Abstract
The 2008/2009 global financial crisis and the unprecedented policy response in advanced economies have a worldwide impact. The episode also led many to question the standard framework of economic thinking on regional integration, financial liberalization and their repercussions on income disparity. The paper argues that one needs to take a balanced view on integration—not just the benefits but also the risks. If regional integration leads to greater inequality, the expected growth and prospect of improved welfare can be diminished. Utilizing a general equilibrium framework, it is also shown how financial liberalization and the surge of capital inflows can produce not only financial instability but also worsening income disparity. By combining model-based results and theory-based ranking applied to the Asian case, and considering the benefits, opportunities, costs and risks of alternative policies, it is revealed that imposing levy on bank-led flows can be used to reduce instability and inequality. This type of macro-prudential policy reflects a departure from the ‘First Best’ to the ‘Second Best’ approach of liberalization, where the frictionless outcome of the former is seriously questioned.
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- 1.
When integration is promoted for political reasons and to build trust, the political windfall that follows can also lead to significant economic benefits.
- 2.
Asia’s export share to other emerging markets outside Asia, particularly exports to the Middle East, grew fast, followed by Africa and Latin America. As a result, the export share to these regions increased from 8.4 % in January 2007 to 11.3 % in August 2012.
- 3.
Venables (2009) argued that the gains from integration are unevenly distributed. Some countries will lose from integration. In particular, the effects of preferential liberalization in regional integration will only benefit resource-poor countries, whereas non-preferential liberalization tends to benefit only resource-rich countries.
- 4.
Evidence from Cross-Sectional Analysis of the Regional Growth Process within the European Union is shown in Armstrong (1995); and Ben-David (2001). Some, however, found a pattern of divergence; see Slaughter (2001); Arestis and Paliginis (1995). Part of the explanation rests on the interpretation of σ- and β-convergence (Martin 1996), where σ-convergence is a decrease in GDP dispersion, hence showing how the distribution of income evolves, and β-convergence points to a negative relationship between growth and initial level of GDP.
- 5.
Recent comment by Vice President of the European Commission, Vivane Reding, who is the longest serving Brussels commissioner, is simply a re-confirmation. She called for the EU (European Union) to become a “United States of Europe as the best weapon against the Euro-skeptics.” She further argued that “We need to build a United States of Europe with the Commission as government and two chambers…………,” implying that individual sovereignty would be a thing of the past.
- 6.
Under certain circumstances, however, Stiglitz (2010) shows that risk sharing can be unfavorable. While the more integrated the regional economy the better risks can be dispersed, risk sharing can lower expected utility when the standard assumption of convexity and concave utility function does not hold. In particular, this is true when technologies are not convex. Following this dictum, and given the fact that information, externalities, and learning processes may give rise to a natural set of non-convexities, the intuition that integration should be desirable is not always accurate.
- 7.
A customs union is a form of regional integration likely to cause the largest trade diversion, where effects are distributed unequally.
- 8.
The trade-off between trade creation and trade diversion is often used to back north-south FTAs. South-south FTAs are more prone to trade diversion.
- 9.
The convergence effect of regionalization on between-country income inequality in Europe outweighs the polarizing effect of regionalization on within-country inequality, such that the net total income inequality has declined. In other words, regional integration has a positive net effect on reducing total income inequality (Scharpf 1997).
- 10.
Inequality can also affect poverty by way of determining the growth-poverty elasticity. Added by the well-known effect of growth on poverty, a triangular relation between growth, inequality, and poverty is established [see (Bourguignon 2004)].
- 11.
OECD and International Labour Organization (ILO) 2012. Joint statement by ILO Director-General Juan Somavia and OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría on the occasion of the G20 Labour and Employment Ministers Meeting. Guadalajara, Mexico, 17 May.
- 12.
A similar principle can also be applied to the concept of globalization; see Rodrik (2011).
- 13.
In the 1990s alone, financial crisis struck Europe (1992/1993), Mexico/Latin America (1994), Asia (1997), Eastern Europe and Russia (1998). The recent global financial crisis began in the US and Europe. Crisis contagion has also become less regional and more global. Technology and information enable financial spillovers by reducing structural distance.
- 14.
Most analysis suggests the easy money policy in advanced economies was less effective than originally thought. The policy not only failed to strengthen recovery in the US and other advanced economies, but also provoked global monetary instability through capital flows, including those led by “carry traders,” who exploit interest rate differentials across countries. See Mckinnon (2012).
- 15.
The amplified effect of cross-border flows on the supply of credit due to the changing risk behavior of banks is shown in Valentina and Shin (2012).
- 16.
For example, in the Republic of Korea, each 1 % decline in external funding due to European bank deleveraging following the global financial crisis led to a 0.01 % decline in domestic credit by domestic banks [see Jain-Chandra et al. (2013)]. This occurred despite the country’s relatively healthy foreign reserves, government efforts to provide foreign currency liquidity through bilateral and multilateral currency swap arrangements, and macroprudential measures that lowered domestic banks’ reliance on short-term wholesale funding.
- 17.
See Forbes and Warnock (2012). However, unlike their analysis, I distinguish “debt” from “bank” because banks are more prone to deleveraging and procyclicality, thus having more direct impact on the real sector.
- 18.
In a standard computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, for example, the allocation between the domestic market (D) and imports (M) follows Armington’s constant elasticity of substitution (CES), while the allocation between domestic market (D) and exports (E) follows a constant elasticity of transformation (CET).
- 19.
The dynamics of the use of imported inputs to produce exported goods, known as vertical specialization (VS), is analyzed in Hummels et al. (2001). Amador and Cabral (2009) show that vertical specialization (VS) in high-tech products has increased dramatically since the 1980s, especially in emerging Asia. Some even label it a new paradigm in the organization of world production, representing an important element of international trade.
