Advertisement

Aaron Sloman: A Bright Tile in AI’s Mosaic

  • Margaret A. BodenEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Cognitive Systems Monographs book series (COSMOS, volume 22)

Abstract

When AI was still a glimmer in Alan Turing’s eye, and when (soon afterwards) it was the new kid on the block at MIT and elsewhere, it wasn’t regarded primarily as a source of technical gizmos for public use or commercial exploitation (Boden 2006, p. 10.i-ii). To the contrary, it was aimed at illuminating the powers of the human mind.

Keywords

Virtual Machine Computational Thinking Visual Agnosia Computer Revolution Conscious Feeling 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

References

  1. Anderson JR (1983) The architecture of cognition. Harvard University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  2. Baker S (2011) Final Jeopardy: man vs. machine and the quest to know everything. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, BostonGoogle Scholar
  3. Beaudoin LP (1994) Goal processing in autonomous agents. Ph.D. thesis, School of Computer Science, University of Birmingham. Available at http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/cogaff/
  4. Bennett MR, Hacker PMS (2003) Philosophical foundations of neuroscience. Blackwell, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  5. Boden MA (1959) In reply to hart and hampshire. Mind (NS) 68:256–260Google Scholar
  6. Boden MA (1965) McDougall revisited. J Pers 33:1–19. [Reprinted in Boden MA (1981) Minds and mechanisms: philosophical psychology and computational models. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, pp. 192–208]Google Scholar
  7. Boden MA (1969) Machine perception. Philos Q 19:32–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Boden MA (1970) Intentionality and physical systems. Philos Sci 37:200–214CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Boden MA (1972) Purposive explanation in psychology. Harvard University Press, CambridgeCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Boden MA (1973) How artificial is artificial intelligence? Br J Philos Sci 24:61–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Boden MA (1977) Artificial intelligence and natural man. Basic Books, New York. (2nd edn., expanded, 1987. MIT Press, London; Basic Books, New York)Google Scholar
  12. Boden MA (ed) (1990) The philosophy of artificial intelligence. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  13. Boden MA (2006) Mind as machine: a history of cognitive science. Clarendon/Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  14. Brachman RJ, Levesque HJ (eds) (1985) Readings in knowledge representation. Morgan Kauffman, Los AltoszbMATHGoogle Scholar
  15. Brooks RA (1990) Elephants don’t play chess. Robot Auton Syst 6:3–15CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Christensen HI, Kruijff G-JM, Wyatt JL (eds.) (2010) Cognitive systems. Cognitive systems monographs vol 8. Springer, BerlinGoogle Scholar
  17. Clark AJ (2013) Whatever next? predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science. Behav Brain Sci (in press)Google Scholar
  18. Clowes MB (1967) Perception, picture processing, and computers. In: Collins NL, Michie DM (eds) Machine intelligence 1. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, pp 181–197Google Scholar
  19. Clowes MB (1969) Pictorial relationships-a syntactic approach. In: Meltzer B, Michie DM (eds) Machine intelligence 4. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, pp 361–383Google Scholar
  20. Clowes MB (1971) On seeing things. Artif Intell 2:79–116CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Craik KJW (1943) The nature of explanation. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  22. Crevier D (1993) Ai: the tumultuous history of the search for artificial intelligence. Basic Books, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  23. Damasio AR (1994) Descartes’ error: emotion, reason, and the human brain. Putnam, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  24. Dautenhahn K (ed) (2002) Socially intelligent agents: creating relationships with computers and robots. Kluwer Academic, BostonGoogle Scholar
  25. Dennett DC (1988) Quining qualia. In: Marcel A, Bisiach E (eds) Consciousness in contemporary science. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 42–77Google Scholar
  26. Dennett DC (1991) Consciousness explained. Allen Lane, LondonGoogle Scholar
