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The International Relations Framework

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Minorities, Minority Rights and Internal Self-Determination
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Abstract

International law neither exists nor is it made in a political vacuum. It would probably often make life easier for those making and interpreting international law if this were the case. However, circumstances have it that international relations are important and as this project seeks to at least consider circumstances in the real world, if not work with them, a word on the underlying international framework is necessary. Allen Buchanan has given a short reason as to the necessity of an underlying international relations framework. Paraphrasing, it is ‘an exercise in futility’ if the international relations theory one adheres to does not support the approach one has to international law. By agreeing to international relations realism, meaning that law is simply irrelevant to international politics, this project would be reduced to a hypothetical exercise of the mind with no relevance. If one accepts that international law has some sort of meaningful relationship with international relations, the starting point is very different. This is what is done in this chapter.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Buchanan (2004), p. 29.

  2. 2.

    Slaughter (1995), p. 503.

  3. 3.

    Brownlie (2008), pp. 32–33.

  4. 4.

    Henkin (1968), p. 42.

  5. 5.

    Keohane (1997), p. 488.

  6. 6.

    Goldsmith and Posner (2005), pp. 11–12.

  7. 7.

    Keohane (1997), p. 489.

  8. 8.

    See respectively Goldsmith and Posner (2005), p. 14; Keohane (1997), p. 488.

  9. 9.

    Goldsmith and Posner (2005), p. 15.

  10. 10.

    For this summary see Goldsmith and Posner (2005), pp. 14–15.

  11. 11.

    See Sect. 5.3.

  12. 12.

    For a presentation of his theory of transnational legal process see Koh (1997), pp. 2645–2658. Koh also suggests empowering more actors to participate (p. 2656). This is done by the careful selection of non-state actors.

  13. 13.

    Koskenniemi (1990), p. 9.

  14. 14.

    See Sect. 4.1.

  15. 15.

    Slaughter et al. (1998), p. 378. See also Moravcsik (1997), pp. 516–520.

  16. 16.

    Michael Doyle is often cited for introducing these criteria. See Doyle (1983), pp. 207–208.

  17. 17.

    Slaughter (1995), p. 510.

  18. 18.

    Kymlicka (2001), pp. 21–22.

  19. 19.

    CSCE (1990) Copenhagen Document http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/14304 Accessed 06 May 2014.

  20. 20.

    The Copenhagen Document refers only to Part IV on minorities. Aspects of adoption are, of course, meant to apply to the whole document.

  21. 21.

    For more on the freedom of the individual and democratic majority decision see Freeman (1999), p. 362.

  22. 22.

    Anne Marie Slaughter has pointed out that early regime theory is now generally referred to as institutionalism. See Slaughter (1993), p. 206.

  23. 23.

    Krasner (1982), p. 186.

  24. 24.

    Krasner (1982), p. 186.

  25. 25.

    For this comparison see Slaughter (1993), p. 220.

  26. 26.

    Slaughter et al. (1998), p. 371.

  27. 27.

    Slaughter et al. (1998), p. 371.

  28. 28.

    Slaughter (1993), p. 206.

  29. 29.

    Sandholtz and Sweet (2004), pp. 241–242.

  30. 30.

    Hathaway defines costs as sanctions or harm to reputation.

  31. 31.

    Here, institutionalists use game theoretic reasoning. Hathaway (2002), p. 1951; Sandholtz and Sweet (2004), p. 243. These institutionalists have also been called ‘modified structural realists’; see Slaughter (1993), pp. 218–219.

  32. 32.

    Sandholtz and Sweet (2004), pp. 240–241.

  33. 33.

    There are exceptions such as the International Labour Organization that accepts non-state actors as full members. Many international governmental organizations allow other organizations a minor role.

  34. 34.

    See Chap. 4.

  35. 35.

    Koh (1997), pp. 2612–2613.

  36. 36.

    On a global level: the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions of the IMF, the World Bank and GATT a few years later. On a regional level: NATO, the Council of Europe and the organizations that were to become the European Union. For a nuanced discussion on the legalization of politics see Kahler (2000). Kahler focuses on legalized international institutions such as organizations and binding instruments. Robert Keohane has discussed a more general demand for international regimes. See Keohane (1982), esp. pp. 336–345.

  37. 37.

    Slaughter et al. (1998), p. 370.

  38. 38.

    For disagreement and complementarity see Moravcsik (1997), pp. 536–538.

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Barten, U. (2015). The International Relations Framework. In: Minorities, Minority Rights and Internal Self-Determination. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08876-1_2

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