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Prosecuting Cyberlaundering

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Part of the book series: Law, Governance and Technology Series ((LGTS,volume 19))

Abstract

This chapter deals with the enforcement pillar of the anti-cyberlaundering (ACL) legal regime. Much like the preceding chapters of this study that attempt to pave an untreaded path in the law and unravel a novel issue currently unexplored, this chapter takes the ACL campaign a step further by exploring legal ramifications pertaining to the prosecution of cyberlaundering. It completes the discussion on the pillars of the ACL legal regime, and complements the prevention and compliance pillars discussed in the preceding chapter.

The chapter begins by identifying certain important issues and challenges that come with the prosecution of cyberlaundering. Under the enforcement pillar, this chapter discusses investigative and jurisdictional issues, borrowing from similar principles falling under the current anti-money laundering (AML) legal regime. In establishing the enforcement pillar, this chapter also follows the adaptive approach to regulating cyberlaundering, as posited in the preceding chapter. Given that the current AML legal regime does not cater for this, the adaptive approach employed here also requires a probe into how current anti-cyber crime (ACC) laws can be adopted, as the prosecution of cyberlaundering cases does not only require the mind of money laundering investigators, but also cyber forensic experts who have tactical intelligence on hi-tech criminality, such as cyberlaundering demands. This chapter further discusses recent case studies that provide evidence of the urgent need for a proper ACL prosecutorial policy. Certain technical issues or formalities involved in establishing the ACL legal regime complete the discussion on the enforcement pillar.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See discussion in Chapter 2, paragraph 2.1.2.

  2. 2.

    Smith (2003, p. 4). Cf Australasian Centre for Policing Research (2000, p. 4).

  3. 3.

    For a detailed discussion of these factors, see Chapter 4, paragraph 4.2.

  4. 4.

    A databank is synonymous with a database, and it implies an electronic repository of information classified into different subjects, in order to facilitate the use and quick retrieval of deposited information when required.

  5. 5.

    Busia (2004, p. 81). Cf Bailey (2011, p. 10) and Solove (2011, p. 55).

  6. 6.

    See the discussion in paragraph 5.4 below.

  7. 7.

    Electronic traffic data refers to data on telephonic and electronic traffic, such as information via telephonic terminals (i.e. calls on fixed landlines and mobile networks), as well as fax, short message service (sms), multimedia message service (mms), and electronic mails (emails).

  8. 8.

    As the name suggests, data on location refers to data relating to the location or geographic site of the electronic communication device used.

  9. 9.

    This refers to personal information that can be accessed from video-surveillance installations, which are ideally meant for the protection of persons and property. These tallies with biometric analysis which enables law enforcers to assess the geometry of the face, irises. The acquired information can then be compared with data previously recorded. Busia (2004, p. 87).

  10. 10.

    Genetic data refers to information that can be derived from an individual by virtue of the person’s genome or hereditary information. However, the argument holds that genetic data could incur the risk of discrimination and racial profiling. Busia (2003, p. 88) and Solove (2011, p. 59).

  11. 11.

    Act 25 of 2002.

  12. 12.

    See sections 51 and 52 of the Act.

  13. 13.

    Act 70 of 2002. See sections 2 to 11.

  14. 14.

    Act of 1982, Title 12, U.S.C. sections 3401–3409.

  15. 15.

    Act 18 of 1986, U.S.C. section 2510(12).

  16. 16.

    See sections 3401–3409 of the RFPA.

  17. 17.

    See sections 2510(12) of the ECPA.

  18. 18.

    For example, in Germany, many of these provisions are contained in the Federal Data Protection Act (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz—BDSG) 2001.

  19. 19.

    Busia (2004, p. 83). Cf Nissenbaum (2009, p. 158), Solove (2007, p. 105) and Solove (2011, p. 56).

  20. 20.

    An enscrow is an agreement reached between two contracting parties and a neutral third party, which obligates the third party to deliver an item held in his/her trust to either of the parties when a certain condition is fulfilled.

  21. 21.

    Scheier (1998, p. 14). Cf Straub (2002, p. 530).

  22. 22.

    Straub (2002, p. 530).

  23. 23.

    Casey (2004, p. 12). Cf Marcella and Greenfield (2002, p. 29), and Nelson et al. (2010, p. 102). In some jurisdictions, such as South Africa, the term ‘data message’ is used instead of electronic evidence. This is defined in section 4 of South Africa’s Electronic Communications Transactions Act 25 of 2002 as meaning any “data generated, sent, received or stored by electronic means and includes- (a) voice, where the voice is used in an automated transaction; and (b) a stored record.” This definition is consistent with Article 2 of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Electronic Commerce 1996. In South Africa, within the ambits of the law of evidence, the definition of data message is currently being revised. See South African Law Reform Commission ‘The Review of The Law of Evidence—Draft discussion paper on the review of the law of evidence’ Committee Paper 02/2012 Project 126, 29 September 2012.

  24. 24.

    Computer-generated data include web logs, call detail records, financial instrument trades (some purely machine-generated, some human-based, network event logs, though often associated with web logs), telemetry collected by the government (especially for intelligence purposes), online gaming data, genetic or gnemone research data, energy research data, location and/or movement data, amongst others. See DBMS2: A Monasch Research Publication (2010. Examples of Machine-Generated Data’ available at <http://www.dbms2.com/2010/04/08/machine-generated-data-example/> [accessed on 22 February 2013]. Cf Manning (2010, p. 140).

  25. 25.

    Computer-stored data includes central processing units (CPU) of computers, random access memory (RAM) of computers; read only memory (ROM) of computers; tape libraries, optical juke boxes, optical discs, flash memory or universal serial bus (USB) devices, floppy discs, zip disks, or punched cards, among several others. See Wise Geek (an undated website document. What is data storage?’ available at <http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-data-storage.htm> [accessed on 22 February 2013].

