Abstract
In this chapter, the stratification and the analogies between spatiality and temporality are further discussed in relation to the constitution of the spatio-temporal thing. The stratification in this context can be traced back to the foundational relationship between the constitution of res temporalis and of res extensa. The analogies concern specific aspects of the constitution of the spatial and the temporal thing. It is argued that such an inquiry is based upon an abstracting procedure that aims at isolating, for the sake of description, the spatial dimension from the temporal dimension. The outcomes of the present chapter further emphasize the limits of a mere analogical and parallel account of spatial and temporal constitution. First, the claim that we can properly consider temporal objects apart from their spatial localization is questioned. Secondly, it is argued that the constitution of the spatial thing implies temporal syntheses, so that, whenever abstracting from temporality, we can only provide an incomplete description of spatial constitution. Thirdly, the abstracting procedure does not allow us to account for the constitution of tridimensional space. For, being based upon movement, this constitution requires both spatiality and temporality.
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- 1.
- 2.
Cf. e.g. Hua III/1, pp. 91f./(Husserl 1983, pp. 94f.) See, for instance, De Warren (2009, p. 44). Arguing for this position, I of course do not mean to simply equalize the mode of givenness of subjectivity with the mode of givenness of material things, but rather to phenomenologically address the question as to the embodiment of subjectivity. I will make my point clearer in the last chapter of this book, by distinguishing the notion of embodied subjectivity from the notion of bodily subjectivity.
- 3.
“[…] das Ästhetische des körperlichen Dinges […],.” A IV 5/63 b. See also, D 13 III/196a ff.; A VII 14/18 b.
- 4.
“Bewegen wir uns in der Sphäre der anschaulichen Gegebenheiten, so haben wir auch in der raumgegenständlichen Sphäre nur “ästhetische” Raumgegenstände zu nehmen, mit sinnlichen Qualitäten erfüllte Ausdehnungen.” D 8/40b.
- 5.
“[…] of course, the phantom is a unity of duration, and if I apprehend the thing as lasting from “yesterday” until today, as just individually the same, then the phantom as well is the same in the same sense. It has endured further.” “[…] natürlich das Phantom ist eine Dauereinheit, und wenn ich das Ding als von” gestern “bis heute dauernd auffasse, als individuell dasselbe eben, so ist auch das Phantom in demselben Sinn dasselbe; es hat noch weiter fortgedauert.” D 13 II/167 b. See also, Hua XVI, pp. 345–346/(Husserl 1997, pp. 301–302), where Husserl refers to the object of pure experience as to the spatio-temporal schema plus sensible fullness.
- 6.
Hua XVI, p. 65/(Husserl 1997, p. 55).
- 7.
“If we abstract from time and extract a point of the thing’s duration, then to the time-filling content of the thing there belongs the thing’s spatial extension” Hua XVI, p. 66/(Husserl 1997, p. 55). Translation modified. See also D 13 II/167 b.
- 8.
Thus, I agree with Zahavi (1999, p. 92), when he points out that listening to a string quartet by Schubert, for instance, implies a reference to my bodily location with respect to the orchestra. Consistently, we can even go a step further and argue, as Schapp (1976, pp. 26–32) does, that there is a specific constitution of the so-called Tonraum.
- 9.
Hua XIX/1, p. 273/(Husserl 2001c, pp. 28–29).
- 10.
- 11.
Hua XIX/1, p. 273/(Husserl 2001c, p. 29).
- 12.
Hua XVI, p. 62/(Husserl 1997, p. 52).
- 13.
Cf. Hua X, pp. 70, 280/(Husserl 1991, pp. 72–73, 190).
- 14.
Hua X, p. 23/(Husserl 1991, p. 24). Assuming one distinction already formulated by Granel (1968, pp. 44–53), Schnell (1996, pp. 81–83) insists on the distinction between the temporal objects [zeitliche Objekte or zeitliche Gegenstände] and the so-called tempo-objects [Zeitobjekt or Zeitgegenstand]. Whereas the former designate temporal constituted unities, such as the note, the latter refer to duration itself. Husserl’s approach to the intuitiveness of time is considered to be based upon this distinction. As I have already suggested in the previous chapters and as I will now further show, however, I do not consider that the intuition of duration as such can be accomplished apart from the intuition of temporal objects; rather, the former can happen only in and through the latter.
- 15.
- 16.
