Skip to main content

Enabling Resilience: An Examination of High Reliability Organizations and Safety Culture Through the Lens of Appreciative Inquiry

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Disaster Management: Enabling Resilience

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Social Networks ((LNSN))

Abstract

Dulac (A framework for dynamic safety and risk management modelling in complex engineering systems. MIT, Cambridge, 2007) argues that complex socio-technical systems have a tendency to slowly drift from a safe state toward a higher risk state, where they are highly vulnerable to small disturbances whereby seemingly inconsequential events can precipitate an accident. Recent socio-technical disasters such as the 2011 Fukushima Nuclear accident, 2010 Deepwater Horizon accident and 2005 refinery explosions at BP’s Texas City all highlight major disasters in which a safety culture was not working. Many industries around the world are showing an increasing interest in the concept of ‘safety culture’ as a means of reducing the potential for large-scale disasters, and accidents associated with routine tasks (Cooper Saf Sci 36:111–136, 2008). Traditional root cause methods of analysis examining safety culture apply a deficiency model in which problems are identified to support corrective action and transformational change. Within this paradigm one asks: “What are the problems?”, “What’s wrong?” or “What needs to be fixed?” Here we introduce a paradigm shift from a deficiency based approach to a strength based approach through the advent of “Appreciative Inquiry” (AI). The Appreciative Inquiry model is based on the assumption that the questions we ask will tend to focus our attention in a particular direction. Appreciative Inquiry stands out as a methodology that can facilitate examination and ‘construction’ of safety culture. As a high engagement, strength-based approach to organizational change, AI focuses on aligning strengths of the organization with opportunities, aspirations and desired results and transforming goals into action fostering organizational learning at its core. Drawing upon the literature on AI, High Reliability Organizations and safety culture, this chapter presents appreciative inquiry as a tool-set to facilitate structured analysis and construction of the qualities of a safety culture of excellence to support a High Reliability.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 139.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 179.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  1. Beck U (2006) Living in the risk society. A Hobhouse memorial lecture given at old theatre. London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London, Wed 15th February 2006 at 6:30 pm

    Google Scholar 

  2. Bourke J (2005) Fear: cultural history. Virago Press, Time Warner Group UK, Brettenham House, Lancaster Place, London, WC2E7EN

    Google Scholar 

  3. Bushe GR (2010) Appreciative inquiry: theory and critique. www.gervasebushe.ca/AITC.pdf. Accessed 15 Dec 2010

  4. Carroll JS (1995) Incident reviews in high-hazard industries: sense making and learning under ambiguity and accountability. Organ Env 9(2):175–197

    Article  Google Scholar 

  5. Cooper MD (2000) Towards a model of safety culture. Saf Sci 36:111–136

    Article  Google Scholar 

  6. Cooper D (2002) Safety culture: a model for understanding and qualifying a difficult concept. Professional Safety

    Google Scholar 

  7. Cooperrider DL, Whitney D, Stavros JM (2008) Appreciative Inquiry handbook: for leaders of change, 2 ed. Crown Custom Publishing Inc.

    Google Scholar 

  8. Cooperrider DL, Srivastva S (1987) Appreciative inquiry in organizational life. In: Woodman RW, Pasmore WA (eds) Research In organizational change and development, vol 1. JAI Press, Stamford, pp 129–169

    Google Scholar 

  9. Dekker SWA (2002) The re-invention of human error. Technical report 2002-1, Lund University School of Aviation, pp 1–16

    Google Scholar 

  10. Deepwater Horizon Study Group (2011) Final report on the investigation of the Macondo Well Blowout. Center for Catastrophic Risk Management (CCRM), The University of California Berkley

    Google Scholar 

  11. Deepwater Horizon Study Group (2011) Final report on the investigation of the Macondo well blowout. Center for Catastrophic Risk Management (CCRM), The University of California Berkley

    Google Scholar 

  12. De Long DW, Fahey L (2000) Diagnosing cultural barriers to knowledge management. Acad. Manage. Executive 14(4):113–127

    Google Scholar 

  13. Dulac N (2007) A framework for dynamic safety and risk management modelling in complex engineering systems. PhD dissertation, MIT, Cambridge, MA

    Google Scholar 

  14. Fernandez-Muniz B, Montes-peon JM, Vazquez-Orda CJ (2007) Safety culture: analysis of the causal relationships between its key dimensions. Saf Cult 38:627–641

    Google Scholar 

  15. Gupta A, Govindarajan V (2000) Knowledge flows within multinational corporations. Strateg Manag J 21(4):473–496

    Article  Google Scholar 

  16. Hammer D (2010) Federal investigators blast BP over ‘safety culture’ at oil spill hearings. The Times-Picayune. Thursday August 26 2010. www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/08/federal_investigators_blast_bp.html. Accessed 1 Nov 2010

  17. Helbing D (2013) Globally networked risks and how to respond. Nature 497:51–59

    Google Scholar 

  18. Hopkins A (2012) Disastrous decisions: the human and organizational causes of the gulf of Mexico Blowout. CCH Australia Limited, Australia

    Google Scholar 

  19. HSC (1993) Organising for safety: third report of the ACSNI (Advisory committee on the safety of nuclear installations) study group on human factors. Health and safety commission (of Great Britain). HSE Books, Sudbury

