Essay #14: Frankfurt on Why We Care About Truth: The Worlds of the Two Harrys

Abstract

This essay offers a summary and critique of the position that Harry Frankfurt has taken in On Truth for why we care about truth. Frankfurt is a great champion of objective truth, while at the same time holding a noncognitivist position concerning normative issues. The critique offered by this essay concerns the interface between these two realms. Frankfurt’s view is that objective truths can serve as premises for valid or invalid arguments in support of normative conclusions. This essay argues that Frankfurt is mistaken about that, and through the use of several concrete examples seeks to make that case.

Frankfurt considers the situation of the postmodernist, who is characterized as denying that there are any objective truths or objective falsehoods. He expresses puzzlement that postmodernists are not troubled about characterizing their own beliefs as true. But why should this be troubling? One who denies that there are any objective truths, can still recognize other species of truth, such as subjective truth. So, when the postmodernist embraces some proposition as true, what they must mean is that such a proposition is true to them, or true from their subjective perspective.

The paper ends with a speculation concerning what Frankfurt calls the prevalence of bullshit in our culture.