Husserl might refer to the 1873 lecture course he personally attended or to a third person’s report. Brentano later developed his position on time, and changed his mind on some relevant aspects (Cf. Brentano 1976). However, Husserl did not modify his critique in the 1928 edition of his lectures, even if by that time he should have been aware of these developments. Kraus (1930) polemically addresses this lack of consideration for the developments in Brentano’s account of time in the 1928 edition. For the discussion of these developments in Brentano’s analyses of time, see Chrudzimski (1998/99). For further discussion of Husserl’s relationship to Brentano regarding time, see Benoist (2008); Bernet (1985); De Warren (2009, pp. 50–140); Kortooms (2002, pp. 28–38); Rinofner-Kreidl (2000, pp. 345–376).
- 17.
For a thorough analysis of the understanding of original association as imagination see notably De Warren (2009, pp. 50–140).
- 18.
See Hua X, pp. 11–12/(Husserl 1991, pp. 11–13). As I mentioned earlier, the target of this critique is most probably Helmholtz.
- 19.
Hua XXIII, pp. 43–48, 63f./(Husserl 2005, pp. 47–52, 69f.).
- 20.
Hua XXIII, p. 49/(Husserl 2005, p. 53).
- 21.
According to Benoist (2008), this is the central point of Husserl’s critique to Brentano and, at the same time, the point that makes the originality of the lectures on inner time consciousness. Brentano’s idea of a determining modification of the temporal contents eventually implies the negation of their reality, which is precisely what Husserl aims to maintain.
- 22.
Hua X, p. 13/(Husserl 1991, pp. 13–14).
- 23.
- 24.
Originally, the essay was published in volume XXI of the Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane. Here, I will refer only to the reprinted version in Meinong’s collected works (Meinong 1971).
- 25.
Stern’s article, indeed, is itself a critical response to Meinong’s, “Beiträge zur Theorie der psychischen Analyse”, published in Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane VI (1894), reprint: (Meinong 1969).
- 26.
According to James (1981, pp. 605–619), the objective duration of the specious present can be objectively measured in an interval of around 12 s (James 1981, p. 613). Other differences between Stern’s presence-time and James’s specious present are discussed by Gallagher (1998, pp. 17–69), who suggests that that Husserl’s approach to time is much closer to Stern’s presence-time then to James’s specious present.
- 27.
The notion of primary memory was coined by Exner in order to indicate the process of maintaining the immediate past into mind. See Stern (1897, p. 338), who refers to Ludimar Hermann’s Handbuch der Physiologie.
- 28.
Bernet (1985, pp. XXI–XXII) points out that Husserl most probably knew Stern’s text only indirectly, through the references in Meinong’s essay. Indeed, as it is shown in the texts collected in part B of Hua X, Husserl’s critique to the idea of the punctuated present precedes his acquaintance with Stern’s text (which must not have been earlier that 1904). Cf. Hua X, pp. 167–170, 173–176/(Husserl 1991, pp. 171–174, 178–182).
- 29.
See, notably, Hua X, pp. 19–23, 216–234/(Husserl 1991, pp. 21–25, 223–242).
- 30.
Hua X, pp. 224–225/(Husserl 1991, pp. 231–233).
- 31.
Hua X, p. 226/(Husserl 1991, p. 233).
- 32.
Hua X, p. 227/(Husserl 1991, pp. 234–235).
- 33.
Hua X, pp. 19–23/(Husserl 1991, pp. 21–25).
- 34.
Hua X, p. 232/(Husserl 1991, pp. 239–240).
- 35.
As Kortooms (2002, p. 111) observes, the first occurrence of the notion of “retention” is the one contained in text number 51 of Husserliana X.
- 36.
As Husserl writes, the “perception of the past” at first sounds like “wooden iron” Hua X, p. 415.
- 37.
- 38.
Hua X, 40/(Husserl 1991, p. 42).
- 39.
In one note to the Seefeld Manuscripts (1905), Husserl retrospectively finds in these texts the “concept and the correct use” of the phenomenological reduction. However, we observe the texts effectively dating back to the Seefeld stay do not properly provide transcendental-constitutive analyses, particularly regarding their main topic (individuation and consciousness of identity). Such analyses, instead, were added later to the convolute, and date back to 1917. See Hua X, 237f./(Husserl 1991, pp. 245f.) and Bernet (1985, p. XXXII).
- 40.
- 41.
Hua XXIV, pp. 243–250/(Husserl 2008, pp. 241–248).
- 42.
Hua XXIV, 243/(Husserl 2008, p. 241).
- 43.
