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Legal Fictions in Theory and Practice pp 175–195Cite as

Law’s Fictions, Legal Fictions and Copyright Law

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Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 110))

Abstract

This paper analyses legal fictions—the use of certain constructs in legal reasoning—through the eyes of law’s fictions—the way in which law accounts for fictional objects in copyright law. Recent developments in philosophy that saw increased interest by analytical philosophers and logicians in the Austrian tradition of ontology, provide the theoretical framework for analysing both types of occurrence of fictional objects in legal discourse. This paves the way for a future formal and computational theory of copyright law on the one hand, a ‘computational metaphysics’ of the jurisprudential theory of legal fictions on the other.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Walt Disney Productions v Air Pirates 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978).

  2. 2.

    Walt Disney Productions v Air Pirates 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), p. 753, quoting from K. Wheelwright, “Parody, Copyrights and the First Amendment” 10 U.S.F. L. Rev. 564 1975–1976, p. 582.

  3. 3.

    See: at first instance Joanne Kathleen Rowling, Uitgeverij de Harmonie BV, Time Warner Entertainment Company LP v Uitgeverij Byblos BV (Case KG 03/477 SR, District Court of Amsterdam) [2003] E.C.D.R 23; and on appeal Uitgeverij Byblos BV v Joanne Kathleen Rowling, Uitgeverij de Harmonie BV and Time Warner Entertainment Company LP (Cause List No. 844/03 SKG, Court of Appeal of Amsterdam) [2004] E.C.D.R 7.

  4. 4.

    Leslie S Klinger v Conan Doyle Estates Ltd (US District Court Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division) 23 December 2013 (available at: http://freesherlock.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/klinger-order-on-motion-for-summary-judgment-c.pdf, accessed 3 April 2014). The aspects of character added in the later stories (for examples of which, see footnote 8 below) were newer ‘increments of expression’ of those characters which, at least on the evidence before the court at the summary judgment stage, were entitled to copyright protection and, given the rules on copyright duration, remained in copyright for some years to come.

  5. 5.

    The opportunity to address this question was missed in the Walt Disney Productions v Air Pirates case itself. In that case, the court held that copying a comic book character’s visual image constituted copying to an extent sufficient to justify a finding of infringement and this was not contested, the court proceeding directly to consider (and reject) the defendant’s plea of a parody-based ‘fair use’ defence: 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), p. 756. There was no argument about infringement of any rights in the wider ‘characters’ of the copied cartoon creatures. See further Nevins (1991–1992).

  6. 6.

    Our account is heavily indebted to the excellent exposition of the discussion by Kroon and Voltiolini (2011).

  7. 7.

    For a discussion see, for example, Putnam (1973) and the papers in Schwartz (1977), critically Howell (1979) with a reply by Pavel (1979).

  8. 8.

    Such attributes included character traits such as Dr Watson’s athletic background (first described in a 1924 short story) and personal storylines, such as Sherlock Holme’s retirement (first described in a 1926 short story): Leslie S Klinger v Conan Doyle Estates Ltd (US District Court Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division) 23 December 2013 (available at: http://freesherlock.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/klinger-order-on-motion-for-summary-judgment-c.pdf, accessed 3 April 2014), p. 15.

  9. 9.

    The US court had no difficulty with the fact that, as Conan Doyle Estates put it, its ruling would in effect ‘dismantle’ each character into two versions, a public domain version and a copyright-protected version: Leslie S Klinger v Conan Doyle Estates Ltd (US District Court Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division) 23 December 2013 (available at: http://freesherlock.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/klinger-order-on-motion-for-summary-judgment-c.pdf, accessed 3 April 2014), pp. 13–14.

  10. 10.

    See in particular Leslie S Klinger v Conan Doyle Estates Ltd (US District Court Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division) 23 December 2013 (available at: http://freesherlock.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/klinger-order-on-motion-for-summary-judgment-c.pdf, accessed 3 April 2014), p. 14. The decision follows existing US case law precedent on this issue, in particular Silverman v CBS, Inc. 870 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1989).

  11. 11.

    http://mally.stanford.edu/cm/.

  12. 12.

    As Kroon and Voltolini (2011) note, the Menard thought experiment was introduced by Lewis (1978, p. 39) and then further developed by Fine (1982, p. 107); see also Thomasson (1999, pp. 7 and 56).

  13. 13.

    Those who are sceptical about the explanatory value of such a proposition are, for example, Brock (2010).

  14. 14.

    Although the most used, it should be noted that the ‘distinct delineation’ test is not the only test which has been used by the US courts on the issue of entitlement to copyright protection for fictional characters. Other tests have included the so-called ‘story being told’ test, which looks at the relative importance of character over plot in the work in which the relevant character appears: see, in particular, Warner Bros. Pictures Inc. v Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954). However, it is thought that US law is now converging on the ‘character delineation’ test: Kurtz (2012–2013), at p. 447. On the different tests and their application in US law and for commentary on how the ‘distinct delineation’ test has been applied in practice, see further: Kurtz (1990); Schienke (2005); Karjala (2006); Katyal (2006); Lai Chung (2007–2008); Foley (2008–2009); Coe (2011).

  15. 15.

    Nichols v Universal Pictures Corporation et al 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).

  16. 16.

    Nichols v Universal Pictures Corporation et al 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), p. 121.

  17. 17.

    Sunbank Trust v Houghton Mifflin Company 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).

  18. 18.

    Sunbank Trust v Houghton Mifflin Company 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001), at p. 1266.

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Acknowledgment

Work on this paper was supported by the RCUK CREATE network grant. We are particularlygrateful for the help provided by our RA Laurence Diver.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Law, University of Edinburgh, Old College, South Bridge, EH8 9YL, Edinburgh, Scotland

    Burkhard Schafer & Jane Cornwell

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  1. Burkhard Schafer
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Correspondence to Burkhard Schafer .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Law, Queen Mary University of London, London, United Kingdom

    Maksymilian Del Mar

  2. Faculty of Law, University College London, London, United Kingdom

    William Twining

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Schafer, B., Cornwell, J. (2015). Law’s Fictions, Legal Fictions and Copyright Law. In: Del Mar, M., Twining, W. (eds) Legal Fictions in Theory and Practice. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 110. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-09232-4_9

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