Abstract
Once a default on a syndicate loan arises, both the lenders and the borrower, for different reasons, are interested in finding a way to an agreed solution.
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Notes
- 1.
This analysis will be made on direct loan syndicates (not on participation syndicates) on account of their major recurrence in bank lending (cf. supra, § 6.2).
- 2.
See Aronson (1979), pp. 306–309.
- 3.
Both the parties are called to recognise the existence of these problems and to take them into account in the negotiation process, Kurz (1983), pp. 148–150.
- 4.
See Hurlock (1984), p. 31.
- 5.
If credits become liabilities, the credit rating of the banks will be negatively affected, as well as their stock and bonds accordingly, Carreau (1985), p. 27.
- 6.
See Lowenfeld (1985), p. 489.
- 7.
See Lipson (1986), pp. 212–213. In this regard, it is worth emphasising that normally US banks combine a higher exposure with smaller reserves and must present quarterly profits to their shareholders; European banks combine smaller exposure with higher reserves and are not pressed by the necessity to present quarterly results, Amaral (1985), pp. 642–643.
- 8.
- 9.
Syndicated debt was restructured by Pakistan in 1999, by Serbia and Montenegro in 2005, by the Dominican Republic in 2005, and by Iraq in 2006, Das et al. (2012), p. 33.
- 10.
However, whether these events of default are legally enforceable depends on the governing law of the agreement, Ryan Jr (1984a), p. 158.
- 11.
See Mugasha (2007), p. 245.
- 12.
Ryan Jr (1984a), pp. 159–163.
- 13.
However, automatic defaults constitute a double-edged weapon, as may also activate cross-default clauses in loan agreements between the same borrower and other creditors, Gruson (1994), p. 433. Following acceleration, interest payments are no longer due since the entire principal is immediately due, Capital Ventures International v. Republic of Argentina, 2010 US Dist Lexis 32072 (SDNY 31 March 2010).
- 14.
Banks are inclined to accord a grace period more easily for failure to make payments on interest than for failure to make payments on principal because in the latter case, their asset ratio results are more affected, Ryan Jr (1982), p. 92. Of course, this grace period is granted as long as the default does not signal an insolvency, Jacquemont (1979), p. 73.
- 15.
In substance, an unfaithful representation or warranty may signal that the loan might not be repaid, Ryan Jr (1984a), p. 159.
- 16.
Sometimes lenders may consider a covenant so fundamental in the framework of the loan that its violation would entail an automatic default, Ryan Jr (1982), pp. 93–94.
- 17.
See Carreau and Julliard (2010), p. 691.
- 18.
See Ryan Jr (1982), pp. 95–96.
- 19.
The clause is intended to complete the architecture of the covenants, including adverse social, political, or economic situations affecting the capacity of the borrowing country to pay its debt. The wording of the clause is intentionally imprecise so as to cover various situations. This vagueness can generate disagreement between the borrower and the lender on the exact meaning to attribute to the clause. See Ryan Jr (1984a), p. 163.
- 20.
See Wallman (1985), pp. 481–483.
- 21.
The connection between the loan agreement and the IMF may be structured in different ways: representation on entry into the loan agreement, representation on each single advance of the loan, or default related to the standing of the membership or of an arrangement, Gold (1985), pp. 17–35.
- 22.
See Tennekoon (1991), p. 61.
- 23.
See Youard (1984), pp. 179–180.
- 24.
Under this scheme, the banks with larger exposure may exert influence over minor lenders, Blaise and Fouchard (1981), p. 204.
- 25.
- 26.
The difference between the two terms is that “[a]n amendment cannot be retrospective, it may only be made prior to a breach”, while “[a]fter a breach has occurred the breach can be waived and, if commercially acceptable, the relevant provision amended to prevent further breaches from occurring”, Hughes (2007), p. 37.
- 27.
“By participating in a syndicated loan, each bank thus cedes to the syndicate the right to make certain decisions”, Buchheit and Reisner (1994), p. 440. More precisely, the amendment or the waiver of the following provisions requires the consent of the borrower and the lenders alike: definition of “majority lenders”, extension of payment date, reduction of principal and interest, extension of any commitment, change of the borrower or the lender that is not contemplated in the loan agreement, change in the rights and obligations of the parties, Mugasha (2007), pp. 243–244.