  26. 26.

    Casey (2004, p. 12). Cf Mason and Schafer (2010, p. 710) and Nelson et al. (2010, p. 106).

  27. 27.

    Mason and Schafer (2010, p. 710), and Nelson et al. (2010, p. 106).

  28. 28.

    These factors are often readily ascertainable from the relevant domestic law. For example, in the United States (US), Rule 401 of the Federal Rule of Evidence (Act of 1975, Title 28, United States Code) states the meaning of relevant evidence to include “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” This definition embodies the factors of materiality and probative value.

  29. 29.

    For more details, see the Legal Information Institute (an undated internet report. Rule 401, Test for Relevant Evidence’ available at <http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/rule_401> [accessed on 16 February 2013]. In the highly-regarded United States (US) case: United States of America v. Foster 986 F.2d 541 (D.C. Circuit) (1993), the Court stated that the crucial first step in determining relevancy is to “identify the matter properly provable.”

  30. 30.

    Mason and Sheldon (2010, p. 776). Cf Casey (2004, p. 19). The principle relating to the authentication of electronic evidence is one that has received much attention over the years, particularly in the United States (US). This legal rationale has grown with court precedence. For example, in the case of United States of America v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109 (8th Cicuit). (1976), the court called for a more authentic foundation for the authentication of electronic evidence, given its novelty at the time. Later court decisions such as the United States of America v. Vela, 673 F.2d 86, 90 (5th Circuit) (1982) averred that electronic evidence should be treated with the same circumspection as any other evidence. In the United Kingdom (UK), the Association of Chief Police Officers have developed guidelines for the authentication of electronic evidence, such as are now used in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland. These guidelines include the obligation incumbent on police officers not to change data held on a storage device which might be used as electronic evidence in court; that where a circumstance exists that warrants a person to access original data held on a storage device, such person must have the competence to do so, with the capability of giving evidence that explains the relevance and implications of such actions; that an audit trail and all processes applied to electronic evidence of a computer-based nature should be made and preserved; an independent third party should be capable of examining the same processes and achieving the same result, and the relevant supervising law enforcement officer has the responsibility of ensuring that the law and these principles are all observed. Association of Chief Police Officers (undated website document. Good Practice Guide for Computer-Based Electronic Evidence’ Official Release Version 4.0 available at <http://www.7safe.com/electronic_evidence/ACPO_guidelines_computer_evidence_v4_web.pdf> [accessed on 22 February 2013].

  31. 31.

    Casey (2004, p. 19) and Casey (2011a, p. 20). Cf Mason and Schafer (2010, p. 710).

  32. 32.

    Cf Casey (2011c, p. 57) and Frieden and Murray (2011, p. 25).

  33. 33.

    Such exceptions can be wide-ranging, depending on the jurisdiction concerned. For example, in the United States (US), Rule 801(d)(1)(A)-(C) of the Federal Rules of Evidence Act of 1975 provides that the prior statement of a witness is not hearsay if the person who made the statement is subject to cross-examination at the trial. Amongst several others, some other exceptions include a statement made by a person that conveys his or her sense of the state of an event or condition of something (Rule 803(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence Act of 1975); a statement made as a result of an excited utterance (Rule 803(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence Act of 1975); a statement made for medical diagnosis of treatment (Rule 803(4)(a) and (b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence); public records (Rule (803(8) of the Federal Rules of Evidence Act of 1975); family records (Rule 803(13) of the Federal Rules of Evidence Act of 1975) and statements in ancient documents (Rule 803(16) of the Federal Rules of Evidence Act of 1975). In the United Kingdom (UK), there is a distinction between statutory exceptions on the one hand (i.e. statements relating to unavailable witnesses, business documents and previous consistent or inconsistent statements—contained in sections 116 of the Criminal Justice Act of 2003) and common law exceptions on the other hand (for example, public information, reputation or family tradition and common enterprise—contained in Section 118 of the Criminal Justice Act of 2003).

  34. 34.

    The United States (US) is an example of how this poses a grave challenge for courts: In the cases of Haag v. United States, 485 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Circuit) (2007); United States of America v. Fujii, 301 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Circuit) (2002); United States of America v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1494 (7th Circuit) (1990), the courts held that computer-based electronic evidence is prima facie admissible under section 803(6) of the Federal Rule of Evidence. However, a more grounded rationale soon developed, which is that electronic evidence results from a process and is consequently not averments made by individuals, hence not falling into the category of hearsay evidence. Thus the printed result of a computer-based test (United States of America v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 230-31 (4th Circuit) (2007)), a computer based header (United States of America v. Hamilton, 413 F.3d 1138, 1142-43 (10th Circuit) (2005)), and the utterances of a machine (United States of America v. Khorozian, 333 F.3d 498, 506 (3d Circuit) (2003)) do not amount to hearsay evidence. For details see United States Department of Justice (an undated website document. Computer Crime’ available at <http://www.cyber crime.gov/ssmanual/05ssma.html> [accessed on 22 February 2013]. Cf Frieden and Murray (2011, p. 25).

  35. 35.

    Alghamdi (2011, p. 53). Cf Grama (2010, p. 467) and and Nelson et al. (2010, p. 107).

  36. 36.

    The best evidence rule dates back to the English case of Omychund v Barker (1745) 1 Atk, 21, 49; 26 ER 15, 33, in which Lord Harwicks held that no evidence was admissible unless it was the best that the nature of the case will allow. The reasoning was based on the fact that, in the eighteenth century, an original document was often reproduced or rewritten by hand, and the principle held that if the original was not produced, then there was a high probability that the copy was illegitimate for reasons of fraud or error. See Gilbert (2010, p. 203).

  37. 37.

