Abstract
This paper presents new distinguishers against Keccak-f[1600] permutation reaching up to 6-rounds. The main intuition is to exploit the self-symmetry of the internal state of Keccak. Formal analysis reveals that the proposed distinguisher can penetrate up to 3 rounds and the penetration depends only on the hamming weight of the round-constant of the initial round. New strategies developed in this work, when combined, are shown to distinguish up to 5-rounds with a probability of 1 using a single query. Finally, the extension to 6-rounds with a complexity of 211 gives us the most efficient 6-round distinguisher reported in literature. All claims and formal arguments conform to the results obtained by extensive experimentation.
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Kuila, S., Saha, D., Pal, M., Roy Chowdhury, D. (2014). Practical Distinguishers against 6-Round Keccak-f Exploiting Self-Symmetry. In: Pointcheval, D., Vergnaud, D. (eds) Progress in Cryptology – AFRICACRYPT 2014. AFRICACRYPT 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8469. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06734-6_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06734-6_6
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