Enron case resulted in criminal convictions of former top two executives, Jeffrey Skilling and Kenneth Lay (now deceased) in 2006. Following a 4-year investigation into the largest corporate fraud in United States history, Skilling was sentenced to a jail term of 24 years and 4 months for conspiracy, insider trading, making false statements to the market and securities fraud.

  133. 133.

    See, e.g., Baldwin (2004), p. 351.

  134. 134.

    See, e.g., Tadros (2009).

  135. 135.

    See, e.g., Dellit and Fisse (1994). See also Maume and Walker (2013).

  136. 136.

    Game theory is a theory of decision making; see, generally, Osborne (2004).

  137. 137.

    Ayres and Braithwaite (1992).

  138. 138.

    Fisse and Braithwaite (1993).

  139. 139.

    For an enforcement pyramid in New Zealand, see Maume and Walker (2013).

  140. 140.

    Stenning et al. (1990), p. 112.

  141. 141.

    For an overview, see Ford (2008), p. 1; Black and Baldwin (2010), p. 181.

  142. 142.

    See Coffee (2007), pp. 276–284.

  143. 143.

    Letter from McCarthy (2005), available under FOI.

  144. 144.

    Carson (2011), p. 19.

  145. 145.

    Lee (2002).

  146. 146.

    See Austin (2010).

  147. 147.

    The most blatant example is the Global Financial Crisis of 2007/2008, as discussed in Chap. 3.

  148. 148.

    See, e.g., Karmel (2005), pp. 79 and 130.

  149. 149.

    See, e.g., Parker (2002), p. 8.

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Latimer, P., Maume, P. (2015). The Ability of the Commission to Achieve Disclosure in Financial Markets. In: Promoting Information in the Marketplace for Financial Services. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-09459-5_6

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