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International Conference on Information Security Practice and Experience

ISPEC 2014: Information Security Practice and Experience pp 302–317Cite as

Efficient Sealed-Bid Auction Protocols Using Verifiable Secret Sharing

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 8434))

Abstract

This article proposes efficient solutions for the construction of sealed-bid second-price and combinatorial auction protocols in an active adversary setting. The main reason for constructing secure auction protocols is that the losing bids can be used in the future auctions as well as negotiations if they are not kept private. Our motivation is to apply verifiable secret sharing in order to construct various kinds of sealed-bid auctions. We initially propose two secure second-price auction protocols with different masking methods. Subsequently, we provide two secure combinatorial auction protocols based on our second masking approach. In the first scheme, we apply an existing dynamic programming method. In the second protocol, we use inter-agent negotiation as an approximate solution in the multiple traveling salesman problem to determine auction outcomes. It is worth mentioning that our protocols are independent of the secret sharing scheme that is being used.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, Illinois, USA

    Mehrdad Nojoumian

  2. David R. Cheriton School of Computer Science, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada

    Douglas R. Stinson

Authors
  1. Mehrdad Nojoumian
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  2. Douglas R. Stinson
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. School of Mathematics and Computer Science, Fujian Normal University, No. 32 Shangsan Road, 350007, Fuzhou, China

    Xinyi Huang

  2. Infocom Security Department, Institute for Infocomm Research, 1 Fusionopolis Way, #21-01 Connexis, South Tower, 138632, Singapore, Singapore

    Jianying Zhou

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Nojoumian, M., Stinson, D.R. (2014). Efficient Sealed-Bid Auction Protocols Using Verifiable Secret Sharing. In: Huang, X., Zhou, J. (eds) Information Security Practice and Experience. ISPEC 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8434. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06320-1_23

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06320-1_23

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-06319-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-06320-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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