    In the United Kingdom (UK), in the case Butera v Director of Public Prosecutions for the State of Victoria, (1987) 164 CLR 180, the court held that the copy of a tape recording is admissible electronic evidence. The court followed the rationale that the content of the tape recording, and not the tape recording itself, is of relevance, and thus it should not matter that a copy is presented as evidence. Also, the court stated that this does not mean that the highly revered best evidence rule is not followed. It further stressed that the law should be developed in line with modernity and should never be left in a state of uncertainty. In the United States (US), Rule 1001(3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that if data is stored in a computer, any print-out or output readable by sight is an original, as long as it is shown to reflect the data accurately. As in the United Kingdom (UK), the courts in the United States (US) are commonly of the opinion that copies or print-outs of electronic data do not circumvent the best evidence rule. For example, in the case Aguimatang v. California State Lottery (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 769 [286 Cal.Rptr. 57], the court held that a computer print-out does not violate the best evidence rule as it is considered an original, if it meets the requirements of relevance and authenticity.

  38. 38.

    For an elborate discussion on cyberlaundering through online banking, see Chapter 2, paragraph 2.4.1.

  39. 39.

    For an elebaorate discussion on online casinos as a method of cyberlaundering see Chapter 2, paragraph 2.4.3.

  40. 40.

    See paragraph 5.2.3 below.

  41. 41.

    Casey and Schatz (2011, p. 187).

  42. 42.

    See Chapter 3, paragraph 3.1.3. Cf Madinger (2012, p. 301).

  43. 43.

    Cf discussions on electronic payment systems in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.3.

  44. 44.

    See discussion in Chapter 2, paragraph 2.2.1.

  45. 45.

    See discussion in Chapter 2, paragraph 2.3.

  46. 46.

    Casey and Schartz (2011, p. 187). Cf Casey (2011b, p. xxii).

  47. 47.

    Reyes et al. (2007, p. 86).

  48. 48.

    Reyes et al. (2007, p. 86).

  49. 49.

    McKemmish, R (1999, p. 14). Cf Abdullah et al. (2008, p. 215); Arthur and Venter (2006, p. 3); Borck (2001, p. 2); Casey and Schatz (2011, p. 188); Fernandez et al. (2005, p. 315, 316); Garber (2001, p. 23); Slade (2004, p. 2) and Yasinsac (2003, p. 16).

  50. 50.

    Palmer (2001, p. 25). Cf Abdullah et al. (2008, p. 215) and Arthur and Venter (2006, p. 3). Certain factors have led to developments in the field of computer forensics, such as the growing dependence of law enforcement bodies on computing, the now ubiquitous nature of computers and computing, and the concomitant growth in new offences such as cyberlaundering. Cf Abdullah et al. (2008, p. 215) and Arthur and Venter (2006, p. 3).

  51. 51.

    Casey and Schatz (2011, p. 190). Cf Mason and Sheldon (2010, p. 706) and Slade (2004, p. 5). This process is also akin to the investigative techniques for the conventional notion of money laundering. Cf Madinger (2012, p. 303).

  52. 52.

    Carrier and Spafford (2003, p. 3) and Slade (2004, p. 4).

  53. 53.

    The physical model form of digital investigation entails a scenario where the digital investigative process is related, continually associated or linked to the physical crime scene, thus oddly perceives the investigated digital device itself as a crime scene. This model is further sub-grouped into the ‘readiness group, deployment group, physical crime scene investigation, digital crime scene investigation, and presentation.’ Casey and Schatz (2011, p. 190) and Carrier and Spafford (2003, p. 1).

  54. 54.

    As the name implies, with the staircase model of digital investigation, the investigative process symbolizes an ascending sequence of stairs, on which cyber crime investigators, forensic experts and the public prosecutor work together to scale each step from bottom to top, in a systematic fashion, in order to have a compelling story at the stage of forensic presentation. Generally, the steps include incidents alerts and accusations, assessment of worth, incident crime scenes protocols, identification or seizure, preservation, recovery, harvesting, reduction, organisation and research; analysis, reporting, persuasion and testimony, with the encompassing feature of case management for each step of the way. Casey and Schatz (2011, p. 193). Casey and Palmer (2004, p. 5).

  55. 55.

    The evidence flow model of digital investigation is primarily geared towards describing the flow of information in digital investigation from the moment investigators become aware of the crime, until the investigation concludes. This model is akin to the staircase model, save for a significant deviation, being that it goes beyond the given steps by adding certain features, such as the authorization, notification, proof/defense, and transportation of evidence. Casey and Schatz (2011, p. 191) and Ó Ciardhuáin (2004, p. 3).

  56. 56.

    The sub-phase model borrows from other models in a multitier fashion, and adds different sub-phases to the respective step or phase of the digital investigation. For example, the main steps used in this model are preparation, incident response, data collection, data analysis, findings presentation and incident closure, and the corresponding sub-phases are mainly to survey, extract, and examine with the aim of reducing the amount of data to analyze; assessing the skill level of suspects; recovering deleted files; find relevant hidden data, determining the chronology of file activity; recovering relevant ASCII data; recovering relevant non-ASCII data; ascertaining non-email activity history; and recovering relevant emails and attachments. Casey and Schatz (2011, p. 195) and Beebe and Clarke (2005, p. 149).

  57. 57.

    Otherwise known as the FORZA model, this model is suited for cases that require complex digital investigation. It focuses not only on technical issues that follow digital investigation, but also on certain key legal and managerial issues. It defines eight principal roles (i.e. the case leader, system owner, legal advisor, security/system architect, digital forensic specialists, forensic investigator/system administrator, forensic investigator/forensic analysts and the legal prosecutor) and provides six key questions that each role player must answer in an investigation (i.e. who, what, how, when, where and why). However, in this model, the process within each role is not outlined. Thus, it is imperative to reference other models, explaining why the model operates entirely as a higher level of abstraction. Casey and Schatz (2011, p. 196) and Ieong (2006, p. 4).

