1 Introduction

The recent Italian legislation requires central and local public entities to manage organizational and individual performance. At present, several Italian entities have to adopt Performance Management Systems (PMS). There is a great controversy in the main literature concerning this reform and the effective implementation of these systems in public administrations [2].

The aspect that seems to pose the greatest challenge to an effective measurability of performance in public administrations lies in the existence of a close link between the processes of producing and providing a service. The finalist approach to output measurement, which has always characterized enterprise, becomes rather difficult to apply to the public framework precisely due to the close correlation between the intermediate process and the final service [3]. As these two items are inseparable, it is hard to achieve a global assessment of the efficiency of the administrative action [4], whose appraisal can be undertaken only through the use of blatant approximation mechanisms.

More generally, issues related to the configuration of information systems in public administrations have sparked a debate on several themes: the bases of accounting; the methods and metrics of performance measurement, the architecture of systems in support of PMS.

The studies carried out in the context of information and communication technology systems (ICTs) in support of planning and control processes in the public administration highlighted the following problems:

  • Issues regarding the design and integration of ICTs [58];

  • An increase in the workload of the administrative staff [9];

  • Difficulties in identifying the activities that make up the processes [1012];

  • Difficulties in implementing changes related to ICTs [1315]

  • A low correlation between strategic planning and budgeting [1618];

  • Difficulties in measuring outputs [19, 20];

  • Difficulties in identifying performance measurement indicators, with the consequent problems of measuring the levels of effectiveness and efficiency of organizations [21, 22];

  • A weak ability to support decision-making [23]

While the literature is unanimous in recognizing the instrumental role of information systems, their capacity to support performance management is still in question. This work fits in the wide area of studies based on a “holistic” approach. It assumes a correlation between the architecture of information systems and the plurality of variables that characterize the organizational framework and the cultural, social and institutional context in which the administration operates [2426].

To understand the role of the variables involved in ICTs, we should simultaneously take into consideration the characteristics of the environment and the organizational context, without neglecting the evolutionary paths or the “history” of those systems [27].

The Italian Authority for Electricity and Gas has resolved many of the issues raised by preview studies and researches concerning the methods and techniques to be used to define and measure strategies, politics and actions.

2 The Characteristics of the Authority

AEEG is the first independent regulatory body established in Italy with Law no. 481/1995. This law, which is also the regulatory framework for other bodies operating in the fields of telecommunications, mail, water and transportation, was approved by the Parliament with an extremely large majority, reflecting the relevance of such a role in the liberalization and privatization of public services that had traditionally been delivered by public companies. The main target of the new independent regulation is to promote fair competition and foster the efficiency and quality of public services that, after the privatization process, are now delivered not only by the central State or local government-owned companies, but also by private organizations.

Over time, the progress of a European legislative framework towards a full liberalization of energy markets (electricity and gas) has reinforced the need for independent regulation. Since 2003, any EU Member State must appoint an independent regulatory authority for electricity and gas (with Germany as the last large State to introduce such a new public body) and since 2007 all energy consumers have the right to choose their electricity or gas supplier in a framework of regulated, EU-wide competition. Since 2011, a new European Agency (ACER—Agency for the cooperation of energy regulators) has been working for the harmonization of the national regulatory frameworks through the development of Single Market rules and technical codes. ACER’s board members represent all the national EU regulators.

Independence from national Government directives and rulings is the key feature of the new regulatory authorities. For instance, AEEG may adopt resolutions without the consent of the Government, only being subject to procedural rules for decision-making, in particular public consultation on draft proposals for any new regulation and, for the most complex cases, a regulatory impact analysis. Special procedural rules are also requested for individual decisions on enforcement and sanctioning measures. Moreover, the regulatory authority plays a role of institutional adviser and can provide both Parliament and Government with opinions on draft legislation or any other issue, as each case may require.