- 28.
See Asiedu-Akrofi (1992), p. 18.
- 29.
“Nor is there any basis for reading fiduciary or other duties into agreements ‘among sophisticated lending institutions’”, New Bank of New England v. Toronto-Dominion Bank 768 F Supp 1017, 1021 (SDNY 1991).
- 30.
The facts run as follows: CIBC, a vulture fund that had raised on the secondary market a percentage slightly below 50 % of the external debt owed by Brazil under a particular Multi-Year Deposit Facility Agreement entered into with a group of banks, asked the Southern District Court of New York to freeze the votes corresponding to the residual quota of the loan facility detained by Banco do Brasil so as to be able to accelerate the loan, pleading the principle of good faith. In fact, CIBC argued that Banco do Brasil declined to join the restructuring process and retained its credits on the suggestion of the Brazilian government so as to neutralise any action by CIBC. However, the Court rejected this claim, arguing that even the existence of an implying duty of good faith could not prevail over the express covenants permitting Banco do Brasil “to vote its share of that debt in order to hinder an attempt at acceleration by another creditor”, CIBC and Trust Company LTD v. Banco Central do Brasil, 886 F Supp 1105, 1016 (SDNY 1995). See Gruson (2000), p. 281.
- 31.
Group of Ten, The Resolution of Sovereign Liquidity Crises, 1996, point 84, available at www.bis.org. The common features of both the approaches are the regular payment of interest and the parity of treatment of all the creditors, Clark and Hughes (1984), pp. 134–135.
- 32.
Usually, the debtor contacts the banks with the largest credit exposures, Evans (1985), p. 138. In this regard, Rieffel (2003), pp. 116 and 118, emphasises that the debtor tends to contact the bank(s) with previous experience in restructuring negotiations (the author includes a list of banks that have chaired steering committees). If the steering committee is not sufficiently authoritative to hold the creditors together, banks can choose to contact the debtor country individually, Bogdanowicz Bindert (1983), p. 325.
- 33.
Sometimes these bodies avoid even characterising themselves as “committees”, preferring “bank advisory groups” to avoid any similarities with the creditors’ committees in bankruptcy procedures, Buchheit (1991a).
- 34.
The participation of these banks in these committees takes place on voluntary basis and is not linked to the role that the lead manager and the agent used to play in the formation and in the management of the syndicate, Penn et al. (1987), pp. 190–191. Nevertheless, it has been suggested that these subjects would have at least a “remote duty” to provide information to the remaining members of the syndicate and to offer services in coordinating common action (Horn 1984, p. 405) or a “fiduciary duty” to promote a coordination among creditors (MacCallum 1987, p. 449).
- 35.
This cross-membership phenomenon is not necessarily to be stigmatised as it tends to increase the expertise in this field, Mudge (1984), pp. 66–67.
- 36.
In the case of ample bank syndicates, committees tend to divide themselves into subcommittees both at regional level, with the task of acting as intermediaries between the committee and the creditors of a particular area, and at technical level, with the task of examining specific problems or preparing specific documentation. See Kurz (1983), pp. 143–144, and Lomax (1986), pp. 153–155. A crucial role is exerted by the macroeconomic sub-committee, which is called upon to analyse the economic capacity of the debtor and its debt-servicing capacity, Milivojević (1985), p. 68.
- 37.
According to Clark and Hughes (1984), p. 134, this trend towards uniformity is particularly evident in those contexts where the presence of the New York bankers (and their lawyers) is more significant.
- 38.
Cf. infra, § 11.3.1.
- 39.
- 40.
See Power (1996), p. 2712.
- 41.
See Buchheit and Reisner (1994), p. 442.
- 42.
- 43.
Roughly speaking, under the US approach, the announcement is made directly by the banks sitting in the committee, while the European approach is to leave this task to the debtor. This distinction is mainly due to the different perceptions of the accountability of the committee, which, as said, does not possess any formal mandate to negotiate. See Clark and Hughes (1984), p. 135.
- 44.
Major banks have good reasons to press for a shared solution: to avert the risk of qualifying their credits as non-performing, to keep their financial relationships with sovereign borrowers current, and to maintain good links with other major financial players. Minor banks, which take part only occasionally in these financial operations, do not share the same preoccupations and so can play the role of the recalcitrant creditor. In this case, major banks can signify that they would take into account the obstinate position of these banks in relation to their participation in future financial operations. See Lipson (1986), pp. 210–211 and 219–220. In certain situations, national governments have exerted a significant pressure on bank lenders to accept restructuring packages, Aggarwal (1987), p. 28.