  58. 58.

    Casey and Schatz (2011, p. 197). Cf Casey and Palmer (2004, p. 4).

  59. 59.

    Casey and Schatz (2011, p. 200). Cf Arthur and Venter (2006, p. 6).

  60. 60.

    For more details see paragraph 6.4.4.3 below.

  61. 61.

    Casey and Schatz (2011, p. 204). Cf Arthur and Venter (2006, p. 10).

  62. 62.

    See Chapter 4 for an outline of the cyberlaundering elements.

  63. 63.

    The state is a victim of a money laundering offence because the interests that are protected by criminalising money laundering are the economy of the state and effectiveness of the judicial process. Cf Unger (2007, p. 149) and Tanzi (2005, p. 91). This rationale is the same with cyberlaundering, which shares the same protected interests. Cf discussion in paragraph 5.3.2 below, and the discussion in Chapter 1, paragraph 1.4.1.

  64. 64.

    Cf Chapter 2, paragraph 2.4.5.

  65. 65.

    Casey and Schatz (2011, p. 201). Cf Casey and Palmer (2004, p. 6).

  66. 66.

    Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 15 November 2000 and came into force on 29 September 2003.

  67. 67.

    Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 7 December 1987, and came into force on 11 November 1988.

  68. 68.

    Articles 11(5) and 3(8) of the Palermo and Vienna Conventions, respectively.

  69. 69.

    Sections 1956 and 1957, Title 18 of the United States Code.

  70. 70.

    Casey and Schatz (2011, p. 200). Cf paragraph 5.2.2 above.

  71. 71.

    See discussion on the obligation to report to Financial Intelligence Units in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.2.3.2.3. Cf Recommendations 20, Financial Action Task Force (2012a, p. 19). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2003, p. 8).

  72. 72.

    See the anti-money laundering (AML) principles set out in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.1.2. Recommendations 22 and 23 of the Forty Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force provide that, other than financial institutions, the duty to report is also incumbent on lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants who engage in the activities of their clients, such as real estate transactions; management of client money and other assets including securities; management of bank, savings and securities accounts; creation, operation or management of legal persons or arrangements; buying and selling of business entities, and the organisation of contributions for the creation, operation or management of companies. See Financial Action Task Force (2012a, p. 20), Cf Financial Action Task Force (2003, p. 8). Also, the obligation is incumbent upon non-financial entities, such as dealers in precious metals or stones, as well as trust and company service providers. See Financial Action Task Force (2012a, p. 20). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2003, p. 16).

  73. 73.

    For a detailed discussion on what amounts to ‘reasonable suspicion,’ see discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.1.2. The concept of reasonable suspicion is incumbent on the existence of a predicate offence for cyberlaundering, as one of its constituent elements. See discussion in paragraph 5.4.3.2 below.

  74. 74.

    See discussion in Chapter 2, paragraph 2.4.1.

  75. 75.

    See Jamali (2009, p. 43).

  76. 76.

    For more information see Red Plc (an undated website document. PRISM Merchant System’ available at <http://www.redplc.com/about/> [accessed on 16 February 2013].

  77. 77.

    Red Plc (an undated website document. PRISM Merchant System’ available at <http://www.redplc.com/about/> [accessed on 16 February 2013].

  78. 78.

    This is but one of several challenges to the effective regulation of cyberlaundering. Cf discussion in Chapter 4, paragraph 4.2.

  79. 79.

    Ascertaining the presence of mens rea comes at the analysis stage. See paragraph 5.3.2 below.

  80. 80.

    See Article 6(2)(c) of the Palermo Convention and Article 7(15)(c) of the Vienna Convention. Cf discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.1.3.

  81. 81.

    The Palermo and Vienna Conventions do not have express provisions in this regard. It is, however, stated in Articles 3(4) and 3(5) of the Council of Europe Directive 2005/50/EC on the prevention and use of financial systems for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing, adopted by the European Parliament and the Council of Europe of the European Union on 26 October 2005, which came into force on 25 November 2005. Cf Basel Institute on Governance: Assets recovery Knowledge Centre (2007. Anti-Money Laundering’ available at <http://www.assetrecovery.org/kc/node/82bce589-7805-11dd-9c9d-d9fcb408dfee.3> [accessed on 5 February 2013].

  82. 82.

    See Chapter 2, paragraph 2.2.1.

  83. 83.

    Cf detailed discussion on the concept of ‘an activity,’ as part of the elements of cyberlaundering discussed in Chapter 4 paragraph 4.4.1.

  84. 84.

    For a detailed discussion on the key vulnerable avenues for cyberlaundering, see Chapter 2 above at paragraph 2.4.

  85. 85.

    See detailed discussion in Chapter 2 above at paragraph 2.1.2.

  86. 86.

    For a discussion on how the relevant jurisdiction can be determined, see paragraph 5.3 below.

  87. 87.

    Cf Walden (2010, p. 607).

  88. 88.

    See Article 12(1)(a) and (b) of the Palermo Convention. Cf Article 5(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention. Cf see discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.1.

  89. 89.

    Article 3 of the Convention which was adopted by the Council of Europe on 16 May 2005, and which came into force on 1 December 2009.

  90. 90.

    Cf see discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.2.2.

  91. 91.

    Article 12(1)(a) and (b) of the Palermo Convention. Cf Article 5(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention which does not entail this scenario. Nor is there an applicable provision in the Council of Europe Convention on Cyber crime (otherwise known as the Budapest Convention) which was adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 08 November 2001 and came into force on 1 July 2004. However, as discussed in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.2.1, a similar law that should apply is the SB-82 (NV Senate Bill 82-75th, BDR 14-266, which came into effect on 1 July 2009) of the American state of Nevada, which permits law enforcement agencies to investigate suspicious activities involving smart cards and freeze funds for up to 10 days after such seizure.