Just to make a real, very simple but meaningful example, regulatory independence is of utmost relevance for setting tariffs, especially if the former incumbent service provider is still owned by the State, even only partially. Tariffs, indeed, have a direct impact on share values and therefore on dividends for the Treasury. In the past, before the creation of independent regulatory authorities, tariffs were set by the Government with an eye to general inflation and another eye to market share values, whilst now the only focus of independent regulation are efficiency and effectiveness (service quality and innovation).

Some institutional rules protect the regulator’s independence in crucial circumstances like the appointment of the Board members of the regulatory authority (bi-partisan majority is required in the Parliament), their long-term mandate (7 years) without being entitled to hold any other post during the mandate and to have the mandate renewed, in order to avoid conflicts of interest. However, it clearly appears that the regulator’s independence is not only a once-every-7-years event, but should be grounded in the real everyday life of these new public bodies.

Therefore, independence means continuous and extensive accountability. The provisions of institutional Law no. 481/1995, which require an Annual Report to be submitted by the regulatory Authority to the Parliament and Government, are already significant, but still not enough. Another important tool for accountability is that, being the authority a public administrative body, all its decision can be appealed in the Administrative Court with a two-step jurisdictional process. Nonetheless, the fact that the same public body can both issue regulations for a specific sector and enforce them through sanctions and other orders is a reason for concern in a democracy traditionally based on the separation of powers. This implies that the regulator’s accountability must be reinforced with respect to other “ordinary” public bodies, to which the separation of powers applies in the traditional forms.

Although not strictly required by the institutional law, AEEG has set its own procedural rules since its first proceedings in 1997. Wide consultation of all stakeholders on each draft proposal for new regulation or for major regulatory changes has been, since then, a distinctive mark of regulatory authorities like AEEG. In 2009, public consultation rules were updated after a specific “consultation process on the consultation process”.

A further important step forward in the improvement of accountability was taken by AEEG in 2005 with the disclosure of its Strategic Plan for the first time. That 3-year Strategic Plan contains strategic objectives defined for the entire organizational structure, whose major goal is to stimulate competition in the energy markets and drive an efficient development of energy infrastructures. This Strategic Plan is publicly discussed in yearly general hearings with market participants, customer association representatives and all the other interested parties/stakeholders, and it is regularly updated. Moreover, a more detailed operational plan was also published at least until 2011, with a regulatory agenda for the most significant public consultations and final decisions to be made for the reference year.

Both the consultation process and strategic-operational planning are real-life examples of the accountability of the independent regulatory authority and impact both its budget and organizational layout. The actual operation of the planning process can be assured only through the implementation of internal information systems. Since the beginning of its operations, AEEG focused its attention on the development of its website (www.autorita.energia.it), with a special care to ensure transparency, friendliness for different targets (operators, final consumers and media/investors) and full search features for the portal contents. The AEEG website is now a very authoritative resource on energy issues in the Internet in Italy, being among the first companies listed upon entering the word “energia” (Italian for: energy) in Google.

In order to better explain the organizational impact of the new “intranet” information system, it is worthwhile to briefly explain the organizational structure of the regulatory authority. First of all, we should point out that institutional Law no. 481/1995 acknowledged the “organizational autonomy” of AEEG as an essential component of its independence. Therefore, AEEG is one of the few public bodies in Italy for which changes in the organizational chart do not require a legislative act to be introduced, but only a decision of the Board.

As in other public bodies (e.g. the European Commission), there is a formal distinction within AEEG between the Board (the “Collegio”) and the Services (the “Structure”). The Board is the decision-making body that substantially makes all the regulatory decisions of the Authority; it consists of a President and members with equal voting rights, who adopt resolutions with the simple majority voting method (actually, almost all decisions are made unanimously). All the five Board Members are appointed by a complex procedure that involves the Government for the initial nomination, then the Parliament for approval with a highly qualified majority (two-thirds of the relevant Parliamentary Committees), and eventually the President of the Republic to issue the final appointment act. As already said, each member of the Board has a 7-year mandate, during which he/she cannot cover any other public or private position. The mandate cannot be renewed and a 4-year term is foreseen after the end of the mandate, during which former members cannot have any direct or indirect relationship with regulated entities.

3 The Theoretical-Doctrinal Models for the Configuration of the System

The case of AEEG bears witness to the possible development of a methodology based on the approaches of theoretical models and on the most sophisticated assessment tools to reflect the peculiarities of the administration and become a real instrument for guidance. The configuration of the performance measurement system is based on two closely interrelated elements: the first is the logical-conceptual framework of the assessment system and is expected to comply with the requirements of the administration and its distinguishing features; the second concerns the development of a tool to be used to support the operation of the system itself.

The objective pursued when developing the measurement system was not to limit the scope of the assessment to the sole final result of the administrative action, but rather to highlight the determinants of that action and examine their global impact.

This leads to the need to define performance measurement systems capable of correlating the use of resources, that have an economic value, with the results achieved, not all of which can be captured by monetary metrics because they are related with the fulfilment of needs and with the judgement of their global institutional usefulness. Therefore, there is a need to use a logical system of tools allowing for the improvement and/or better knowledge of the economic effects of the decisions and choices made.

The prerequisite for a functional architecture is the joint examination of the different players (the individuals and the progressive aggregation structures where they operate) and of the relationships between them, which may be interpersonal, intra-organizational or inter-organizational [28].

The complexity of intra-organizational governance may be described by using two variables: on the one side, the degree of predictability of the activities to be carried out and, on the other side, the degree of subdivision of the structures into sub-units. The more the activities are difficult to predict, as they are affected by contingencies, the greater the need for a constant problem-solving effort, the coordination of individual actions and the reconfiguration of processes to respond to any emerging situation. Conversely, for the second variable, the intensity of coordination is reinforced in connection with the number of units that make up each structure. The higher the number of sub-units, the greater the complexity connected with their governance, that is to say the need to establish a greater variety of tasks, set a system of responsibilities or introduce internal specialization processes.

The legislative innovation of the beginning of the Nineties brought about the passage from a bureaucratic, self-referential kind of public administration, soaked in a culture of mere compliance with legal requirements, to a managerial-like public administration where the focus was progressively shifted towards economic and financial efficiency, and the relationship between the resources used, and the goods and services produced.

With the reforms of the years 2000, managerial logics were integrated by an approach centred on public governance: the emphasis of performance measurement systems today is on outcomes and the ratio of the use of performance information is to increase the level of knowledge on the value created by the administrative action.

But in spite of the cultural evolution that took place after the changes made to the regulatory framework, the operating reality remains complex.

Even though the key steps of the logical path that leads to the construction of a performance measurement system can be easily identified:

  • Analysis of the institutional mission, i.e. the needs of the community to which the administration is accountable and expected to provide answers by defining strategic objectives and its action policies,

  • Operating objectives, which give form to the abovementioned strategic objectives through planning and budgeting,

  • Inputs, i.e. the resources required for the implementation of the activities aimed at achieving objectives,

  • The processes that make up the flow of activities and the way these activities are coordinated and interrelated,

  • The outputs, i.e. the goods and services produced,

  • and finally, outcomes.

The path to be trodden is still steep and affected by a number of factors, such as the emphasis of the measurement system, the method used to build the measurement system, the frequency of information collection, the approach to the use of information on performance, the users and the frameworks where the information will be used.

The implementation of the performance measurement system has stemmed from the analysis of the organizational architecture, or better, of the size of the organization: the degree of specialization of the structures; the degree of centralization of decision-making; the professionalization of work; the governance system; the availability of personnel and resources; the degree of formalization of the system.

The organizational layout of the Authority substantially reflects the coordination mechanism described by Mintzberg [29] as the professional bureaucracy model, whose constituents are further strengthened by:

  • An intense degree of specialization, accompanied by the availability of significant technical competencies;

  • A deep influence of the institutional context and of specific sector regulations, at both national and international level;

  • The measurement of the values under the Authority’s responsibility, which confirm the distinctive independent nature of the institution;

  • The functional structure developed around a central core consisting of the Board, with its branching out facilities and directorates that control simple or complex functions, with directorates being re-aggregated into departments based on the consistency of their action frameworks.

The analysis of the organizational layout requires not only the characteristics of the governance to be taken into consideration, but also the principles based on which activities are implemented. On the whole, processes are developed through the Board, with the result that the functional instrumentality of operating processes is emphasised with respect to the activity of the Board. The implementation of functions, even complementary to one another, is ensured by the structures, each one a carrier of its own competencies and professional skills, and responsible for specific steps and/or aspects of the process.

Always within the framework of our preliminary analysis, we surveyed the sources from which data and knowledge in support of measurement activities have been taken and we identified information requirements:

  • The financial size of the administration,

  • Economic-equity magnitudes,

  • Evidence deriving from budget allocation,

  • Strategic policies,

  • Information on the decision-making activities of the Board,

  • The assignment of tasks by objective,

  • Evidence regarding the management of human resources, and

  • Accounting evidence concerning some expense categories.

As regards the conceptual reference model of our analysis and in the light of the considerations developed, we proposed the use of Porter’s value creation model.

The features of the organization, of the generated output and outcomes, the intangibility and discretionary nature of many activities, as well as the difficulty of measuring them have generated the need not to focus the assessment action exclusively on the measurement of costs, but rather to extend the assessment metric to a comparison between the value absorbed and the value generated by the activities of the Authority.

The benefits created by this choice can be summarized in the possibility of performing this analysis without having to use a cost allocation system to identify costs through cost and responsibility centres, but also in the availability of a unifying measurement criterion that can be globally recognised by the different structures, albeit different by organizational layout and type of resources used.

The shift from cost measurement by structure to the notion of a ‘value absorbed by activities’ allowed accountants to isolate the weight of individual processes, correlate intensity to the output achieved and, finally, clarify the contribution offered by the structures to the value created for the Board and, consequently, for the external community.

According to Porter’s original approach, the production of value by an individual organization has to be connected with the activities it performs. Therefore, examining the value creation process becomes a necessity because the different types of activity must be identified and isolated within each specific combination [30].

The value chain of an organization is the expression of the individual activities that are carried out within it and, most of all, of how the individual activities are interrelated, integrated and coordinated: only one value chain corresponds to each organization and the value chain of each organization differs from the value chain of another organization.

Porter’s notion of ‘value chain’ leads to two considerations.

The first is that the value generated by an organization depends on the configuration of its processes in the perspective that:

  • Each activity is implemented with the purpose of producing value;

  • Each activity is connected to at least another activity;

  • Each activity absorbs resources and generates outputs.

The second consideration is that each administration has its own value chain as the utmost expression of its peculiarity and specificity (Fig. 1).

Fig. 1
figure 1

The value chain in AEEG

The feature that characterizes the value chain of the Authority we are examining is the presence of the Board, which acts as connector of the value created by the organizational structures. The Board catalyzes the generated output, captures its value and, through the exercise of its powers, fulfills the functions attributed to AEEG, thus generating the social value of the institution.

The Board is therefore simultaneously the receptor of the value generated by the organization, the propellant of the administrative action and the generator of the social value that stems from the very role of the Authority.

4 The Structure of AEEG’s Information System

AEEG is very complex both in terms of measurability of its output (regulatory function) and in terms of organizational structure.

The complexity of an administration depends on the action of two types of environmental determinants: the “institutional” and the “technical” forces [31].

The intensity of their action may produce a lesser or greater degree of complexity.

The high level of complexity requires increasing capacities in structuring processes and programming tasks, as well as in measuring the generated outputs and outcomes.

A huge investment was made in the years 2009–2010 tore-engineer the “extranet” platform used by the Authority to capture the data flow from market and grid operators that can provide AEEG with the information required by the regulations through secure credentials. Data is an essential resource for ensuring informed and robust regulatory decisions; this explains why the information system layer devoted to external users was deemed a higher priority with respect to the internal information system layer.

