Abstract
The view that governments should actively promote the happiness of their citizens is gaining considerable popularity. Politicians and policymakers have joined forces with scientists who believe that recent scientific advances can be used to increase societal happiness levels and thereby improve the quality of human life. Whether governments should regard the direct promotion of happiness as a legitimate goal for public policy is, however, not a scientific, but a normative question, and many prominent authors in the history of political thought have considered the idea that governments should seek to promote societal happiness only to conclude that it ought to be rejected. In the current political turn toward happiness such opposing views have received very little attention. This paper canvasses possible reasons to be wary of the current political commitment to happiness, arguing that many of these reasons point toward genuine concerns that have not been given the level of attention they warrant and, therefore, should be taken far more seriously than presently fashionable.
People want to be happy . […] That should be the rule for […] public choice. […] Bully for Bentham I say.
Richard Layard Happiness: Lessons from a new science (2005, p. 125).
[The holders of authority] will say to us: what, in the end, is the aim of your efforts, the motive of your labours, the object of all your hopes? Is it not . happiness ? Well, leave this happiness to us and we shall give it to you. No, Sirs, we must not leave it to them. No matter how touching such a tender commitment may be, let us ask the authorities to keep within their limits. Let them confine themselves to being just. We shall assume the responsibility of being happy for ourselves
Benjamin Constant —The liberty of the ancients compared with that of the moderns (1988; p. 326).
A government established on the principle of benevolence to the people […] in which the subjects […] are […] to wait only upon the judgment of the head of the state as to how they should be happy […] is the greatest despotism thinkable.
Immanuel Kant —On the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice (1996, p. 291).
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- 1.
The research on which this paper is based formed part of the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) project Measuring Well-Being: Attitudes, Comparability and Justification carried out at the University of Amsterdam. For helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper I thank Jelle de Boer, an anonymous referee, and participants of Well-being in Contemporary Society: International Conference on the Philosophy and Science of Wellbeing and their Practical Importance (Enschede, July 2012) and the 4th Annual Dutch Conference in Practical Philosophy (Eindhoven, November 2012).
- 2.
The precise relation between subjective happiness and a person’s true wellbeing is much debated within philosophy (see e.g. Cahn and Vitrioli 2008 for an overview). In this paper I will abstract from such questions as much as possible in order to focus on political issues, assuming that though the precise relation between wellbeing and happiness is unclear, there nonetheless is a substantial relation between the two. It would seem, for instance, that subjective happiness forms part of most plausible conceptions of the good life .
- 3.
It should also be noted that other SSWB scientists are more circumspect when it comes to utilitarianism: Diener et al. (2009), for example, distance themselves from utilitarianism, be it less than wholeheartedly (p. 10); Bok (2010) emphasises that there may sometimes be other political values that on occasion outweigh the importance of politically promoting happiness, but nonetheless maintains that happiness is a very important public goal (p. 57); for a view that is very critical of using SSWB findings to implement utilitarian policies, see Frey (2008) (esp. Sect. 13.4).
- 4.
Kantianism is best known for its stringent deontological approach to ethics, emphasizing the importance of the goodness of the will and the unconditional nature of duties. Kantian political theory at first glance appears to be very different from Kantian ethical theory, however, as it pays little attention to motives and maxims, focusing almost exclusively on rights and what is known as ‘external freedom ’. Roughly stated, according to Kantian political theory (contrary to its ethical theory) it does not matter why a person does what he does, as long as he does not violate anyone’s rights in doing so. It would be going too far to discuss Kantian political theory and its view on the nature of the state in detail here (for detailed analyses see Williams (1983) and Ripstein (2009)), but it is perhaps useful to mention that Kant limited the state to guaranteeing three basic principles: the freedom of its members as human beings, their equality as subjects of the state, and their independence as citizens (Kant 1996, p. 291). Just how conservative or liberal these principles turn out to be in practice is a matter of debate, but most noteworthy for this paper is the absence of happiness as a fundamental principle. In fact, Kant’s practical philosophy has even been described as ‘devoted to putting happiness in its place’ (Hill 2002, p. 169).
- 5.
- 6.
