Abstract
Animal cognition researchers are (mainly) concerned with behavior, which they use to infer the underlying mechanisms of physiological control. Of course, an animal’s internal representations of the external world must have their physical basis in the brain, therefore understanding the neural basis of cognition must be an essential component of fully understanding cognition in animals (and humans). However, presently there is a basic problem in integrating neurobiological techniques and knowledge with behavioral cognitive studies. The problem is that our behavioral knowledge of cognitive capabilities, rudimentary though it may be in many respects, is still more advanced than our neurobiological knowledge. Therefore, theories of cognition in non-human animals are mainly functional, lacking any deeper knowledge of the exact content of the stored representations. This is true for both consciousness and proto-consciousness. Dreaming is no exception. From the behavior of a sleeping dog, we may infer it is dreaming. For example, I once read the following web entry (http://petshub.com/dog/dog-dreaming.php):
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Huber, L. (2014). How Does the Protoconsciousness Concept of Dreaming Fit with Your Model of the Animal Mind? Do Dogs, Parrots, and Monkeys “Think” Without Words?. In: Tranquillo, N. (eds) Dream Consciousness. Vienna Circle Institute Library, vol 3. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-07296-8_17
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