  92. 92.

    Casey and Schatz (2011, p. 210).

  93. 93.

    Reyes et al. (2007, p. 56). Cf Casey and Schatz (2011, p. 200).

  94. 94.

    Casey and Schatz (2011, p. 210). Cf Reyes et al. (2007, p. 56).

  95. 95.

    Casey and Schatz (2011, p. 210). Cf Bell (2002, p. 321) and Mason and Scheldon (2010, p. 707).

  96. 96.

    Casey and Schatz (2011, p. 212).

  97. 97.

    See discussion on the process models in paragraph 5.2.2 above. Cf Carrier and Spafford (2003, p. 3), Casey and Schatz (2011, p. 212) and Slade (2004, p. 4).

  98. 98.

    Casey, Ferraro and Nguyen (2009, p. 1354). Cf Casey and Schatz (2011, p. 212).

  99. 99.

    Data recovery means where deleted, hidden, lost or damaged data is extracted from available sources, regardless of its relevance to the case at hand. Casey and Schatz (2011, p. 214).

  100. 100.

    Data harvesting refers to how the investigator can harvest data for later analysis. However, an important feature of this process is that, unlike the data recovery process, only relevant data is harvested. Thus it requires a more logical application of thought. Casey and Schatz (2011, p. 215).

  101. 101.

    Organisation and search involves the grouping of derived data in units in order to accelerate later analysis. As such, relevant data may be grouped, tagged, or clearly separated in order to allow law enforcement to find the relevant data during the analysis stage. Cf Casey and Schatz (2011, p. 214). Cf Cohen (2009, p. 413).

  102. 102.

    Like separating the wheat from the chaff, reduction focuses on the overall structure of the object, and not the content. It looks at the smallest set of digital investigation having the highest potential of containing greatest potential for containing data of probative value. Casey and Schatz (2011, p. 214). Cf Cohen (2009, p. 413).

  103. 103.

    Casey and Schatz (2011, p. 217). Cf Mason and Scheldon (2010, p. 714).

  104. 104.

    Casey and Schatz (2011, p. 216). Cf Cohen (2009, p. 413).

  105. 105.

    The statute of limitation discussion in paragraph 5.2 answers the statute of limitations question sufficiently.

  106. 106.

    Cf for discussion on the elements of cyberlaundering see Chapter 4 paragraph 4.4.1.

  107. 107.

    Cf Madinger (2012, p. 107).

  108. 108.

    For an elaborate discussion, see Chapter 2, paragraph 2.3.

  109. 109.

    See paragraph 5.2.3

  110. 110.

    For more elaboration, see Chapter 3, paragraph 3.1.2.

  111. 111.

    Casey and Scahtz (2011, p. 219). Cf Walden (2010, p. 608).

  112. 112.

    Cf Walden (2010, p. 610).

  113. 113.

    See an elaborate discussion of the principles of mutual legal assistance in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.1.3.

  114. 114.

    Cf Angers (2004, p. 50) and Pocar (2004, p. 36) and discussion in paragraph 5.5 below.

  115. 115.

    Cf elaborate discussion on assets recovery in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.1.3.

  116. 116.

    The author is of the view that the principles of assets recovery of the current AML legal regime, as discussed earlier, apply in the same way mutatis mutandis to cyberlaundering. As such, the discussion on assets recovery is not repeated in this chapter. See Chapter 3, paragraph 3.1.3.

  117. 117.

    Etymologically, jurisdiction has Anglo-French and Latin origins, and when interpreted syllabically, it means to speak the law (i.e. iuris—meaning ‘law’; dicare—meaning ‘speak’). See Merriam-Webster Dictionary (an undated website document. Juirsdiction’ available at <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/jurisdiction> [accessed on 22 February 2013].

  118. 118.

    Certain factors determine jurisdiction locally. This is dependent on the structure of the relevant jurisdiction (i.e. federal government system, unilateral system, provincial, etc). Vertically, jurisdiction in the local sphere is categorized into subject-matter jurisdiction, which allows a local court to establish jurisdiction for the crime because of its related subject matter; in personam jurisdiction whereby jurisdiction is established with respect to the capacity of the person (often either as a perpetrator or victim); and in rem jurisdiction, which pertains to a thing or property. Cf Cater and Weiner (2011, p. 728); Henkin et al. (2009, p. 1048); Oxman (1987, p. 277) and Brenner and Koops (2004, p. 29).

  119. 119.

    Section 401(a), Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, American Law Institute (1987, p. 330). Cf Brenner and Koop (2004, p. 5) and Buergenthal and Murphy (2002, p. 217).

  120. 120.

    Section 401(a), Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, American Law Institute (1987, p. 332). Cf Brenner and Koop (2004, p. 5) and Buergenthal and Murphy (2002, p. 220).

  121. 121.

    See United States (US) Legal (an undated website document. Jurisdiction’ available at <http://civilprocedure.uslegal.com/jurisdiction/> [accessed on 22 February 2013]. Cf Twitchell (1988, p. 610).

  122. 122.

    American Law Institute (1987, p. 330). Cf Brenner and Koops (1987, p. 5), Buergenthal and Murphy (2002, p. 218) and Koops and Robinson (2011, p. 178).

  123. 123.

    Dorward (1998, p. 142). Cf Stein (1985, p. 782).

  124. 124.

    The nationality principle presupposes that countries would have jurisdiction over their nationals who have committed crimes outside their territories. This principle is supported by Article 4(b)(i) of the Vienna Convention, and Article 15(2)(b) of the Palermo Convention.

  125. 125.