  27. Fisher M (1990) Personal love. Duckworth, LondonGoogle Scholar
  28. Frege G (1884/1950) The foundations of arithmetic (trans. Austin JL). Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  29. Frith U (1989/2003) Autism: explaining the Enigma, 2nd edn. Blackwell, Oxford (rev. 2003)Google Scholar
  30. Gandy R (1996) Human versus mechanical intelligence. In: Millican PJR, Clark AJ (eds) Machines and thought: the legacy of alan turing, vol I. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 125–136Google Scholar
  31. Gibson JJ (1966) THe senses considered as perceptual systems. Greenwood Press, WestportGoogle Scholar
  32. Goodale MA, Humphrey GK (1998) The objects of action and perception. Cognition 67:181–207CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. Goodale MA, Milner AD (1992) Separate visual pathways for perception and action. Trends Neurosci 13:20–23CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. Goodale MA, Milner AD (2003) Sight unseen: an exploration of conscious and unconscious vision. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  35. Grush R (2004) The emulation theory of representation. Behav Brain Sci 27:377–442Google Scholar
  36. Laird JE, Newell A, Rosenbloom P (1987) Soar: an architecture for general intelligence. Artif Intell 33:1–64CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  37. McCarthy J, Hayes PJ (1969) Some philosophical problems from the standpoint of artificial intelligence. In: Meltzer B, Michie DM (eds) Machine intelligence 4. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, pp 463–502Google Scholar
  38. McDowell J (1994) Mind and world. Harvard University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  39. Marr DC (1974a) The computation of lightness by the primate retina. Vision 14:1377–1388CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  40. Marr DC (1974b) A note on the computation of binocular disparity in a symbolic, low-level visual processor. MIT AI-Lab Memo no. 327, Cambridge. [Reprinted in Vaina L (ed) From the retina to the neocortex: selected papers of David Marr. Birkhauser, Boston, pp 231–238 (1991)Google Scholar
  41. Marr DC (1975a) Analyzing natural images: a computational theory of texture vision.AI Memo 334. MIT AI Lab., CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  42. Marr DC (1975b) Early processing of visual information. AI Memo 340. MIT AI Lab, Cambridge. [December 1975. Officially published in Philos Trans Roy Soc B 275:483–524 (1976)Google Scholar
  43. Marr DC (1975c) Approaches to biological information processing. Science 190:875–876Google Scholar
  44. Marr DC, Hildreth E (1980) Theory of edge-detection. Proc Roy Soc B 207:187–217CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  45. Marr DC, Nishihara HK (1978) Visual information processing: artificial intelligence and the sensorium of sight. Technol Rev 81:2–23Google Scholar
  46. Marr DC, Poggio T (1976) Cooperative computation of stereo disparity. Science 194:283–287CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  47. Marr DC, Poggio T (1977) From understanding computation to understanding neural circuitry. Neurosci Res Prog Bull 15:470–488Google Scholar
  48. Marr DC, Poggio T (1979) A computational theory of human stereo vision. Proc Roy Soc B 204:301–328CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  49. Milner AD, Goodale MA (1993) Visual pathways to perception and action. In: Hicks TP, Molotchnikoff S, Ono T (eds) Progress in brain research, vol 95. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp 317–337Google Scholar
  50. Minsky ML (1965) Matter, mind, and models. In: Proceedings of the international federation of information processing congress, vol 1. Spartan, Washington, pp 45–49Google Scholar
  51. Minsky ML (1985) The society of mind. Simon & Schuster, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  52. Minsky ML (2007) The emotion machine: commonsense thinking, artificial intelligence, and the future of human mind.Google Scholar
  53. Newell A (1973) Artificial intelligence and the concept of mind. In: Schank RC, Colby KM (eds) Computer models of thought and language. Freeman, San Francisco, pp 1–60Google Scholar
  54. Newell A, Simon HA (1961) GPS—A program that simulates human thought. In: Billing H (ed) Lernende Automaten. Oldenbourg, Munich, pp 109–124. [Reprinted in Feigenbaum EA, Feldman JA (eds) (1963) Computers and thought. McGraw-Hill, pp 279–293]Google Scholar