Initially, only simple and not integrated applications were developed to support strategic and operational planning processes, but over the last 2 years (2011–2012), an important investment was made to re-engineer the whole “intranet” layer of the information system of the regulatory authority with a threefold purpose: first, to enhance the information flow from the services to Board, and viceversa; second, to efficiently distribute knowledge resources in a skilled environment with severe limitations to quantitative HR developments (due to State law); third, to improve horizontal communication in order to ensure the internal circulation and discussion of cross-departmental issues and avoid excessive vertical specialism.

The Board selects strategic objectives and defines both the organizational chart and the budget of the Services, but has relatively limited power in day-to-day management. Almost all managerial decisions are taken by directors, under the supervision of the Board. Services are currently organized into three Departments (legal and coordination; regulation; enforcement and consumer affairs), further subdivided into Divisions and Units. The total amount of HR for energy regulation is capped by law at 180 people (of whom 25 are executives), even though a very recent legislative act entrusted AEEG also with water regulation and allowed it to hire 40 additional units (vacancies are currently under selection with public procedures).

Most of the Services’ activity is aimed at the preparation of draft Board decisions. The assessment of the proposal prepared by Directors is performed with in a two-step process (which may be reduced to a single step when urgent measures are required) (Fig. 2).

Fig. 2
figure 2

The process of the assessment of the proposal

Every week, an informal meeting of the Board and Services is held to scrutinize draft decisions and make any amendments requested by the Board. When the proposal is finalized, the Department for Coordination proposes the President to include it in the weekly agenda of the formal Board meeting, where the formal decision is eventually made and finally published (and notified to the interested parties, if it is an enforcement act).

The new intranet-based integrated information system supports all the processes involved (Fig. 3).

Fig. 3
figure 3

The planning and control system

The Strategic Planning process is supported by managing “strategic objective” entities. Each strategic plan is a collection of several strategic objectives and is associated to a given timeframe. When a new Strategic Plan is launched (or amended according to the annual update process), the system allows for a reclassification of its contents without any loss of information (“Change Plan” feature).

The Operational Planning process is supported by deploying each strategic objective into more detailed “specific objectives”, each of which is assigned a deadline and associated with a description (also including cooperating units, requests for special legal advice, and so on). For internal functioning, where specific objectives cannot be easily referred to strategic objectives, intermediate “operational objectives” are defined (these can be implemented by the Services without a formal decision of the Board—e.g. payroll management, procurement and expenditure process, communication and external relationships, and so on).

Each specific objective can be managed throughout its lifecycle. The most important action is rescheduling, according not only to HR congestions, but also to exogenous variances (changes in upward legislation, priority reformulation, and so on). Directors are entitled to re-schedule the specific objectives of their direct competence and monitor all changes even in different departments or divisions. Additional possible actions that can be performed only by the Department for Coordination are the merging of two specific objectives or the cancellation of a previously scheduled specific objective (with indication of the reason).

Every month, a two-month ahead detailed scheduling (Operational Programming) is required in order to identify, for each decision, a Commissioner due to play the role of ‘referee’ Each week, the agenda of the Board (for both the informal and the formal meeting) is prepared by using the same information system used to follow and track each change.

Every week, the owner of each scheduled specific objective can upload the documentation for the informal and formal Board meetings; features for easy download are developed and document versioning is managed in order to keep track of all documentation versions and changes.

On an ex-post basis, the information system is now integrated with the performance assessment tool that enables the director of each Department or Division to assess outputs according to the performance assessment methodology adopted. Not only the ‘regulatory Board’s output’ classified according to Strategic Objectives is assessed, but, with the same tool, staff divisions and units can also assess their own ‘internal operation output’, which is classified according to Operational Objectives. A suite of reports enables both strategic and management control.

From a technical viewpoint, the access to the integrated information system is based upon LDAP security credentials and integrated with the intranet portal with Single-Sign On (SSO). All the system is built with a fully web-based architecture, meaning that it requires only a standard browser, without any client component, therefore allowing for a high level of mobility access, not being necessary to be physically connected to the internal network. High security standards are ensured through encryption.