    The objective territoriality principle implies that a country would have jurisdiction because the action had an actual or intended effect on the country’s territory without the necessary occurrence of the action in that territory. An indirect reading of this principle can be gleaned from Article 4(a)(i) of the Vienna Convention, and Articles 15(1)(a), (b)(i) and (ii) of the Palermo Convention.

  126. 126.

    The universality principle of jurisdiction means that any state would be able to claim jurisdiction on the basis that the alleged offence is of such a serious nature that it threatens the international peace, human rights and integrity that they affect all states and all people. This principle is grounded in customary international law. See discussion at paragraph 5.3 below.

  127. 127.

    The passive personality principle of jurisdiction holds that jurisdiction can be established on the basis of the fact that the national of a states party is a victim of the alleged offence. This principle is supported by Article 15(2)(a) of the Palermo Convention.

  128. 128.

    The subjective territoriality principle of jurisdiction is an American terminology, and a similar concept exists in Europe as the ‘ubiquity theory’. Stessen (2000, p. 198). Cf Koh (2006, p. 57) and Oxman (1987, p. 278).

  129. 129.

    Stessen (2000, p. 198). Cf Oxman (1987, p. 277). Arguably, this principle is contained in Article 4(a)(i) of the Vienna Convention, and Articles 15(1)(a), (b)(i) and (ii) of the Palermo Convention.

  130. 130.

    Article 6(2) of the Vienna Convention, and Article 6(2) of the Palermo Convention. An important caveat to this principle is the concept of dual criminality which might serve as a bar to founding jurisdiction. Essentially, where a predicate offence is an offence in one country, but not in another, the former country cannot punish the offence or offences based on said offence (i.e. money laundering) as it is tantamount to governing into another sovereign states’ territory and jurisdiction, which defies the principle of international law.

  131. 131.

    Essentially, the crime of money laundering has the potential to create multi-jurisdictional claims, as it is not focused on whether the crime has an effect or result in that territory, but on whether an essential part of the conduct took place there.

  132. 132.

    The issue of extradition is unsettling in the international arena, for political reasons. In principle, jurisdiction itself serves as a strong barrier to extradition. Many times, other barriers, such as a lack of dual criminality of the offence, the political nature of the alleged crime, the death penalty, or the threat of torture tend to subdue a request for extradition. For example, due to differences in the French and United States (US) human rights laws, it took years, and with strong pressure from the international community, before the President of France, Jacque Chirac, gave in, in 2002, to the extradition request of the United States (US) to have Ira Eihon (famously dubbed ‘the Unicorn killer’) extradited. He was an American who killed his wife and locked her up in the closet for 20 years. More recently, in July 2010, the extradition request made by the United States (US) to Switzerland, for famed international filmmaker, Roman Polanski, who is charged in the United States (US) with sexual assault allegedly committed in the United States (US) in 1978, was refused, on what the United States (US) considers immaterial grounds. New York Times (2010. Swiss Reject United States (US) Request to Extradite Polanski’ available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/13/movies/13polanski.html?src=mv> [accessed 24 February 2013]. Also, in certain cases where the barriers to extradition are lowered, as evident in the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), to which the principle of dual criminality does not apply, the issue of extradition is still not without political concerns. The EAW issued by the Swedish authorities against Julian Assange on grounds of having committed sexual assault is a good example. The matter is embroidered with political concerns, which slows down the entire process of extradition. For more details see the case of Julian Paul Assange v. Swedish Prosecution Authority [2013] UKSC 22. Also see Rundle, G (2010. Did he or didn’t he?’ available at <http://www.theage.com.au/national/did-he-or-didnt-he-the-murky-politics-of-sex-and-consent-20101211-18tie.html> [accessed on 15 July 2013].

  133. 133.

    The Convention was drawn up by the Council of Europe in Strasburg, with participation of the Council of Europe, observer states Japan, Canada and China. The Convention was adopted by the Committee of the Ministers of the Council of Europe at its 109th session on 08 November 2001. On 23 November 2003, it was open for signature in Budapest, and on 1 July 2004, it came into force. As at 9 March 2012, the Convention had been ratified by 32 states parties. In tandem with the Convention is the Council of Europe Convention on Cyber crime: Additional Protocol to the Convention adopted by the Council of Europe on 7 November 2002 and came into force on 1 March 2006. For more information see the Treaties Office of the Council of Europe at <http://conventions.coe.int/> [accessed on 9 February 2013]. Cf discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.2.1.

  134. 134.

    See page 326 of the judgment.

  135. 135.

    See sections 5-27-606 of the Annex to the Arkansas Criminal Code of 2003, sections 14-453-.2 of the North Carolina General Statute of 2002, and sections 53(a)-261 of the Annex to the Connecticut General Statute of 2004.

  136. 136.

    See article 2 of the Dutch Criminal Code (Strafwetboek) of 1994; article 3 of the Belgian Criminal Code (Strafwetboek belgie) of 2012 and section 3 of the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) of 1998. Cf South African legislation: Section 90 Electronic Communications and Transactions Act No. 22 of 2002.

  137. 137.

    Brenner and Koops (2004, p. 16). Cf Koops and Robinson (2011, p. 179).

  138. 138.

    See article 11(3) of the Singapore Computer Misuse Act of 1993, and article 9(2) of the Computer Crimes Act of 1997.

  139. 139.

    Brenner and Koops (2004, p. 16). Cf Koops and Robinson (2011, p. 180).

  140. 140.

    A web server refers to computer hardware, or computer software, such as a computer application that delivers accessible content through the internet. The web server is often used to host websites, amongst other functions such as enabling gaming activities, storing of data, as well as for conducting several internet enterprises. See Web Developers Note (an undated website document. What is web server—A computer of a program’ available at <http://www.webdevelopersnotes.com/basics/what_is_web_server.php> [accessed on 1 March 2013].

  141. 141.