Hua XXIV, p. 246/(Husserl 2008, p. 243).
- 44.
Hua X, pp. 269–286 and 335–353/(Husserl 1991, pp. 279–297, 347–364). Boehm, the editor of Hua X, dates text 39 back to the 1906/07 lecture course. However, there is both theoretical and historical evidence that allow us to consider the text as part of the 1909 lecture course. See Hua X, p. 492 and Bernet (1985, p. XXXVI).
- 45.
Hua II, p. 35/(Husserl 1999, pp. 27–28).
- 46.
Hua I, pp. 70f./(Husserl 1960, pp. 31f.).
- 47.
Hua X, pp. 279f./(Husserl 1991, p. 289f.).
- 48.
Hua X, pp. 283–284/(Husserl 1991, pp. 293–294).
- 49.
Hua X, p. 275/(Husserl 1991, p. 285).
- 50.
Hua X, p. 339/(Husserl 1991, pp. 350–351).
- 51.
Hua X, p. 343/(Husserl 1991, p. 355).
- 52.
Hua X, p. 340/(Husserl 1991, p. 352).
- 53.
- 54.
Hua X, p. 326f./(Husserl 1991, pp. 338f.) The difference between the intentionality of retention and recollection, and the foundational relationship between the two, has been insightfully treated by Fink (1966, pp. 19f.), who coins the notion of de-presencing [Entgegenwärtigung] to designate the process of retentionalization. I shall return more extensively on the dynamics of this process in the next section.
- 55.
As Bernet (1985, p. XLII) points out, this may be problematic, since such a view does not allow to account for the forgetfulness of that which is inaccessible to consciousness (e.g. traumas) and history. In the texts written in the Twenties and in the Thirties, Husserl will be confronted with some of these problems. Against Bernet, and referring to Husserl’s later lectures on transcendental logic (Hua XI), Mishara (1990) argues that Husserl’s account of retentional consciousness, association, and affection is apt to describe the process of forgetting. Thereby he refers to Husserl’s metaphor of the “night of the unconscious”, and to the characterization of process of retentionalization as a process of forgetting. Cf. Hua XI, p. 154/(Husserl 2001a, pp. 201–202). His argument, however, does not seem to challenge Bernet’s point, since, in Husserl’s view, all that which has retentionally sedimented can, in principle, be awaken and presentified in recollection. In this sense, the unconscious is not the realm of a radical forgetfulness or alienness, because this would imply the impossibility, in principle, to appropriate the past in recollection. For a thorough inquiry into the unconscious in light of the phenomenology of alienness, see Waldenfels (2002, pp. 286–359). The question as to the apodicticity of recollection will be further developed by Husserl in the text published as Appendix VIII in Hua XI, pp. 365–383/(Husserl 2001a, pp. 451–473). In this text, Husserl claims that recollection has indeed an apodictic character in spite of the possibility of error. This claim is grounded, on the one hand, on the correlation between the double intentionality of recollection and a double reduction. On the other hand, it refers to the unitary structure of the temporal stream of consciousness and to the Ego as the identical pole of the stream of experiences.
- 56.
- 57.
Hua X, pp. 368–382/(Husserl 1991, pp. 379–394).
- 58.
Hua X, p. 380/(Husserl 1991, p. 392).
- 59.
Hua X, p. 297/(Husserl 1991, p. 308).
- 60.
Hua X, pp. 55–57/(Husserl 1991, pp. 56–59).
- 61.
Hua X, pp. 137f./(Husserl 1991, pp. 141f.). A more precise characterization of this phenomenon is provided in the texts written around the Twenties, starting with the Bernau Manuscripts. I shall discuss the theoretical impact of these developments in the third section.
- 62.
Hua X, p. 167/(Husserl 1991, p. 172).
- 63.
Hua X, p. 169/(Husserl 1991, pp. 173–174).
- 64.
Hua X, p. 297/(Husserl 1991, p. 308).
- 65.
Hua X, p. 297/(Husserl 1991, p. 309), footnote.
- 66.
Hua XVI, p. 66/(Husserl 1997, p. 55).
- 67.
This notion is particularly present in Husserl’s discussion of Hering’s and Hofmann’s positions in manuscript D 13 III/201a f. to which I shall return later in this chapter.
- 68.
Hua III/1, pp. 348–352/(Husserl 1983, pp. 363–366).
- 69.
Hua XVI, pp. 297–336/(Husserl 1997, pp. 257–288).
- 70.