  55. Picard RW (1997) Affective computing. MIT Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  56. Picard RW (1999) Response to sloman’s review of affective computing. AI Magazine, 20/1 (March), pp 134–137Google Scholar
  57. Putnam H (1967) The nature of mental states. First published as ’Psychological Predicates’ in Capitan WH, Merrill D (eds) Art, mind, and religion. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, pp 37–48. [Reprinted in Putnam H (1975) Mind, language, and reality: philosophical papers, vol 2. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 429–440]Google Scholar
  58. Putnam H (1982) Why there isn’t a ready-made world. Synthese 51:141–167Google Scholar
  59. Putnam H (1988) Representation and reality. MIT Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  60. Putnam H (1997) Functionalism: cognitive science or science fiction? In: Johnson DM, Erneling CE (eds) the future of the cognitive revolution. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 32–44Google Scholar
  61. Putnam H (1999) The threefold cord: mind, body, and world. Columbia University Press, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  62. Rorty R (1979) Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Princeton University Press, PrincetonGoogle Scholar
  63. Ryle G (1949) The concept of mind. Hutchinson’s University Library, LondonGoogle Scholar
  64. Searle JR (1980) Minds, brains, and programs. Behavior Brain Sci 3(3):417–457Google Scholar
  65. Simon HA (1962) The architecture of complexity. Proc Am Philos Soc 106(1962):467–482Google Scholar
  66. Simon HA (1967) Motivational and emotional controls of cognition. Psychol Rev 74:29–39CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  67. Simon HA (1969) The sciences of the artificial. The Karl Taylor compton lectures. MIT Press, Cambridge. (2nd and 3rd edns. 1981 and 1996)Google Scholar
  68. Sloman A (n.d.) The CogAff group’s website: http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/cogaff
  69. Sloman A (1971) Interactions between philosophy and artificial intelligence: the role of intuition and non-logical reasoning in intelligence. Artif Intell 2:209–225CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  70. Sloman A (1974) Physicalism and the Bogey of determinism. In: Brown SC (ed) Philosophy of psychology. Macmillan, London, pp 283–304Google Scholar
  71. Sloman A (1975) Afterthoughts on analogical representation. In: Schank RC, Nash-Webber BL (eds) (1985) Theoretical issues in natural language processing: an interdisciplinary workshop in computational linguistics, psychology, linguistics, and artificial intelligence, Cambridge, Mass., 10–13 June. (Arlington, Va.: Association for computational linguistics), pp 164–168. Reprinted in Brachman and Levesque, pp 431–39Google Scholar
  72. Sloman A (1978) The computer revolution in philosophy: philosophy, science, and models of mind. Harvester Press, Brighton. Out of print but available—and continually updated—online at http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/cogaff/crp/
  73. Sloman A (1982) Towards a grammar of emotions. New Univ Q 36:230–238Google Scholar
  74. Sloman A (1983) Image interpretation: the way ahead? In: Braddick OJ, Sleigh AC (eds) Physical and biological processing of images. Springer-Verlag, New York, pp 380–40Google Scholar
  75. Sloman A (1986) What sorts of machine can understand the symbols they use?. In: Proceedings of the Aristotelian society, Supplementary 60:61–80Google Scholar
  76. Sloman A (1987a) Motives, mechanisms, and emotions. Cogn Emot 1: 217–233. (Reprinted in Boden 1990:231–247)Google Scholar
  77. Sloman A (1987b) Reference without causal links. In: du Boulay JBH, Hogg D, Steels L (eds) Advances in artificial intelligence—II. North Holland, Dordrecht, pp 369–381Google Scholar
  78. Sloman A (1989) On designing a visual system: towards a gibsonian computational model of vision. J Exp Theor AI 1:289–337CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  79. Sloman A (1992) The emperor’s real mind review of roger penrose’s the emperor’s new mind: concerning computers minds and the laws of physics. Artif Intell 56:355–396CrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  80. Sloman A (1993) The Mind as a Control System. In: Hookway C, Peterson D (eds) Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 69–110Google Scholar
  81. Sloman A (1995) Sim\_Agent help-file. Available at ftp://ftp.cs.bham.ac.uk/pub/dist/poplog/ sim/help/sim\_agent. See also ‘Sim\_agent web-page, Available at http://www.cs.bhma.ac.uk/axs/cog_affect/sim_agent.html