    A content provider is an enterprise that develops content for electronic commerce websites. It studies and incorporates a search engine optimized technology to help customers find content, and it tends to attract the attention of website users. The fact that all website owners (i.e. having the web servers) do not always create their own content tells why a content provider’s business is lucrative, given as most of such website owners often lack the skill. See eHow (an undated internet article. What is an Internet Content Provider’ available at <http://www.ehow.com/about_6695350_internet-content-provider_.html> [accessed on 2 March 2013].

  142. 142.

    See discussion in Chapter 2, paragraph 2.4.1.

  143. 143.

    See discussion in Chapter 2, paragraph 2.4.5.

  144. 144.

    As a further example, this principle also reflects largely with virtual worlds, and the act will be said to have been committed in the territory where the web server and content provider of the virtual world website are located within the territory of the country seeking jurisdiction.

  145. 145.

    See article 5(2)(b) of the Computer Misuse Act of 1990, Chapter 18. Cf a similar provision exists in article 257F(2)(b) of the Tasmanian Criminal Code Act of 1924.

  146. 146.

    This principle is supported in the case United States of America v. Nippon Paper Industries Co. Ltd 109 F. 3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1997) where the court elucidated the matter in depth, stating that a state can readily proscribe conduct outside its territory, where such conduct has a substantial effect within its territory, so long as the standards of reasonableness are met.

  147. 147.

    See sections 7(2)(1) of the Strafgesetzbuch (German Criminal Code of 1998); article 5(1)(2) of the Wetboek van Strafrecht (Dutch Criminal Code of 1994); article 11 of the Wet houdende de voorafgaande title van het Wetboek van Strafvordering (Belgian Criminal Code of 2012) and the sections 4 and 5 of the Computer Misuse Act of 1990, Chapter 18. Cf South African law: Section 90 Electronic Communications and Transactions Act No. 22 of 2002.

  148. 148.

    This principle is embedded in Article 18(9) of the Palermo Convention and Article 7 (15) (c) and (d) of the Vienna Convention.

  149. 149.

    This is typically the case with Germany and Belgium. See sections 7(2)(1) of the Strafgesetzbuch (German Criminal Code of 1998), and article 11 of the Wet houdende de voorafgaande title van het Wetboek van Strafvordering (Belgian Criminal Code of 2012). Certain states in the United States (US) such as Michigan also have similar provisions. See section 762.2(1)(d) of the Michigan Compiled Laws, Act of 2004.

  150. 150.

    Cryer, Frieman, Robinson and Wilmshurst (2010, p. 50). Cf Bassiouni (2004, p. 36) and Werle (2009, p. 57).

  151. 151.

    This principle was propounded further in the case before the International Court of Justice: Belgium v Spain (Second Phase) ICJ Rep 1970 3 at paragraph 33.

  152. 152.

    For example, in the Netherlands, cyber crimes do not fall under the universal jurisdiction clause (article 4 of the Wetboek van Strafrecht (Dutch Criminal Code of 1994). Conversely, countries such as Germany and Belgium can claim universal jurisdiction for prosecuting the cyber crime of child pornography—sections 6(6) and 184(b) of the Strafgesetzbuch (German Criminal Code of 1998) and article 10ter(1) of the Wet houdende de voorafgaande van het Wetboek van Strafvordering (Belgian Criminal Code of 2012). Cf commentaries by Brenner and Kooper (2004, p. 28).

  153. 153.

    Section 1030 (e)(2)(b) of the United States Code also embeds another principle of international jurisdiction known as the principle of protection. This principle allows a state to exercise jurisdiction over alleged crimes committed outside of its borders, where such allegedly committed crimes threaten its security and basic functions. Nichols (1997, p. 305). Cf Brenner and Koop (2004, p. 26). The protective principle is not included in the Budapest Convention and is not discussed separately due to the fact that it would be a reiteration of the universality principle with which it is synonymous.

  154. 154.

    For example, a criminal mastermind who knows his way around the internet could very well combine multiple avenues in order to launder his funds. The avenues of online banking, online gambling, virtual worlds, and online barter trading are but only few examples of such avenues. See discussion in Chapter 2, paragraph 2.4.

  155. 155.

    American Law Institute (1987, p. 383). Cf Brenner and Kooper (2004, p. 28).

  156. 156.

    See discussion in paragraph 5.3.2 above.

  157. 157.

    Cf Aas (2007, p. 130), Bermann (2003, p. 106,183 and 226) and Siegel and Borchers (2005, p. 136).

  158. 158.

    See discussion in paragraph 6.6.1 above. Cf Cater and Weiner (2011, p. 728), Henkin et al. (2009, p. 1048); and Oxman (1987, p. 277).

  159. 159.

    Cf discussion in paragraph 5.1.1 above.

  160. 160.

    United States of America v. E-Gold Ltd, Douglas Jackson, Barry K. Downey, and Reid A. Jackson, 521 F.3d 411, 417 (D.C. Circuit) (2008).

  161. 161.

    See discussion on E-gold Ltd above in Chapter 2, paragraph 2.4.4.

  162. 162.

    Digital gold currency is a form of electronic money based on ounces of gold weighed digitally. For a detailed discussion on electronic payment system, see Chapter 2, paragraph 2.2.

  163. 163.

    See the website of Gold and Silver reserve Inc at <https://www.e-gold.com/unsecure/pgpkey.htm> [accessed on 13 February 2013].

  164. 164.

    Prior to this time, several other e-gold currency companies had come to compete with E-gold Ltd such as OS-Gold, Standard Reserve and INTGold, but none recorded the measures of success recorded by E-Gold Ltd. Most of these other companies have been under scrutiny for money laundering and for being a facade of a sheer Ponzi Scheme. Cf Hallam-Baker (2008, p. 343).

  165. 165.

