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Part of the book series: SpringerBriefs in Religious Studies ((BRIEFSRESTU,volume 2))

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Abstract

Even if religious experiences can provide good grounds for religious belief, the question remains whether someone else’s experience-reports provide good grounds for me to form similar beliefs, and accept their religious claims. Whether it is rational to accept religious testimony, or even irrational not to accept it, depends on whether certain defeaters are operative, which would impugn the testifier’s sincerity or competence. While there is some reason to think that defeaters are often present, there is no reason to believe they always are, so it is sometimes rational to accept religious testimony. Then the question of which testimony to accept turns on the question of which testimony has the least likelihood of being defeated. Comparing Christian and Theravada Buddhist experiences, Christian experiences are more likely to be subject to priming effects and self-deception, so, all other things being equal, it is more rational to accept the Theravada Buddhist experience claims.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This point is made very nicely in Coady (1992). Since the publication of Coady’s book, the epistemology of testimony has been a lively topic of philosophical research, resulting in hundreds of books and articles.

  2. 2.

    Or, to be more precise, when the instance of belief-formation based on testimony is an instance of the operation of a reliable mechanism, or process, or whatever.

  3. 3.

    There is, of course, a huge variety of kinds of internalism. See Alston (1988) for a discussion of some of the more popular varieties.

  4. 4.

    Paul Saka suggested this line of thought to me in conversation, at the NEH Seminar in Social Epistemology at the University of Arizona, summer 2000.

  5. 5.

    Not surprisingly, Chisholm (1977, 135) did discuss such a notion (or one nearby in logical space), the notion of a proposition’s being “beyond reasonable doubt.” Presumably, if something is beyond reasonable doubt for a subject, she would have to be unreasonable to withhold belief.

  6. 6.

    The example of a mule cleverly painted to look like a zebra, and indistinguishable to the normal observer, was formulated by Dretske (1970, 1007–1023); the locus classicus for the countryside replete with papier-mâché barns is Goldman (1976) .

  7. 7.

    I am indebted to William Alston for this felicitous phrase.

  8. 8.

    For a nice account of that phenomenon, see Heider (2005). Chapter 3 of Guthrie (1993) surveys a variety of explanations for the phenomenon.

  9. 9.

    Such a world would be more like The Truman Show than The Matrix.

  10. 10.

    This reasoning contains a very familiar kind of circularity: We know the message is true because the prophet is reliable. We know the prophet is reliable because the message says he is.

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Webb, M.O. (2015). Buddhist Testimony and Christian Testimony. In: A Comparative Doxastic-Practice Epistemology of Religious Experience. SpringerBriefs in Religious Studies, vol 2. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-09456-4_5

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