Hua III/1, p. 181/(Husserl 1983, pp. 192–193).
- 71.
- 72.
- 73.
- 74.
- 75.
Hua XVI, pp. 72f./(Husserl 1997, pp. 60f.).
- 76.
“These contents of sensation, e.g., the sensations of color which present the appearing coloration, have in themselves an extension and are fragmented along with the fragmentation of the total appearance. The color-data are not dispersed and without connection; they have a rigorous unity and a rigorous form, the form of pre-phenomenal spatiality. The same applies to all sense-data which pertain to properly space-filling qualities as presentational contents.” Hua XVI, p. 69/(Husserl 1997, p. 57).
- 77.
Many notes of Husserl’s are reported and commented on in Costa (1996, pp. 181–185).
- 78.
“Insofar as two dimensions are represented, the third dimension is also co-represented” And further: “Accordingly, a pure representation of surface is just as impossible as a pure representation of lines or points, and as impossible as a representation of quality without space. Every visual content necessarily already includes the third dimension. And this is just as inherent to its nature as the fact that it is represented in a quality of colors.” (Stumpf 1873, p. 182).
- 79.
“The great task here would be to penetrate as deeply as possible into the phenomenological “creation” of three-dimensional spatiality, i.e., into the phenomenological constitution of the identical corporeal thing in the manifold of its appearances” Hua XVI, p. 154/(Husserl 1997, p. 131).
- 80.
E.g. Hua XVI, p. 78/(Husserl 1997, p. 65).
- 81.
E.g. Hua IV, p. 22/(Husserl 1989, p. 24).
- 82.
The dissertation will then be published in 1913 in the Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie (Hofmann 1913). See also, Schuhmann (1977, p. 123). Husserl comments on this text can be found in manuscripts D 13 III/196a-243b; D 13 III/244a, 246b. Husserl’s interest in Hering’s theory of vision is aroused by his reading of Hofmann. Comments on this theory can be found in manuscript D 13 III/200b-226a; D 13 III/259f.
- 83.
Even resorting to Hering’s (1879, 1920) concept of visual thing, Hofmann explicitly distances himself from the latter’s position. As Mattens (2006) points out, this difference is related to the general frame work of the two researches. Hering’s distinction of visual thing [Sehding] and real thing [wirkliches Ding] belongs to a psycho-physiological theory of vision. Hofmann’s account of the visual sensible-thing, instead, is assumed within a phenomenological theory of the constitution of the sensible thing.
- 84.
“The relationship of the visual thing to the respective “thing-appearances” is thus not necessarily the relationship of the whole to its parts. The “thing-appearances” are not simple pieces of the visual thing. Rather, we have to quasi create the visual thing through a specific process of choice and synthesis, out of the manifold of the continuously merging “thing-appearances”.” (Hofmann 1913, p. 85).
- 85.
Hua XIX/2, pp. 566–570/(Husserl 2001c, pp. 206–209).
- 86.
Hua XVI, pp. 85–105/(Husserl 1997, pp. 73–88).
- 87.
Regarding attention, Hofmann explicitly refers to Husserl 1904/05 course. Cf. Hua XXXVIII, pp. 68–122.
- 88.
“Wir können den Begriff des Phantoms bilden, von dem alle Kausalität ferngehalten ist, das Sehding, das rein sich in der sinnlichen Mannigfaltigkeit konstituiert als das räumliche; das reine ausgedehnte Ding: das aber kein wahres Ding ist, weil es keine Natur hat, keine Verflechtung in eine Welt der Kausalität.” D 13 II/166 b.
- 89.
We shall emphasize that this positive definition is also an abstracting one. In our full-blown experience, we do not perceive phantoms but things, and phantoms are only a layer thereof. Husserl nonetheless occasionally refers to some examples of phantom perception, such as the rainbow, the blue sky, stars, planets, the sun, and the moon. See, for instance, Hua IV, pp. 36–37/(Husserl 1989, pp. 39–40), and manuscript D 13 III/202 a-220 b. The moon was also taken up by Hering (1879, pp. 343f.) in order to exemplify the notion of Sehding. Regarding this topic, see also Sokolowski (1974, pp. 95f.). Even if the reference to something immaterial seems intuitively implied by the previous examples, we shall observe that, if we define materiality in relation to the causal laws, then all the previous examples can also be conceived as “material”. The rainbow, for instance, is an optical effect connected to the physical phenomenon of water leakage and of the refraction of sunlight on water drops. Moreover, these phenomena also lend themselves to be conceived in the light of an intuitive kind of causality, related to habits, so that we can expect to see the rainbow if the sun shines immediately after a storm. Thus, I believe that the appropriate definition of phantom shall be an abstracting one, related to the stratifications in the concrete thing. Consistently, I agree with Pradelle (2000, pp. 143–144), regarding the impossibility of conceiving the phantom as a concrete correlate of perception. For Drummond (1983), instead, the rainbow would be a good example of perceived phantom.