    The indictment can be found at website of the United States (US) Department of Justice at <http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ceos/Press%20Releases/DC%20egold%20indictment.pdf> [accessed on 13 February 2013].

  166. 166.

    ‘The United States District Court for The District of Colombia, Holding a Criminal Term, Grand Jury Sworn in on May 11 2006, United States of America v. E-gold, Ltd Gold and Silver Reserve, INC, Douglas L. Jackson, Barry K. Downey, and Reid A. Jackson as Defendants (Criminal No. 07-109): Indictment’ page 3, available at <http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ceos/Press%20Releases/DC%20egold%20indictment.pdf> [accessed on 13 February 2013].

  167. 167.

    United States of America v. E-Gold Ltd, Douglas Jackson, Barry K. Downey, and Reid A. Jackson, 521 F.3d 411, 417 (D.C. Circuit) (2008).

  168. 168.

    See page 413 of the judgement.

  169. 169.

    Together with the sentence of 300 hours of community service for each of the non-juristic entity defendants, they each paid minimal amounts of fines between $ 300 and $ 200.

  170. 170.

    As discussed in Chapter 4, the elements of the crime of money laundering include the disguise and concealment of the proceeds of the relevant criminal activity, along with the violation of government or state activities and its management system by causing instability in its financial sector, and obstructing the normal activities of the justice and the investigation of crime, (i.e. the actus reus of the crime). Together with this, the requisite mens rea elements must also exist on the part of the accused in the form of knowledge and intention of the conduct described.

  171. 171.

    See Chapter 2, paragraph 2.1.3.

  172. 172.

    See Chapter 4, paragraph 4.4.1, where the elements of cyberlaundering are discussed at length.

  173. 173.

    For a detailed elemental discussion of the principle particularly on the international plane, see Kreß (2010, p. 2). Cf Cassese (2005, p. 438), Lamb (2004, p. 23), Tomuschat (2006, p. 835) and Werle (2009, p. 36).

  174. 174.

    Some of these other websites include < www.megavideo.com > , < www.megapix.com > , < www.megalive.com > , and < www.megabox.com > .

  175. 175.

    These facts are all contained in an indictment charge against the defendants: ‘In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, United States of America v. Kim Dotcom, Megaupload Ltd, Vestor Ltd, Fin Batato, Julius Bencko, Sven Echternach, Mathias Ortmann, Andrus Nomm, and Bram van der Kolk as Defendants (Criminal No. 1:12CR3): Indictment, dated 5 Januaray 2012’ page 3, available at `http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204616504577171180266957116.html [accessed on 13 February 2013].

  176. 176.

    ‘In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, United States of America v. Kim Dotcom, Megaupload Ltd, Vestor Ltd, Fin Batato, Julius Bencko, Sven Echternach, Mathias Ortmann, Andrus Nomm, and Bram van der Kolk as Defendants (Criminal No. 1:12CR3): Indictment, dated 5 Januaray 2012’ page 1, available at `http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204616504577171180266957116.html [accessed on 13 February 2013].

  177. 177.

    RTHK (2011. HK seizes $ 330 in Megaupload raids’ available at `http://m.rthk.hk/news/20120121/813246.htm [accessed on 16 February 2013].

  178. 178.

    Cf Articles 3(4) and 3(5) of the Council of Europe Directive 2005/50/EC.

  179. 179.

    Act 28 of 1998, Title 17, United States Code.

  180. 180.

    Inference can be drawn from the fact that the defendants had a knowedge or suspicion of the illegality of their conduct due to the fact that, in a prior civil action case against Megauplaod—Perfect 10, INC v. Megaupload, Kim Schmitz Case No. 11cv0191– IEG (BLM) (2011)—the court found that the defendant (Megaupload) had directly infringed on the copyright right of the plaintiff. This should have been a good basis upon which Megaupload should have desisted from the conduct.

  181. 181.

    For example, on 17 January 2012, with the efforts of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the United States, two Russian citizens, Vladimir Zdorovenin and Kirill Zdorovenin, were extradited from Switzerland to the United States (US). They were charged in the United States (US) with committing cyber crime offences such as  the theft of victims’ personal identification information, including credit card numbers, by means of computer programs that were surreptitiously lodged in the victims’ computers and that recorded the information as it was entered. The accused persons also allegedly purchased stolen credit card numbers from other individuals, and used the stolen credit card information to make ‘legitimate’ purchases of goods from numerous internet businesses that they operated (i.e. layering). Apparently, the purchases were fraudulent and were meant to deceive banks, credit card service providers, credit card holders, among others, thereby enabling the accused persons to steal the money they funneled to their websites. In essence, via the internet, the accused persons successfully laundered the loot derived from the commission of other cyber crimes. Interestingly, the accused persons were not charged with money laundering, because the elements of the crime are not present. However, the elements of the crime of cyberlaundering are present, and, as such, prosecution of this would have been possible, where laws exist to that effect. For more information see Federal Bureau of Investigation ‘Manhattan US Attorney and FBI Assistant Director in Charge Announce Extradition of Russian Citizen to Face Charges for International Cyber Crimes’ Press Release (17 January 2012) available at <http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2012/manhattan-u.s.-attorney-and-fbi-assistant-director-in-charge-announce-extradition-of-russian-citizen-to-face-charges-for-international-cyber-crimes> [accessed on 11 February 2013].

  182. 182.

    See discussion in Chapter 4, paragraph 4.4.1.

  183. 183.

    However, of all these signatories to the Convention, only the United States, Australia, Dominican Republic, Japan, Mauritius, and Panama have ratified and brought it into force. Cf discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.2.1.

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Leslie, D. (2014). Prosecuting Cyberlaundering. In: Legal Principles for Combatting Cyberlaundering. Law, Governance and Technology Series, vol 19. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06416-1_5

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