The Design of the Theory

  • Josef Wieland
Part of the Ethical Economy book series (SEEP, volume 48)


Governance Ethics whose basic concepts are presented in this chapter takes up both questions about the role and performance of economy in the realization of moral claims and the role of ethics in economic and entrepreneurial transactions. The theoretical approach is a microanalytical one and focuses the immanent moral dimension of distinct economic transactions. This chapter introduces and explains the basic formula of Governance Ethics, which implies that the realization of the immanent moral dimension of economic transactions is potentially a function (a) of the individual self-monitoring mechanisms of the persons involved, (b) of the formal and (c) informal institutions of a given institutional setting and (d) of the nature of the mechanisms of coordination and cooperation of an economic organization. The object of Governance Ethics is the analysis of the functions and effects of moral regimes within the leadership, management and monitoring of economic transactions by means of an organization of cooperating actors. In this context virtues, values, morals and ethics are seen as individual or organizational resources which are available as effective elements of the formal and informal regime for the leadership, management and monitoring of transactions of the organization and its members. The integration of all the relevant moral parameters of the firms permits their elaboration in a comparatively functioning decision programme. It permits the thematization of the problem of the choice of efficient and effective regimes for the governance of economic transactions including their moral dimension in a discriminatory fashion.


Business Ethic Governance Structure Leadership Ethic Virtue Ethic Child Labour 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Josef Wieland
    • 1
  1. 1.Zeppelin UniversityFriedrichshafenGermany

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