- 90.
“Diese Beschreibung [Hofmann’s M.S.] ist nicht klar. “Was sich von der Kugel sinnlich darbietet” was heißt da sinnlich? Ferner, was sich darbietet, könnte man sagen, ist die Seite der Kugel, so wie und soweit sie eben “in die Erscheinung fällt”. Das ist die “Kugelschale” in der und der Entfernung von mir. Diese erscheinende Seite ist z.B. dieselbe, ob ich die Augen ruhen habe oder die Augen bewege. Ferner, sie braucht nicht richtige “Erscheinung” zu sein. Vielleicht liegt eine Illusion vor, wie beim Mondbeispiel. Jedenfalls sehe ich das und das, und zwar eine so und so gefärbte Dingoberfläche. Das wäre im richtigen Sinn das Sehding zu nennen, so wie es im Grunde auch Hering beschrieben hat. Unabhängig von der Frage, inwieweit ihm das wirkliche Ding entspricht, d.h. hier, inwieweit das Ding, das als diese Seite habende “perzipiert” wird, überhaupt existiert. Diesem Sehding als erscheinende Dingseite, gesehen in dem einen Sinn, ist gegenüberzustellen die Mannigfaltigkeit von “Erscheinungen”, in denen es erscheint: die in anderem Sinn gesehen werden. Jede Bewegung des Auges endet mit einem anderen, direktes Sehen, indirektes Sehen. Jeder Phase entspricht eine “Erscheinung”.” D 13 III/214a-b.
- 91.
“[…] das pure Phantom ist das Sehding und Tastding, der Komplex ursprünglich extensionaler Eigenschaften vor der Materialität.” (D 13 III/133a). We find a similar claim in Thing and Space: “They [the determinations that pertain to the body of the thing (phantom) and those that pertain to its filling matter] form either a unique, self-coherent unity or many such unities. And they are articulated into the appearing visual side and the appearing tactile side. […]. What is important is that the side is a filled extension, specifically an extension of a surface, which delimits the three-dimensionally filled body.” Hua XVI, p. 78/(Husserl 1997, p. 65). Translation modified.
- 92.
As I have argued in the first section, on the basis of this distinction, which is not a separation, a new reading of Kant’s second argument in the Metaphysical Deduction can be proposed. On the basis of this reading, Husserl’s and Kant’s position as to the intuitiveness of space do not seem to be so far from each other, even if Husserl would not reduce space to the form of our outer sense, and rather considers it noematically as the form of the appearing things.
- 93.
“Man nennt auch Ausdehnungsmerkmale, die räumlichen (Gestaltmerkmale), die untrennbar sind von den qualitativen, sinnlich wahrgenommen: sie sind “aistheta koina”, sie werden von” mehreren Sinnen “zugleich wahrgenommen.”(D 13 II/166 b).
- 94.
“Das gibt also auch verschiedene Begriffe von Erscheinung: (1) das wirkliche Ding im Sinn der normalen Wahrnehmungsauffassung, das farbige, glänzende Ding etc.; in ihm “erscheint” das wirkliche Ding im Sinn der Wissenschaft. (2) Das Sehding […] als “Erscheinung” des normalen Wahrnehmungsdinges, des Dinges der normalen, richtigen Wahrnehmung. (3) Das Sehdingrelief als “Erscheinung” des Sehdinges (Sehding im zweiten Sinn, entsprechend zweiter Begriff von Sehraum). (4) Die immanente Abschattung (aus der Mannigfaltigkeit, die zum Sehdingrelief gehört) als Erscheinung des Sehding-Reliefs.” D 13 III/223 b.
- 95.
Hua XVI, p. 90/(Husserl 1997, p. 77).
- 96.
Hua XVI, p. 64/(Husserl 1997, pp. 53–54).
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Summa, M. (2014). The Thing of the Transcendental Aesthetic: Spatial and Temporal Constitution. In: Spatio-temporal Intertwining. Phaenomenologica, vol 213. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06236-5_5
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