Skip to main content

The Health Shadow Price and the Economic Context

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Book cover The New Drug Reimbursement Game
  • 687 Accesses

Abstract

The value of clinical innovation of a new drug is specific to a particular clinical context; the patient group, the clinical protocol and the best alternative therapy. Similarly, the economic value of a given clinical value of innovation is specific to a particular economic context; the financial costs of the proposed and existing therapy, the method of financing the additional costs (budget expansion or displacement of services), the efficiency of the existing allocation and the competition in the market for health inputs. In Chap. 8 the ways in which the health shadow price, β c and Economic value of clinical innovation, EVCI, capture the economic context of the health budget are illustrated. β c is derived for four different economic contexts. I show that when the budget is fixed and allocatively inefficient: β c  = (1/n − 1/m + 1/d) ^ (−1) where n is the average Incremental Cost-Effectiveness, aICER, of the most cost-effective existing technology or programme (in expansion), m is the aICER of the least cost-effective of currently funded technologies or programmes (in contraction) and d is the aICER of the services displaced to finance the additional costs, ΔC P, of the new drug. The health shadow price is conditional on an economic context, indicated by c. The economic context is defined by factors including the sub-optimality of displacement (m-d), the level of allocative inefficiency in the health budget (m-n), the additional costs that need to be financed (ΔC P) and the current price structure in the health input market.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    The definitions of ICERi and NBi are presented in the notation glossary and Pekarsky (2012, Appendix 4).

  2. 2.

    The “operational” justification is that in this fictional country, the Reimburser is required to adopt the new drug based on consideration of its clinical innovation value only, that is, \( \Delta E \) > 0. From a methodological perspective, this assumption allows us to separate the question of the choice of the decision threshold (explored in Chap. 8 in a game theoretic model) from the question of the economic value of the strategy of reimbursement. It also allows us to exclude the possibility that the firm considers the decision threshold when it sets the price. See also the discussion in the Conclusion to this Chapter.

  3. 3.

    The program that is the most cost-effective in expansion is defined as follows. The incremental gain in health effect of expanding all existing programs by an amount ΔC P is estimated. Then the program that gains the largest number of health effects as a consequence of expansion is the most cost-effective program (in expansion). This Program is not necessarily the most cost-effective of all programs. The average cost per effect of the whole program could be more than the cost per effect in expansion if the program has increasing marginal benefit or decreasing marginal cost or both. However there could also be another program or technology that is not yet funded and is only available if the budget is expanded. Hence the best alternative strategy set includes programs and technologies that are either currently funded or not currently funded.

  4. 4.

    This is Strategy S from Sect. 6.3.

  5. 5.

    The Displacer is not permitted to displace programs that are patented and approved as part of a legally enforceable reimbursement process. He can displace programs that are unpatented and can be contracted by small units, for example a respite care program that can be contracted by reducing the hours of care available by 1 or 100 hours.

  6. 6.

    How do we identify a program’s cost-effectiveness in expansion if there is a fixed budget? First the least cost-effective of existing programs, M needs to be contracted. Then the most cost-effective in expansion of remaining programs is funded. This is the most cost-effective given previous contraction. This device allows for the possibility that the best alternative strategy under a fixed budget has no net health effect if the budget is currently economically efficient.

  7. 7.

    The shadow price when the budget is contracted by one unit is consistent with the operations research use of the term and when it is expanded, the economic use (See Sect. 5.3.1).

  8. 8.

    PBMA has a long history and its preeminent advocate in Health Economics is the late Professor Gavin Mooney. The first text I read on this topic was “Choices for health care: a practical introduction to the economics of health provision.” (Mooney et al. 1986) I have also been fortunate enough to observe Gavin take a group through the process of PBMA. The set of all alternative actions in Step (4) of PEA is essentially a formalised version of identifying activity at the margin in PBMA.

  9. 9.

    Why is Strategy A, optimal reallocation, described as the best alternative strategy, T? Shouldn’t the two actions of optimal displacement and adoption each be described as the best alternative? The important point is that pairs of displacement and adoption in such a set are about the strategy to reallocate, which, like the term reimbursement, describes two actions. Reimbursement is a qualitatively different strategy to the strategies of (1) Reallocation, and (2) budget expansion and new Program adoption.

References

  • Buchanan J (2008) Opportunity cost. In: Durlauf S, Blume L (eds) The New Palgrave dictionary of economics online, 2nd edn. Palgrave Macmillian, Basingstoke

    Google Scholar 

  • Mooney G, Russell E, Weit R (1986) Choices for health care: a practical introduction to the economics of health provision, 2nd edn, Studies in social policy. Macmillan, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Pekarsky BAK (2012) Trust, constraints and the counterfactual: reframing the political economy of new drug price. Dissertation, University of Adelaide. http://digital.library.adelaide.edu.au/dspace/handle/2440/79171. Accessed 25 Dec 2013

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Pekarsky, B.A.K. (2015). The Health Shadow Price and the Economic Context. In: The New Drug Reimbursement Game. Adis, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08903-4_7

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08903-4_7

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Adis, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-08902-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-08903-4

  • eBook Packages: MedicineMedicine (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics