Abstract
We have developed a refined institutional scheme derived from Crawford and Ostrom’s Grammar of Institutions (also referred to as ADICO) that has been adapted for the detailed representation of conventions, norms, and rules. In this work we apply this schema to model the emergence of norms. While previous work in the area of normative agent systems largely represents obligation and prohibition norms by discrete deontic primitives (e.g. ‘must’, ‘must not’, ‘may’), we propose the concept of dynamic deontics to represent a continuous perspective on emerging institutions. This supports the expression of norm salience based on the differentiated internal representation among participants.
To demonstrate how it can be operationalised for dynamic modelling of norms in artificial societies, we apply nADICO to a simple agent-based simulation. Our intention is to arrive at a dynamic modelling of institutions in general, facilitating a movement beyond the artificial boundaries between different institution types, while making the institutional grammar purposeful for a wide range of application domains.
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Notes
- 1.
In the following examples, we put in brackets the respective grammar component that represents the preceding fragment of the encoded institutional statement (e.g. ‘Drivers’ representing the \({\varvec{A}}ttributes\) component of the institutional statement).
- 2.
In the context of normative multi-agent systems, the nesting of norms based on their function (e.g. substantive norm backed by check norm) has been discussed by Grossi et al. [10].
- 3.
Note that we extend the index indicating the nesting levels along with letters that associate grammar components with the respective consequential statement(s) on that level. In this example, the second level comprises three statements (a, b and c), all of which share a common sanctioner \(\mathrm{A}_{2}\), expressed as \(\mathrm{A}_{2a/b/c}\), but only b and c share the same Conditions (\(\mathrm{C}_{2b/c}\)) and so on.
- 4.
For a detailed overview of potential monitor types and their association to institution types, refer to [6]. Also note that, beyond the differentiation mechanisms discussed here, and in line with the original ADICO grammar, nADICO relies on the meta-norm of collective action to constitute rules.
- 5.
- 6.
The omissible describes an obligation from which we can deviate in exceptional cases; under promissible we understand a prohibition which we can exceptionally deviate from.
- 7.
Note that the concept of dynamic deontics is not to be confused with dynamic deontic logic [16], which formalises norms over action as opposed to norms over states, an aspect pointed out by one of the anonymous reviewers.
- 8.
Henrich [11] describes the varying emotions associated with the perception of obligation and prohibition in different cultures.
- 9.
To facilitate the interpretation, we only introduce two actions for this simulation.
- 10.
Note that this simulation takes the greenfield approach, i.e. individuals do not know about action effects. No collective action process takes place; no rules are specified ex ante.
- 11.
Each figure consists of two subfigures (one for each action), visualising the distribution of the different deontic terms towards that action in the agent society.
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Frantz, C., Purvis, M.K., Nowostawski, M., Savarimuthu, B.T.R. (2014). Modelling Institutions Using Dynamic Deontics. In: Balke, T., Dignum, F., van Riemsdijk, M., Chopra, A. (eds) Coordination, Organizations, Institutions, and Norms in Agent Systems IX. COIN 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 8386. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-07314-9_12
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