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Rules as Patterns Between Normativism and Naturalism

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Problems of Normativity, Rules and Rule-Following

Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 111))

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Abstract

In the paper, basing predominantly on ideas of Sellars and so-called “Pittsburg school” of philosophy, I focus on the relation between naturalism and normativsim in rule following. In the first part I investigate a vicious regress threat in rule-following and problems that arise when one reduces rule-following to merely regular actions or extends rule-following to following representations of rules. In the second and third part as a Third Way between regularism and intellectualism I reintroduce and critically discuss Sellars idea of pattern-governed behavior that on the one hand helps to overcome sketched difficulties but on the other forces us to accept the irreal status of rules.

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Correspondence to Piotr Kozak .

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Kozak, P. (2015). Rules as Patterns Between Normativism and Naturalism. In: Araszkiewicz, M., Banaś, P., Gizbert-Studnicki, T., Płeszka, K. (eds) Problems of Normativity, Rules and Rule-Following. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 111. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-09375-8_7

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