- 45.
- 46.
- 47.
“By participating in a syndicated loan, each bank thus cedes to the syndicate the right to make certain decision that would, in a single-bank credit, have been the exclusive prerogative of the lending bank”, Buchheit and Reisner (1994), p. 440.
- 48.
Buchheit (2000), pp. 145–149, reports a sample clause where modifications affecting the payment terms may be effected solely with the consent of each lender adversely affected.
- 49.
Cf. infra, § 16.8. This new category of creditors is unaffected by pressures from national regulators and peer banks that normally appear in relation to recalcitrant banks. In the restructuring of the Mexican debt in the 1980s, a minor Florida bank was convinced to abandon a lawsuit against the debtor country following an intervention by the US Federal Reserve, Milivojević (1985), p. 71.
- 50.
See Das et al. (2012), p. 17.
- 51.
The first meeting of the London Club was convened to arrange the restructuring of the debt owed by the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1976, Morais (1998), p. 322.
- 52.
- 53.
See Hudes (1985).
- 54.
- 55.
See Rieffel (2003), pp. 118–121.
- 56.
See Eichengreen and Portes (1995), p. 26.
- 57.
See Carreau (1985), p. 32. Cf. supra, Chap. 6, note 97.
- 58.
- 59.
See Rieffel (2003), pp. 112–114.
- 60.
- 61.
See Guttentag and Herring (1983), pp. 220–221.
- 62.
In the case of the provision of new money, the IMF did not negotiate the details of the restructuring but influenced the level of borrowing necessary for its stabilisation programme, Walker and Buchheit (1984), pp. 149–150.
- 63.
See Barston (1989), p. 81.
- 64.
When the restructuring agreements extend beyond the duration of an IMF facility, the debtor may consent to submit to an enhanced surveillance in accordance with what is provided under Art IV(3) of the IMF Articles of Agreement [(signed 27 December 1945) 2 UNTS 40; an up-to-date version is available at www.imf.org], as was agreed in the 1984 restructuring package between Mexico and bank lenders (Meissner 1985, pp. 620–621). Alternatively, creditors may provide multi-year restructuring agreements conditional upon the renewal of IMF credits or IMF approval of adjustment programmes (Berthelemy and Vourc’h 1994, p. 54). In the case of new lending, the disbursement under the loan agreement coincides temporarily with the disbursement under the IMF arrangements, Carreau (1985), p. 39. Symmetrically, the IMF arranges a facility solely if the banks agree to extend new financing, Carreau and Julliard (2010), p. 696.
- 65.
See Rieffel (2003), p. 125.
- 66.
Supra, § 10.1.
- 67.
Supra, § 9.7.
- 68.
See Clark (1986), p. 863.
- 69.
- 70.
See Kurz (1983), p. 140.
- 71.
Cf. infra, § 12.1. The restructuring of a bonded debt in parallel with a syndicated debt is a problematic matter, as resulting from the vicissitudes of the restructuring of the Costa Rica debt in 1982. The steering committee insisted on the application of the pari passu treatment to the bondholders; otherwise, the syndicated debt would have not been restructured. The Costa Rica government ceded to the request, but this decision triggered a reaction from the bond issue managers, who threatened to exert pressure on the multilateral financial institutions to block further financing in favour of Costa Rica. As a result, the request for a pari passu treatment was dropped. See Milivojević (1985), pp. 52–53.
- 72.
However, when the security is localised in the debtor’s jurisdiction, the secured creditors do not enjoy a strong bargaining position and may prefer to take part in the restructuring process on the same footing as the unsecured creditors, Mauger (1986), p. 115.
- 73.
See Kurz (1983), pp. 139–140.
- 74.
- 75.
This significantly complicates the picture as under the same loan, different legal arrangements may coexist, Walker and Buchheit (1984), pp. 142–143.
- 76.
See Walker and Buchheit (1984), p. 143.
- 77.
Supra, § 6.4.5.
- 78.
See Mauger (1986), pp. 105–107.
- 79.
In the Mexican debt restructuring process of the 1980s, a different path was followed: the framework agreement was not signed by either side, and each bank was merely called to acknowledge the principles of restructuring and to repeat the amount of new money required, with the result that it took 2 years to conclude bilateral implementing agreements. See Rieffel (2003), p. 124.
- 80.
- 81.
- 82.
See Köhler (1985), pp. 324–329.
- 83.
Otherwise, the government might be tempted to create a new agency endowed with certain assets and evade the terms of the loan by pledging them for other loans, Walker and Buchheit (1984), p. 147.
- 84.
Walker and Buchheit (1984), pp. 147–148. Exceptions should comprise securities granted with the prior consent of the majority of the banks, securities created in relation to project financings, securities over documents of title, insurance policies and sale contracts, and gold swaps (e.g., with the Bank for International Settlements), Wood (2007a), pp. 787–788.
- 85.
Therefore, this clause does not apply to domestic debt denominated in local currency, Morales (1995), pp. 387–388.
- 86.
See Ebenroth (1992), pp. 249–250.
- 87.
See Buchheit and Reisner (1988), pp. 511–512.
- 88.
However, this provision does not cover the payments effected to the IMF, the BIS, and the IBRD, although in this last case the exclusion is considered questionable, Clark and Hughes (1984), pp. 133–134.
- 89.
- 90.
The cross-default clause should comprise any default by any public entity, Walker and Buchheit (1984), p. 154.
- 91.
- 92.
See Walker and Buchheit (1984), p. 155.
- 93.
This condition precedent serves two purposes: in the first place, the funds available from the IMF will be applied prior to the resources provided under the restructuring agreement; in the second place, the compliance of the performance criteria arranged with the IMF increases the possibility that the new money is punctually repaid. See Walker and Buchheit (1984), p. 150.
- 94.
See Walker and Buchheit (1984), p. 150.
- 95.
As this information flow may be politically sensitive, the parties can specify which type of information is to be supplied, Walker and Buchheit (1984), pp. 151–152.
- 96.
See Buchheit and Reisner (1988), p. 515.
- 97.
In this regard, it is important to clarify in the restructuring agreement that, on one hand, this type of transaction does not trigger a sharing clause or a mandatory prepayment clause and, on the other, it does not constitute an amendment of the existing agreements; the alternative route is to structure the transaction as a novation. See Buchheit (1991b), p. 12. To facilitate these exchanges, contractual clauses requiring identical treatment among creditors should be neutralised by a clause providing for their freezing as long as all creditors are given an equal opportunity to participate; Newburg (1991), pp. 31–32.
- 98.
Cf. infra, § 17.3.
- 99.
See Wood (2007a), p. 789.
- 100.
Although the duties of the servicing institution are mainly ministerial and mechanical in character, the other banks are called to indemnify it against damages, costs, and liabilities incurred in its function; in this regard, the servicing bank seeks to be contractually exempted from any possible fiduciary duty. See Semkow (1984), p. 926, and Wickersham (1984), p. 119.
- 101.
- 102.
In Credit Français International S.A. v. Sociedad Financiera de Comercio, 490 NYS 2d 670, 682 (NY SCt 1985), the Supreme Court of New York qualified a loan syndicate as a joint venture with consequential duties arising thereunder. MacCallum (1987), pp. 451–453, has argued that, even admitting the existence of this implied duty, the dissenting members of the syndicate cannot be obliged to provide new money under a refinancing agreement.
- 103.
This duty would arise in connection with a restructuring plan consistent with an IMF Stand-by Arrangement and a Paris Club agreed minute and approved by the majority of the creditors. In relation to additional money, should the new loan serve as a replacement for resources previously extended without any real increase exposure, this duty might be envisaged; should the new loan entail an increase in real exposure, a creditor could not be obliged to additional lending. See Horn (1985), p. 308.
- 104.
Participation may be induced through a prohibition of any repayment on the old loan facility or a qualification of such payments as a default; however, these clauses would amount to inducing the debtor to breach agreements with third parties, i.e. the non-participating creditors. See Radesich (1987–1988), pp. 18–19.
- 105.
See MacCallum (1987), pp. 453–454.
- 106.
See MacCallum (1987), p. 454.
- 107.
See Buchheit and Reisner (1988), p. 507.
- 108.
The restructuring agreement for Romania (1982) provided for an amendment of the payment terms with a threshold of 95 % in the number of creditors; a subsequent restructuring agreement with the Philippines (1986) required the postponement of payment maturities at a threshold of 98 % in the number of creditors. These are exceptions as unanimity in this field is often regarded by small banks as a guarantee against the predominance of the larger banks. See Buchheit and Reisner (1988), pp. 509–510, and Buchheit (1991b), p. 11.
- 109.
See Semkow (1984), p. 925.
- 110.
- 111.
See Buchheit and Reisner (1988), p. 512.
- 112.
The latter method is more common, MacCallum (1987), p. 454.
- 113.
Roughly speaking, the former scheme—preferred by US banks—requires specific documentation, while the latter—more frequent in agreements governed by English law—does not, Walker and Buchheit (1984), p. 144.
- 114.
See Buckley (1998a). The origins of sovereign debt commercialisation may be traced back to the deliberation De Pecunie adopted in 1262 by the Maggior Consiglio of the Republic of Venice, under which “De illis vero qui aliorum imprestita emerant iste modus debet observari, videlicet quod ipsa habeant et habere possint cum honore quo habebant illi quorum fuerunt”, quoted in Luzzatto (1963), p. 29; see also Tracy (1985), p. 11.
- 115.
The restructuring process contributed to the growth of a secondary market through the replacement of a multiplicity of borrowers with a sole debtor, the consolidation of various loan agreements in a few restructuring agreements, and the standardisation of the transfer provisions in loan agreements; Buckley (1998d), pp. 305–308.
- 116.
The permanence of these banks within the syndicate could hinder the achievement of consensus towards a restructuring project, given their unwillingness to provide additional resources, Asiedu-Akrofi (1992), p. 17.
- 117.
See MacMillan (1995), pp. 328–329.
- 118.
- 119.
HRC Guiding Principles on Foreign Debt and Human Rights, A/HRC/20/23, paras 59, 62.
- 120.
See Penn et al. (1987), pp. 142–148. The transfer is not a plain and smooth operation as “a loan is not usually intended to be a freely tradeable security. Instead, it is a package of rights and liabilities which may include security and a guarantee; it is the whole or a piece of that package which is bought or sold”, Barratt (1998), p. 51.
- 121.
In the event of a bank with continuing obligations, the lender is relieved of its obligations only if the borrower so agrees in consideration of a new lender who accepts the duty to assume those obligations, Hughes (1987), p. 7.
- 122.
See Penn et al. (1987), p. 145.
- 123.
See Hughes (1987), pp. 8–10.
- 124.
See Buckley (1999), p. 111. Cf. Donegal International v. Zambia [2007] EWCH 197 (Comm) [240], [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 397, 438, per Smith LJ.
- 125.
Under English law, statutory assignment must comply with certain requirements, the most significant of which coincides with notice to the debtor; in contrast, equitable assignment does not impose such a requirement, although it is advisable to inform the debtor who is otherwise discharged if it pays to the assignor; see Burrows (2012), pp. 1483–1484. Along the same lines, under US jurisdictions, legal assignment must possess certain requisites; these include a notice to the debtor not required for equitable assignment, Am Jur 2d – Assignments § 82 et seq.
- 126.
Although the debtor may raise some exceptions intuitu personae (Blaise and Fouchard 1981, p. 174), “[i]n the absence of a clear language expressly prohibiting assignment, however, contracts are freely assignable”, Pravin Banker Association Ltd. v. Banco Popular 895 F Supp 660, 668 (SDNY 1995). However, to facilitate the assignment of rights, it is advisable to insert in the terms of the loan a provision clearly permitting the assignment of the rights arising under the loan contract, Buchheit (2000), pp. 122–126. If the assignment is permissible under the contract, the terms of the loan can provide that the assignment must be notified to the debtor, to the agent bank, and to the servicing bank, Loungnarath Jr (1992), p. 204. If the assignment is prohibited under the terms of the loan, the transfer may still qualify as a declaration of trust, Barbados Trust Co. Ltd (formerly known as CI Trustees (Asia Pacific) Ltd) v. Bank of Zambia & Anor [2007] EWCA Civ 148 [84], [2007] 1 CLC 434, 464, per Rix LJ. When the assignment is limited by the “benefit of agreement clause”, which requires the written consent of the borrower, the agent bank and other syndicate banks, the assignee has no right to be consulted in the matter of default, waiver, or restructuring, Tennekoon (1991), pp. 112 and 114.