The information system integrated as described above offers a clear and concrete representation of the connection between the political and the administrative-management dimensions. Although the experience described is still far from reflecting the establishment of a performance cycle, we may observe that the system allows some light to be shed on some essential aspects:

  • The effectiveness of the administrative action, intended as the achievement of strategic objectives, including from the internal point of view;

  • The efficiency of the administrative action through the periodic monitoring of the human and economic resources used for the implementation of the activity, aimed at achieving strategic objectives and implementing ordinary management,

  • The strategic level, in each administration on the whole and with respect to the degree of implementation of strategic choices;

  • The management level, in first-tier responsibility centres (Departments, Directorates and Offices);

  • The operation level, at second-tier responsibility centres.

5 The Measurement System

The creation of the tools for the collection of the necessary information for assessment activities was based on the organizational characteristics of the Authority.

Concerning the scope of said activities, in the awareness of the complexity of the assessment of external effectiveness or outcome of the performance of the Authority—i.e. the ascertainment of the cause-effect link between implemented actions and results achieved—the focus was restricted on efficiency and size of input and output, through the determination of indicators expressed in terms of global costs of the organizational units, lines of activity and, in some cases, products manufactured.

Taking into account the nature of the regulatory function carried out by the Authority and the necessary use of resources with technical skills and a high degree of specialization, the input was determined as a function of the workforce expressed in terms of person/time used by each organizational unit and line of activity.

For the collection of data and the related information, a survey form was prepared consisting of two sections: the first offering a picture of the organizational structures under the management’s responsibility (Department, Directorate or Office), with indication of the internal organization(second-tier units), functional competencies (activities/objectives “declared” in the annual operating plan) and resources assigned (personnel and forms of externalization consisting in flexible employment opportunities and and/or external services/agreements).

The second section of the survey form regards the use of the resources allocated in the structures in terms of portions used of the allocated resources: considering one hundred as the maximum total use of any resource considered, regardless of the amount of time during which the resource has been used (see the case of part-time employees or staff hired during the year or contractors legally not required to keep to specific working hours or whose professional service cannot be considered as an obligation of means), the percentage of application of the resource to the activity/objective considered is determined. Clearly, the purpose of such a kind of measurement is not to highlight the rate of use of the resources, i.e. the intensity of use of the resources as a function of the time worked or of customary average work times, but rather the percentage of each resource allocated to the structures and used for each individual activity/objective, as well as the amount globally used of each resource.

The output measurement procedure includes three steps, as shown in Fig. 4.

Fig. 4
figure 4

The process to define and measuring output

As regards the output, the first issue was to define its meaning.

Two approaches may be followed to define outputs: the first is a finalist type of approach that defines the output as the conclusion of a production process that is implemented with the contribution of different factors; the second approach, on the contrary, defines a final output as the result obtained after a sequence of intermediate outputs.

The output has been conceived on the basis of the second approach as any factual element that can be enucleated being the result of specific contributions or, in any case, the result of an activity or multiple activities which may differ from one another, but that remain teleologically interconnected.

The second aspect concerned the construction of a taxonomic system that reflected the types of operations carried out by the Authority.

In connection with the considerations developed concerning the organizational and functional characteristics outlined in the preliminary analysis, two parallel measurement models could have been created: one for the organizational structures related to primary activities, for which a measurement system focused on more easily identifiable outputs could have been conceived (the finalist logic), and the other related to accessory activities, for which the classical indicators inferred from documental evidence with reference to the budget system could have been used, thus developing only an analysis by approximation of administrative efficiency.

Instead, a single measurement model appropriate for all corporate structures was selected and supported by a taxonomy consisting of two main categories, according to the dichotomy between primary and support activities: the acts and measures adopted by the Board, on the one hand, and actions under the management’s responsibility undertaken by the structure, on the other hand—where each category is to be seen within a wide and cross-sectional framework, and distinguished into subcategories (Fig. 5).

Fig. 5
figure 5

The taxonomy of outputs

The qualitative analysis of outputs, i.e. the appraisal of the intrinsic complexity of their achievement, is performed by using four explanatory parameters:

  1. 1.

    Problem-solving,

  2. 2.

