Abstract
We are now in a position to present a one-dimensional fuzzy public choice modelPublic choice!fuzzy model designed to predict the outcome of the government formation process in parliamentary systems. Such a model allows us to represent flexibility in actors’ preferences and predict when those actors may make allowances for minor policy shifts as well as when they may prefer major policy shifts. This is because the fuzzy public choice model allows for broad areas of indifferenceIndifference in actor’s preference profiles. Moreover, a fuzzy model is more likely to predict stable outcomes by avoiding the intransitivity problem that plagues traditional models. We present two approaches to such a model. The first makes use of the fuzzy maximal set; the second makes use of the fuzzy Pareto set. We test both models using fuzzy preferences derived from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) data.
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Notes
- 1.
Percentages rounded to the nearest hundredth.
- 2.
All numbers reported for rile, fuzzy median, ranges of the support of fuzzy numbers, and other descriptive statistics are rounded to the nearest hundredths place.
- 3.
As defined by Shugart and Carey (1992).
- 4.
See Clark et al. (2008) for how thick indifferenceIndifference!thick reduces majority cycling without including institutional restraints.
- 5.
- 6.
Formally, an actor \(i\) possesses thick indifference if for \(a,b\in X\), \(a\ne b\nRightarrow aP_{i}b\) or \(bP_{i}a\) where \(P_{i}\) is the strict preference relation for player \(i\).
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Casey, P.C. et al. (2014). Predicting the Outcome of the Government Formation Process: Fuzzy Single-Dimensional Models. In: Fuzzy Social Choice Models. Studies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing, vol 318. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08248-6_4
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