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Bit-Flip Faults on Elliptic Curve Base Fields, Revisited

  • Taechan Kim
  • Mehdi Tibouchi
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8479)

Abstract

As part of their investigation of fault attacks on elliptic curve cryptosystems, Ciet and Joye showed, back in 2003, that perturbing the value representing the cardinality of the base field in a physical implementation of ECC could result in a partial key recovery. They had to assume, however, that the perturbed computation would “succeed” in some sense, and that is rather unlikely to happen in practice.

In this paper, we extend their analysis and show that, in a somewhat stronger fault model, full key recovery is possible with a single fault. For example, our fault attack typically reduces 256-bit ECDLP to solving discrete logarithm problems in a few random elliptic curves over fields of less than 60 bits, which typically takes a matter of seconds. More generally, the asymptotic complexity of ECDLP becomes heuristically subexponential under our fault attack.

Our attack also extends to a very efficient full key recovery attack on ECDSA with two faulty signatures.

Keywords

Elliptic Curve Cryptography Fault Analysis ECDSA 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Taechan Kim
    • 1
  • Mehdi Tibouchi
    • 2
  1. 1.Seoul National UniversitySouth Korea
  2. 2.NTT Secure Platform LaboratoriesJapan

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