    Google Scholar 

  20. Johnston AN (1996) Blame, punishment and risk management. In: Hood C, Jones DKC (eds) Accident and design: contemporary debates in risk management. UCL Press, Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, pp 72–82

    Google Scholar 

  21. Kim DH (1993) The link between individual and organizational learning. Sloan Manage Rev Fall 37–49

    Google Scholar 

  22. Locke EA, Latham GP (1990) A theory of goal setting and task performance. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs

    Google Scholar 

  23. Mason RO (2004) Lessons in organizational ethics from the columbia disaster: can culture be lethal? Organ Dyn 33(2):128–142

    Google Scholar 

  24. Masys AJ (2010) Opening the black box of human error: revealing the complex aetiology of fratricide. VDM Publishing

    Google Scholar 

  25. Masys AJ (2012) The emergent nature of risk as a product of ‘Heterogeneous Engineering’: a relational analysis of oil and gas industry safety culture. In: Bennett S (ed) Innovative thinking in risk, crisis, and disaster management, Wey court east union road farnham, surrey, GU97PT. Gower Publishing Limited, England, pp 59–85

    Google Scholar 

  26. Masys AJ (2014) Critical infrastructure and vulnerability: a relational analysis through actor network theory. In: Masys AJ (ed) Networks and network analysis for defence and security. Springer, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  27. Mohr BJ (2001) Appreciative inquiry: igniting transformative action. Syst Thinker 12(1):1–5

    Google Scholar 

  28. Mohr BJ, Watkins JM (2002) The essentials of appreciative inquiry: a roadmap for creating positive futures. Innovation in Management Series, Pegasus Communications, Inc. Waltham, Mass

    Google Scholar 

  29. Morgan G (1980) Paradigms metaphors, and puzzle solving. Adm Sci Q 25(4):1–17

    Article  Google Scholar 

  30. National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling (2011) Deep water the gulf oil disaster and the future of offshore drilling. Report to the President

    Google Scholar 

  31. Perrow C (1999) Normal accidents: living with high-risk technologies. Princeton University Press, New Jersey

    Google Scholar 

  32. Pidgeon N (1997) The limits to safety? Culture, politics, learning and man-made disasters. J Contingencies Crisis Manag 5(1):1–14

    Article  Google Scholar 

  33. Reason J (1998) Achieving a safe culture: theory and practice. Work Stress 12(3):293–306

    Google Scholar 

  34. Robbins SP, Judge TA (2011) Organizational behaviour, 14th ed. Prentice Hall Publishers, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey

    Google Scholar 

  35. Ryan TA (1970) Intentional behaviour. Ronald Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  36. Senge P (2006) The fifth discipline: the art and practice of the learning organization, 2nd edn. Doubleday Currency, New York

    Google Scholar 

  37. Schein E (1990) Organizational culture. Am Psychol 45(2):109–119

    Article  Google Scholar 

  38. Smith D, Eliot D (2007) Exploring the barriers to learning from crisis: organizational leaning and crisis. Manage Learn 38(5):519–538

    Article  Google Scholar 

  39. Shendell-Falik N, Feinson M, Mohr BJ (2007) Enhancing patient safety improving the patient handoff process through appreciative inquiry. J Nurs Adm 37(2):95–104

    Article  Google Scholar 

  40. Toft B, Reynolds S (2005) Learning form disasters: a management approach, 3rd ed. Palgrave Macmillan Publishers, Hampshire

    Google Scholar 

  41. Turner BA (1976) The organizational and interorgnaizational development of disasters. Adm Sci Q 21(3):378–397

    Google Scholar 

  42. Turner BA (1994) Causes of disaster: sloppy management. Br J Manag 5:210–215

    Article  Google Scholar 

  43. Vaughan D (1999) The dark side of organizations: mistake misconduct, and disaster. Ann Rev Sociol 25:271–305

    Article  Google Scholar 

  44. Wattie J (2013) A study of the effects of organization culture on the reliability of the Trinidad & Tobago Emergency Mutual Aid Scheme (TTEMAS) as the only emergency response group on the Point Lisas Industrial Estate (PLIE). University of Leicester, Civil Safety and Security Unit, Leicester, UK

    Google Scholar 

  45. Weick KE, Sutcliffe KM (2007) Managing the unexpected: resilient performance in an age of uncertainty 2nd ed. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco

    Google Scholar 

  46. Weir DTH (1996) Risk and disaster: the role of communications breakdown in plane crashes and business failure. In: Hood C, Jones DKC (eds) Accident and design: contemporary debates in risk management, 2Park Square. UCL Press, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, pp 114–125

    Google Scholar 

  47. Woods DD (2006) Resilience engineering: redefining the culture of safety and risk management. HFES BULLETIN 49(12):1–3

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Anthony J. Masys .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Wattie, J., Masys, A.J. (2015). Enabling Resilience: An Examination of High Reliability Organizations and Safety Culture Through the Lens of Appreciative Inquiry. In: Masys, A. (eds) Disaster Management: Enabling Resilience. Lecture Notes in Social Networks. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08819-8_9

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics