Abstract
Rule communalism is the view that the rule asymmetry claim is true: rule-following (e.g. language-use) is possible for communal individuals but impossible for solitary individuals. The most notable argument of this general type is Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s argument in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s argument, however, is not a paradigmatic example of communalism because it does not attempt to show that genuine rule-following is possible in a community. Instead, Kripke’s Wittgenstein is a full-blown rule nihilist; his view entails that there is no such thing as rule-following, even in communities. What he offers is an ersatz alternative to rule-following which purportedly useful in communities, but not in solitude. I examine the prospects for defending genuine rule communalism on the familiar grounds that interpersonal—but not intrapersonal—correction can make rule-following possible even in the face of nihilistic arguments. I conclude that such arguments are extremely unlikely to succeed.
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Notes
- 1.
I favor the term ‘nihilism’ rather than the more standard ‘skepticism’ because, outside of its primary philosophical use to name an epistemological position, I am inclined to think that ‘skepticism’ still carries something of its non-philosophical suggestion of incredulity. ‘Nihilism,’ however, is less equivocal. The nihilist about x believes that there are no x’s—that there is no such thing as x.
- 2.
Kusch (2002) suggests that it is metaphysical possibility which is at issue. That claim is plausible, too.
- 3.
It is, of course, possible for a communalist to accept both arguments. However, the arguments are so different that I think that would be reason to suspect that the conclusion is driving the reasoning rather than vice-versa.
- 4.
Communalists often raise an objection to such ways of speaking, objecting that thoughts themselves are infected by the same skeptical/nihilistic worries that afflict rules. The point seems to be that it is illegitimate to explain rule-following in terms of thoughts, since thinking is afflicted by the same problem that afflicts rule-following. Of course we can’t track down and defeat every objection, but this objection seems easily deflected, since we can simply replace ‘thought’ with ‘mental experience.’
- 5.
Such views rarely explicitly admit that solitary rule-following would be possible if solitary individuals could have the relevant thoughts and perform the appropriate actions. But that is what the pure version of the view is committed to.
- 6.
E.g. in Knorpp (2013).
- 7.
Some communalist have tried to argue that such a doppelganger is not conceivable, but such arguments are entirely unconvincing, often amounting to little more than simply denial that such things are conceivable. See e.g., (Lillegard 1998).
- 8.
Since the argument is, as Kripke is careful to note, neither really his, nor (probably) Wittgenstein’s, I’ll say that the argument is “Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s.” I realize this is annoying, and I apologize, but this is better than attributing the argument to someone who did not/does not accept it.
- 9.
For my best go at a fairly complete account of Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s argument, see (Knorpp 2003).
- 10.
This argument is full of problems, but an examination of them is rather beyond the scope of this paper.
- 11.
It might seem odd that I focus on a case of this kind given my complaints about “primitive case bias” in an earlier section. I do think that simple examples are often the best—and simple examples are fine here so long as we are not tempted by a certain common type of objection to the effect that “we can’t really be sure” whether Smith is following rules, since his behavior is so primitive. As long as we recognize that this objection is utterly irrelevant here, there is no harm in focusing on simple cases. The complexity objection is irrelevant because Smith is not, in fact, following rules in any of these examples. Such an objection cannot, at any rate, help the communalist given that it would count against Smith’s following rules even after Jones is added to the picture. Any reader bothered by such concerns, however, should replace these simple examples with examples that reference more complex behavior.
- 12.
It is sometimes objected that it is illegitimate to focus on a case of only two individuals, since there are ways in which a community is not analogous to an individual (Kusch 2006b). These objections are indefensible. First, although individuals and communities are dissimilar in certain ways, they are similar in certain ways—and they are similar in the ways that matter here. Specifically, they can both be an external source of correction. Second, we are giving the communalist his best case by thinking about a second individual, since the reactions of another individual are analogous to the reactions of a community when there is complete consensus in the community. And when there is anything less than complete consensus in the community, this raises a whole new set of problems for the communalist.
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Knorpp, W. (2015). Communalism, Correction and Nihilistic Solitary Rule-Following Arguments. In: Araszkiewicz, M., Banaś, P., Gizbert-Studnicki, T., Płeszka, K. (eds) Problems of Normativity, Rules and Rule-Following. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 111. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-09375-8_3
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