Abstract
Popper’s popular critics made use of the truism that every criticism is answerable, provided that even unsatisfactory rebuttals count as rebuttals. By the same token, every thesis is refuted, provided even unsatisfactory refutations count as refutations. This is a standoff. Hence it is advisable to set some standards for criticism, to bar arguments—refutations and rebuttals—that are too obviously unsatisfactory. We need rules of fair play. Fair play will benefit us all.
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Agassi, J. (2014). Rules Against Mock-Criticism. In: Popper and His Popular Critics. SpringerBriefs in Philosophy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06587-8_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06587-8_3
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