Normativity and Governance

  • Josef Wieland
Part of the Ethical Economy book series (SEEP, volume 48)


The Governance Ethics rejects a hierarchical ordering (dominance model) of the relationship between economics and ethics and follows the theory of functional differentiation of modern society. In modern functionally differentiated societies, the argument runs, neither a systematic primacy of ethics over economy nor a fundamental prioritization of economy over ethics can be carried out without prohibitive costs for society. Instead it is argued that only a consistent instrumentation and regulation adapted to meet the local circumstances in each case can successfully initiate and promote the moral-economic ambitions of firms or their stakeholders efficiently and effectively. This chapter examines the presumptions and consequences of this system theoretical perspective in more detail and explains the interrelation between function systems, organization systems and psychic systems. After explaining why the Governance Ethics have both, descriptive and normative aspects, the chapter closes with developing a theory of moral incentives.


Business Ethic Transaction Cost Collective Actor Governance Structure Binary Code 
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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Josef Wieland
    • 1
  1. 1.Zeppelin UniversityFriedrichshafenGermany

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