- 20.
The effect of income level on macro variables works through the expenditure side. Together with government expenditure (GD) and net exports (E-M), real consumption (CD) reflects the size of agents’ expenditure (EXP) out of their disposable income (YCON). The latter is determined by the income level (INC).
- 21.
Note that lending (BANKLOAN) is not only determined by the size of a bank’s available funds, but also by changes in net worth and external finance premia of both borrowers and lenders; this “credit channel” hypothesis was elaborated in Bernanke et al. (1996), Adrian and Shin (2009), Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003), and Stiglitz (2001).
- 22.
Other financial variables can also affect aggregate economic activity by way of the money market.
- 23.
Changes in the exchange rate also cause some valuation effects: the local currency value of any assets denominated in foreign currencies will increase (decrease) when local currency appreciates (depreciates).
- 24.
Aside from income inequality, poverty and unemployment (UEMPR) are two other social indicators endogenously determined in the model. While unemployment is derived from the difference between labor demand (L) and fixed labor supply, the aggregate variables in the real sector (X, D, E, M, and Q) are all determined along with their respective prices (PX, PD, PE, PM, and PQ). It is PQ that sets the overall price index (PINDEX). The poverty line (PL) can be derived from this. When PL is matched with the endogenously determined household income, the poverty level can be estimated.
- 25.
Indonesia is selected because like most emerging markets, its financial sector has been growing rapidly since financial liberalization began in the 1980s, and income inequality has worsened. Indonesia also became a primary destination for capital flows once advanced economies set ultra-easy monetary policy.
- 26.
The model version used in the analysis here follows Min (2014). Due to space constraint, the detailed explanations of the model and simulation results are not shown here (they are available upon request).
- 27.
On the asset side, other than reducing loan-to-value ratio, efforts to contain excessive credit expansion and other risky investments are also made. On the liability side, mitigating the increase of non-core liabilities through bank-led flows is critical because they can heighten risky bank behavior and increase leverage. See Azis and Shin (2013) and Forbes and Warnock (2012).
- 28.
For the status of Asia’s regional financial safety nets, see Azis (2012).
- 29.
For example, under the BENEFIT scenario in Table 9.1, three eigen-vectors are shown (“Ideals,” “Normals,” and “Raw”). While all three give the same ranking, i.e., encourage outflows being most preferred, followed by assigning levies, and regional financial safety nets (hence the ranking shown in the last column of Table 9.1), the normalized eigen-vector (0.4381; 0.4358; and 0.1261) under “Normal” with the sum equals unity is the most often used. All numbers under the column “Benefit,” “Opportunity,” “Cost,” and “Risk” in Table 9.2 show the normalized eigen-vector.
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Appendices
Appendix
The presence of feedback influences in a network model requires a large matrix—known as supermatrix—that contains a set of sub-matrixes. The supermatrix captures the influence of elements in a network on other elements in that network. Denoting a cluster by C h , h = 1, ……m, and assuming that it has nh elements e h1 , e h2 , e h3 ……., e hmh , and laying out all the clusters and all the elements in each cluster both vertically on the left and horizontally at the top, we have the following supermatrix:
Supermatrix of a Network
The typical entry of this supermatrix is
Entries in Supermatrix of a Network
The entries of sub-matrixes in W ij are the ratio scales derived from paired comparisons performed on the elements within the clusters themselves according to their influence on each element in another cluster (outer dependence) or elements in their own cluster (inner dependence). Judgments are elicited from which ratio scales are derived. The resulting unweighted supermatrix is then transformed into a matrix where each column sums to unity to generate a stochastic supermatrix. The derived weights are used to weight the elements of the corresponding column blocks (cluster) of the supermatrix, resulting in a weighted supermatrix which is also stochastic. The final ranking is derived from the limiting supermatrix, obtained by raising the stochastic supermatrix to large powers to read off final priorities, in which all matrix columns are identical. Each gives the relative priorities of the elements from which the priorities of the elements in each cluster are normalized to one (the powers of the supermatrix do not converge unless it is stochastic, ensuring that its largest eigenvalue is one). Using the example of the EXPAND component under the BENEFIT cluster in Fig. 9.10, the resulting limiting supermatrix is
Limiting super matrix
Alternatives | Goal | EXPAND | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Encourage Outflows | Assign Levy | Reg Safety Nets | EXPAND | CD | FIN INC | FINTM | ID | ||
Alternatives | Encourage Outflows | 0.18477 | 0.18477 | 0.18477 | 0.18477 | 0.18477 | 0.18477 | 0.18477 | 0.1848 |
Assign Levy | 0.23605 | 0.23605 | 0.23605 | 0.23605 | 0.23605 | 0.23605 | 0.23605 | 0.2361 | |
Reg Safety Nets | 0.07918 | 0.07918 | 0.07918 | 0.07918 | 0.07918 | 0.07918 | 0.07918 | 0.0792 | |
Goal | EXPAND | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
EXPAND | CD | 0.0745 | 0.0745 | 0.0745 | 0.0745 | 0.0745 | 0.0745 | 0.0745 | 0.0745 |
FIN INC | 0.15758 | 0.15758 | 0.15758 | 0.15758 | 0.15758 | 0.15758 | 0.15758 | 0.1576 | |
FINTM | 0.13292 | 0.13292 | 0.13292 | 0.13292 | 0.13292 | 0.13292 | 0.13292 | 0.1329 | |
ID | 0.135 | 0.135 | 0.135 | 0.135 | 0.135 | 0.135 | 0.135 | 0.135 |
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Azis, I.J. (2015). Integration, Contagion, and Income Distribution. In: Nijkamp, P., Rose, A., Kourtit, K. (eds) Regional Science Matters. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-07305-7_9
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