- 127.
Supra, § 6.2.
- 128.
The lead bank is not liable to the participant bank if the borrower does not reimburse his loan; Penn et al. (1987), p. 147.
- 129.
- 130.
- 131.
“The common law doctrine of privity of contract means that a contract cannot (as a general rule) confer rights or impose obligations arising under it on any person except the parties to it”, Treitel (2012), p. 1374.
- 132.
See Niremberg (1984), pp. 158–159.
- 133.
In the case of rescheduling, the participant bank has no right to be repaid on the date of the original maturity as its payment depends entirely upon the payment to the seller bank, Tennekoon (1991), p. 113.
- 134.
In this case, the lead bank will act in accordance with the decision of the majority of the participant banks, Carver (1985), p. 315. Moreover, even in the absence of such a provision, the lead bank could still consult the participant banks for at least two main reasons: interbank courtesy and the necessity to avoid responsibility under an agency or fiduciary relationship, Buchheit (1986), p. 160.
- 135.
This is a problematic picture as the banks with major exposures, which are generally more favourable to restructuring, coincide with the banks that have sold more participations. Significantly, in the framework of a participation syndicate, Citibank was sued for having agreed to a restructuring without the consent of the sub-participant, Michigan National Bank. The case was subsequently settled prior to the trial, but it contributed to shedding some light on this crucial point. See Buchheit (1986), pp. 160–161.
- 136.
In this regard, a further question arises as to whether the commitment of new money by the lead bank should imply a commitment of new money by the participant bank in proportion to the participation in the loan; the response depends upon whether the risk involved in the downstream transaction is crystallised at the time of the agreement or covers all the vicissitudes of the loan. See Carver (1985), pp. 316–318.
- 137.
Not all the banks were particularly enthusiastic to re-lend, but a significant pressure was exerted on recalcitrant creditors by the other members of the syndicates, the IMF, and the regulatory national authorities, Power (1996), pp. 2711–2713.
- 138.
Since their exposure was over 100 % of their capital, the largest US banks were unable to set aside sufficient loan-loss reserves to meet the consequences of a definitive default. Conceding new money was a device to gain time to increase the relevant reserves. See Power (1996), pp. 2709–2711.
- 139.
Supra, § 2.4.1.
- 140.
The United States intervention was the product of the need to preserve the stability of its financial system, promote economic development and political stability in Latin America, and support the economic growth in the United States, Santos (1991), pp. 84–85.
- 141.
The plan was presented before the joint annual meetings of the IMF and the World Bank held in October 1985 and subsequently to the US House of Representatives (1986) 25 ILM 412.
- 142.
The Baker Initiative was targeted to the 15 most indebted countries (the so-called Baker Fifteen), mostly Latin American countries, Lowenfeld (2008), p. 682.
- 143.
The result of this picture was not entirely satisfying as the amount of the debt underwent no significant reduction, Power (1996), pp. 2714–2715.
- 144.
See Nassar Guier (1995), p. 122.
- 145.
See Levinson (1992), pp. 93–95.
- 146.
Nicholas Brady launched his proposal at a conference on Third World Debt held in Washington in March 1989, organised by the Brookings Institution and the Bretton Woods Committee; see the text in Fried and Trezise (1989), p. 69.
- 147.
- 148.
- 149.
- 150.
This marked a shift from the propriety approach to the market-based approach, Lowenfeld (2008), p. 684.
- 151.
- 152.
After initial perplexity, Brady bonds became popular among investors as the bond investment was perceived as having seniority over bank debt, Buckley (1998c), pp. 1843–1844.
- 153.
See Auerback (2003), pp. 443–444.
- 154.
See Lowenfeld (2008), pp. 686.
- 155.
- 156.
However, under the terms of the loan, in the event of default, the collateral could not be seized before the maturity date, Power (1996), pp. 2721–2722.
- 157.
See Buckley (1998c), p. 1810.
- 158.
See Buchheit (1992), p. 12.
- 159.
- 160.
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Megliani, M. (2015). Syndicated Debt. In: Sovereign Debt. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08464-0_11
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