  82. Sloman A (1996a) Beyond turing equivalence. In: Millican PJR, Clark AJ (eds) Machines and thought: the legacy of alan turing, vol 1. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 179–220Google Scholar
  83. Sloman A (1996b) Towards a general theory of representations. In: Peterson DM (ed) Forms of representation: an interdisciplinary theme for cognitive science. Intellect Books, Exeter, pp 118–140Google Scholar
  84. Sloman A (1996c) Actual possibilities. In: Aiello LC, Shapiro SC (eds) Principles of knowledge representation and reasoning. In: Proceedings of the fifth international conference (KR ’96). Morgan Kaufmann, San Francisco, pp 627–638Google Scholar
  85. Sloman A (1998) Ekman, damasio, descartes, alarms and meta-management. In: Proceedings of the international conference on systems, man, and cybernetics (SMC98), IEEE Press, San Diego, pp 2652–2657Google Scholar
  86. Sloman A (1999) Review of [R. Picard’s] affective computing. AI Magazine 20:1 (March), pp 127–133Google Scholar
  87. Sloman A (2000) Architectural requirements for human-like agents both natural and artificial. (What sorts of machines can love?). In: Dautenhahn K (ed) Human cognition and social agent technology: advances in consciousness research. John Benjamins, Amsterdam, pp 163–195Google Scholar
  88. Sloman A (2001) Beyond shallow models of emotion. Cogn Process Int Q Cogn Sci 2:177–198Google Scholar
  89. Sloman A (2002) The irrelevance of turing machines to artificial intelligence. In: Scheutz M (ed) Computationalism: new directions. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 87–127Google Scholar
  90. Sloman A (2003) How many separately evolved emotional beasties live within us?. In: Trappl R, Petta P, Payr S (eds) Emotions in humans and artifacts. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 29–96Google Scholar
  91. Sloman A (2009a) Requirements for a fully deliberative architecture (or component of an architecture). Available on the CogAff website: http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cog-aff
  92. Sloman A (2009b) Some requirements for human-like robots: why the recent over-emphasis on embodiment has held up progress. In: Sendhoff B, Koerner E, Sporns O, Ritter H, Doya K (eds) Creating brain-like intelligence: from basic principles to complex intelligent systems. Lecture notes in computer science, vol 5436. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, pp 248–277Google Scholar
  93. Sloman A (2013) What else can brains do?: commentary on A. Clark’s whatever next? Behav Brain Sci (in press)Google Scholar
  94. Sloman A, Chrisley RL (2003) Virtual machines and consciousness. In: Holland O (ed) Machine consciousness. Imprint Academic, Exeter, pp 133–172Google Scholar
  95. Sloman A, Croucher M (1981) Why robots will have emotions. In: Proceedings of the Seventh international joint conference on artificial intelligence (Vancouver), pp 197–202Google Scholar
  96. Sloman A, Poli R (1995) Sim\_Agent: A toolkit for exloring agent designs. In: Wooldridge M, Muller J-P, Tambe M (eds) Intelligent Agents, vol ii. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, pp 392–407Google Scholar
  97. Squires R (1970) Are dispositions lost causes? Analysis 31:15–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  98. Turing AM (1950) Computing machinery and intelligence. Mind 59: 433–460. [(Reprinted in (Boden 1990: 40–66)]Google Scholar
  99. Wilks YA (ed) (2010) Close engagements with artificial companions: key social, psychological ethical and design issues. John Benjamins, AmsterdamGoogle Scholar
  100. Wittgenstein L (1953) Philosophical investigations (Trans. Anscombe GEM). Blackwell, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  101. Wright IP (1997) Emotional agents. Ph.D. thesis, School of Computer Science, University of Birmingham. Available at http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/cogaff/
  102. Wright IP, Sloman A (1997) MINDER1: An implementation of a protoemotional agent architecture. Technical Report CSRP-97-1, University of Birmingham, School of Computer Science. Available at ftp://ftp.cs.bham.ac.uk/pub/tech-reports/1997/CSRP-97-01.ps.gz
  103. Wright I, Sloman A, Beaudoin L (1996) Towards a design-based analysis of emotional episodes. Philos Psychiatry Psychol 3(2):101–126Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of SussexSussexUK

Personalised recommendations