Also, even on a purely empirical level, one may doubt that Kant’s claim that human beings cannot but seek happiness is valid. People suffering from self-hatred , for instance, often seem to seek misery, believing they do not deserve any better. Undoubtedly, Kant would morally disapprove of such behaviour (see, e.g. Kant 1998, p. 49), but empirically, it seems to be possible for human beings to deliberately seek misery rather than happiness.
- 7.
Next to the fact that happiness tends to be valued for its own sake, the SSWB has also shown that happiness can be sought for instrumental reasons (i.e. happiness brings other good things such as higher productivity or health and longevity ). I do not focus on possible instrumental public usages of happiness here for several reasons. For one, it does not seem to be the main reason why SWB scientists and politicians who favour the political turn to happiness believe happiness is so important. Furthermore, if happiness were to be regarded as relevant only as means to other ends, the evaluation of such policies would have to be determined fully in the context of the particular ultimate value it is used to bring about; whether it is acceptable to use happiness findings in that way will always have to be analysed in the context of the end in question and whether the means used are appropriate to pursue that end. Some of the points discussed in this paper will also be relevant to such a determination, but others are not. Lastly, it should be noted that instrumental usages of happiness are far less controversial then adopting happiness as a political end in itself (even Kant, for instance, as violently opposed to happiness being adopted by governments as their fundamental goal, seems to have held that instrumental usage of happiness in politics can be quite acceptable (e.g. Kant 1996, p. 298)).
- 8.
The things that violate it are much less difficult to identify, however (see e.g. Kaufman et al. 2011). Moreover, given the large amount of literature on the nature of wellbeing, it would seem that in this respect dignity is no more or less difficult a concept than wellbeing.
- 9.
Classic references are the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the German constitution.
- 10.
Layard’s claim that happiness is the only thing of which it is true that ‘If we are asked why [it] matters, we can give no further, external reason. It just obviously does matter.’ (p. 113) is therefore belied by the example of dignity, for which this is also true. (Moreover, though we typically do value happiness for its own sake, it is not true that we cannot give other reasons to value happiness; as pointed out, SWB-scientists have discovered that there are many good things that happiness is conducive to, so it is quite possible to value happiness instrumentally, as means to other ends).
- 11.
Those readers who believe that the happy slave is too much a mere theoretical possibility, can replace it by other cases where psychological adaptation makes people content with situations they ought not be content with, or think of the happiness experienced by the winners of certain types of television shows which seem to become more and more prevalent these days.
- 12.
Such findings are sometimes suggested to be a cause of measurement error. A more plausible interpretation of such findings, however, is that they accurately measure happiness levels (i.e. people actually are more satisfied with their lives shortly after experiencing positive trivialities, like finding a dime or the sun shining), but that these life satisfaction judgments are in error (they rate the life in question higher than they ought to). Such findings point to normative judgmental errors on the part of the subjects, rather than to measurement errors on the side of researchers.
- 13.
Some might argue that such a judgment about the indignity of being made happy about something one should not be happy about is something that governments should not be allowed to make, as it is a value judgment that is incompatible with the idea of a neutral liberal state. I will address this type of objection in the next section. As an aside, however, it is worth noting that the ideal of the neutral state is highly contested (see e.g. Wall and Klosko 2003), and that even though an excessive governmental urge to micromanage even the smallest violations of dignity is undoubtedly problematic, many liberals do regard the protection of human dignity to be a legitimate task of democratic governments (especially when it comes to the more outrageous infractions).
- 14.
Though for Layard the reason to oppose Brave New World scenarios lies in their ineffectiveness, not in their incompatibility with human dignity (2005, p. 114).
- 15.
Other happiness findings suggest more politically questionable opportunities for governments to increase happiness, even though such policies would not only provide happiness but also valid grounds for a person to be happy. Marriage , for instance, has been found to have a substantial and lasting positive impact on happiness (e.g. Argyle 1999) (and it is at least arguable that a successful marriage is also something that gives one reason to be happy).
- 16.
Someone who identifies strongly with the society she lives in (a communitarian or a nationalist , for example) may be expected to be much more likely to positively evaluate the happiness that is the effect of deliberate governmental attempts to raise happiness levels than, for instance, a perfectionist with strong individualist leanings or a libertarian with a characteristic dislike or distrust of government. The latter may feel manipulated, perhaps even pressured, by governmental happiness policies, leading them to regard the happiness they may experience as a result of such policies as alien and spurious, as something disingenuous imposed on them from outside. The former, however, may look much more favourably on the happiness that governments bring about, because to her such happiness is simply the beneficial effect of a collective enterprise she feels herself a part of. Hence, she would see no reason to experience governmentally provided happiness in terms of alienation , but can embrace it as fully genuine, as ‘truly her own’.