    Effort,

  3. 3.

    Inter-directionality,

  4. 4.

    Time compression.

Every parameter is, in their turn, translated into attributes. The classification mechanism uses Likert’s restricted-field scales, where weights are not assigned based on mere subjective perception, but for each output the presence or absence of all the requirements/attributes is evaluated by progressively scaling down the score in connection with their actual existence.

The measurement so obtained allows researchers to obtain a representation of the output expressed with a score determined with a consistent metric for all the head offices and departments. Such a measurement system, being the expression of all the main components of the value chain, has led to the creation of a large pool of indicators to monitor the efficiency of the administrative action on its whole.

In particular, the experimental research highlighted some essential features, such as:

  • The capacity of the system to reflect the degree of value absorption by the individual activities/objectives and to facilitate the appraisal of their structure in the reference organizational units;

  • The possibility, through the measurement system prepared, to understand the global level of efficiency of the administrative action of the Authority;

  • The potential of the model to assess efficiency in the perspective of developing an integrated personnel assessment system;

  • The possibility to integrate the analysis model with the planning and control process.

The administration has seen some opportunities in this latter aspect and decided to grasp them by integrating the existing operational planning system with the performance measurement system and extending it to all activities, both those aimed at strategic objectives and those connected with operating objectives.

6 Discussion

This paper belongs to the broad research field of the methodologies for the measurement of performance in public administrations and contributes to the debate by proposing a quali-quantitative method for the measurement of the inputs and outputs of the processes implemented in complex public administrations.

Scientific production has formulated very heterogeneous positions on the theme, that oscillate between two conceptual extremes. The first extreme assumes that the performance of public administrations should be the expression of the capacity of generating public value and, since it cannot be measured by monetary metrics, it is misleading to propose any approximation measure. The risk in electing a forced extension of financial indicators as approximates of public value consists in detecting that which is easy to measure, even if not of primary importance, and loosing that which really characterizes the public service for its intrinsic difficulty in reaching a quantitative translation.

The second extreme, of a rationalist nature, restricts the performance of the administration to its attitude in managing public resources, and consequently the efficiency dimension prevails, being the only one, in substance, that is worthwhile appraising. Both positions lead to potentially harmful conclusions.

While the former could generate the opinion that, since important things cannot be measured, it is better not to measure anything, the latter, by measuring only one partial aspect, could lead to invert the relationship between means and purposes. Resources, considered as a restriction, become the objective of administrative action and the real objective—meeting a public need—is reduced to a merely incidental dimension.

The dominant managerial doctrine tried to find an intermediate way. A ware of the impossibility to appreciate the attitude to generate public value in monetary terms, it developed quali-quantitative methodologies where typically financial dimensions are considered together with qualitative indicators that express internal operating conditions, on the one hand, and estimate the effectiveness of the service, on the other.

This paper starts from an analysis of the needs expressed by some particularly complex public administrations in terms of performance measurement.

The inadequacies that have emerged in said frameworks are, inter alia, those associated with the availability of information with respect to measurement requirements, the difficulties in allocating costs to individual organizational units, and the complication of identifying the outputs correlated to processes.

Starting from these needs, the paper proposes a methodology for the allocation of resources to the activities carried out in the structures, an output weighing system capable of describing the commitment connected with their implementation, and a final correlation to the institutional objectives of the administrations, to link the current dimension with the pluriennial one.

AEEG has developed a web-based integrated planning and performance measurement model starting from the identification of the institutional purposes from which a number of strategic objectives derive. The model allows for the identification of an output level to be achieved for each strategic objective. It uses a weighing mechanism that takes into account the level of complexity required by every output. The “weighing method” is based on a Likert scale, whose metric differs for each item involved.

The assumptions of our work, therefore, originate from the awareness that, in delivering public services, the problem of measuring outcomes, and consequently the public value generated, is still topical and perhaps far from being resolved. However, it proposes a quali-quantitative method that makes it possible to extend a consistent measurement model to all the organizational structures without debasing their different functions and simultaneously ensuring a unitary appraisal metrics.