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Auction Design for the Wireless Spectrum Market pp 19–38Cite as

Truthful Double Auction Mechanism for Heterogeneous Spectrums

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Abstract

In this chapter, we consider the problem of redistribution of spectrums via a double auction and propose truthful auctions mechanism for TV channels.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Hong Kong SAR

    Peng Lin, Xiaojun Feng & Qian Zhang

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  1. Peng Lin
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  2. Xiaojun Feng
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  3. Qian Zhang
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Lin, P., Feng, X., Zhang, Q. (2014). Truthful Double Auction Mechanism for Heterogeneous Spectrums. In: Auction Design for the Wireless Spectrum Market. SpringerBriefs in Computer Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06799-5_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06799-5_3

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-06798-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-06799-5

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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