- 17.
There is some evidence that liberal paternalists believe that respect for persons and their dignity is sufficiently secured by the opt-out possibilities essential to liberal paternalism , but there are good reasons to doubt this (cf. e.g. Hausman and Welch 2010). Moreover, the fact, emphasised by Thaler and Sunstein, that oftentimes it is impossible not to nudge will probably not affect this line of objection a great deal, because it may well be the deliberativeness inherent in a well-thought-through nudge that is deemed problematic.
- 18.
On the conditional nature of the intrinsic value of happiness and its implications for public policy see Van der Rijt (2013).
- 19.
Such a system of perfectionist censure imposing its view of what is ‘proper’ happiness may indeed show tendencies that come close to Kant’s description of happiness-seeking governments as despotic.
- 20.
Diener et al. reject this view: ‘some might argue that it is not the role of the government to make people happy, the actions of most governments (and the rhetoric that politicians rely on) belie this critique’ (2009, p. 60). This is not a very convincing argument, however, as you cannot deduce what governments ought to do from what they actually do.
- 21.
Perfectionist political theories are political theories that are based on specific views about what is (objectively) good for human beings.
- 22.
As unattractive as perfectionist-censured happiness policies may seem, it should also be kept in mind that it is possible for people to derive happiness from distinctly immoral sources , such as the suffering and humiliation of others, or a sense of superiority over others (especially members of other social groups). To my knowledge, very little scientific research has been conducted at present on potential sources of happiness deriving from the nastier sides of human nature. Moreover, such research may also prove more difficult to conduct, as people are less than likely to reply honestly on questionnaires that query such darker tendencies.
- 23.
Within political theory this tradition is known as ‘(neo)-Roman republicanism ’ (to be distinguished from other republican traditions, such as the (neo)-Athenian). When I use the term ‘republican’ in the remainder of this paper, it is exclusively the neo-Roman tradition I refer to. For a paper that exemplifies the type of outlook central to the concern I outline in this section, see Skinner (1983); for a collection of papers dealing with issues in contemporary republican thought, see Laborde and Maynor (2008).
- 24.
Compare, for instance, the disturbing ease with which large parts of the population, allowing themselves to be spooked by the threat of terrorism, have recently supported vast curtailments of their civic rights in order to increase their sense of security.
- 25.
It is perhaps worth noting that in this perspective on democracy elections and representation are regarded as essential, but their primary function is to play their part in ensuring the maintenance of this balance, not the expression or imposition of, for instance, some Rousseauian idea of popular will.
- 26.
Though appeals to a right to pursue happiness are not uncommon, a commitment to such a right clearly falls well short of a right to be happy .
- 27.
From a purely philosophical point of view it is possible to maintain that there are subtle yet important distinctions between the government on the one hand having a responsibility and the people having a right or entitlement to the fulfilment of that responsibility on the other. It is unlikely, however, that such subtle philosophical distinctions will survive long in present-day political rhetoric.
- 28.
This point is similar to the well-known critique of utilitarianism that it fails to respect persons. Though arguably there is a notion of fairness discernible in utilitarianism in that it demands that everyone’s happiness be counted, and counted equally (see e.g. Layard 2005, p. 112), that does not suffice to counter this critique. To use Frey’s phrase, it reduces persons to ‘metric stations’ (2008, p. 166) and gets things backwards: human happiness may be important, but it matters only because human beings matter in the first place (our happiness matters because we matter). It is not the case that we matter only because we happen to be able to experience happiness. Another possible utilitarian reply is that the loss of happiness on the part of the maltreated few will usually be so intense that it will outweigh the gain made by the many who profit, or that such practices will create so much fear in society as a whole that overall happiness will drop. Neither of these points is very convincing from the perspective of respect for persons, as they offer only contingent protection.
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van der Rijt, JW. (2015). The Political Turn Towards Happiness. In: Søraker, J., Van der Rijt, JW., de Boer, J., Wong, PH., Brey, P. (eds) Well-Being in Contemporary Society. Happiness Studies Book Series. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06459-8_12
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