Abstract
In the recent years, the existence of end-to-end voter-verifiable (E2E) voting system had increased significantly. Some of the prospective ones have been used in a medium to large scale elections. We have also developed one (eVote). In this paper we review their capabilities to provide an individual and universally verifiable voting system, incoercibility and receipt-freeness to ensure election integrity. We compare some properties along with its resistance against malicious attacks.
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Rura, L., Issac, B., Haldar, M. (2015). Vulnerability Studies of E2E Voting Systems. In: Sobh, T., Elleithy, K. (eds) Innovations and Advances in Computing, Informatics, Systems Sciences, Networking and Engineering. Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering, vol 313. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06773-5_30
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06773-5_30
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